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GIAMPIERO BRUNELLI



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Vienna, Monumento equestre al Principe Eugenio di Savoia, particolare.
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The first dragoon companies of the Habsburg Empire

The organization, recruitment, arming and first muster of
during the Long Turkish War (1591–1606)

by ZOLTÁN PÉTER BAGI

ABSTRACT. During the 16th century, the appearance and spread of firearms also resulted in serious changes within the cavalry. Those cavalry units appeared that did not want to route the enemy with an overwhelming cavalry charge, but with a combination of movement and firepower. These were the so-called Reiters, harquebusiers and carabiniers. In addition, in the second half of the 16th century, mounted infantrymen, i.e. dragoons, appeared on the Italian theatre of war. The mercenaries of these units approached the battlefield on horseback and then fought on foot. The first dragoon companies of the Habsburg Empire were organized in 1602. In this study, I will follow this process.

KEYWORDS: DRAGOON, HARQUEBUSIER, CARABINIER, LODOVICO MELZO, GIORGIO BASTA, JOHANN JACOBI VON WALLHAUSEN, LAURENTIO DE RAMÉE, CHARLES DE AGENTA, GUILLIOM DE WAUX, MERCURE DE MARILLOFF, LONG TURKISH WAR

On December 29, 1602, the Aulic War Council in Vienna issued a Bestallung—a letter of commission—to four captains: Laurentio de Ramée,¹ Charles de Agenta, Guilliom de Waux, and Mercure de Mariloff, entrusting each of them with the task of forming a dragoon company of one hundred men.² This type of cavalry first appeared in the armed forces of the Habsburg

1 About the career of Laurentio de Ramée: Franz Kurz, *Der Einfall des von Kaiser Rudolf II. in Passau angeworbenen Kriegsvolkes in Oberösterreich und Böhmen (1610–1611)*. Aus dessen Nachlaß mitgeteilt und mit einer Einleitung versehen von Albin Czerny. Linz: Ver[lag] d[es] Vereines Museum Francisco-Carolinum, 1897, passim.

2 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA) Kriegsarchiv (KA) Bestellungen (Best.) 727/1602. I should mention that Alphons von Wrede, and Walter Hummelberger and Thomas Barker, who based their work on him, believed that this type of cavalry first appeared in the service

Empire at that time and served the interests of the Habsburg rulers until the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, with its members shedding their blood on battlefields and in combat. As the title suggests, my work examines the history of the first dragoon regiments that served in the Habsburg Empire, focusing primarily on issues related to their organization, recruitment, and equipment. I would like to touch only as much as necessary on the engagements and battles in which they participated. First and foremost, however, it is worth briefly summarizing how contemporaries defined the dragoons' place within the army and for which tasks they considered best suited.

Dragoon, harquebusier, or carabinier?

In his 1991 study, József Kelenik noted that the sources and data from the late 16th and early 17th centuries regarding the formation of dragoon units are highly contradictory.³ If we review the works of military theorists of the era, as well as the surviving archival documents, we cannot refute the accuracy of this observation. In fact, each of the horsemen mentioned in the title could, in principle, represent a distinct type of cavalry. Consider, for instance, the harquebusiers or *Archibusiers*, whose units and banners had served the Habsburg Monarchy in various fortresses along the Hungarian border as early as the mid-16th century.⁴

A review of military treatises from the early 17th century—the period closest to the Long Turkish War—reveals that even contemporaries could not clearly distinguish between these types of units. Lodovico Melzo in his work published

of the Habsburg Empire in 1623. However, this statement is incorrect. Alphons von Wrede, *Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht*. Band 3. Wien: Seidel & Sohn, 1901, 8.; Walter Hummelberger, „Der dreissigjährige Krieg und die Entstehung des kaiserlichen Heeres,” In: Herbert Furlinger ed. *Unser Heer. 300 Jahre österreichisches Soldatentums in Krieg und Fried.* Wien–München–Zürich: Verlag Furlinger, 1963, 27.; Thomas M. Barker, *Doppeladler und Halbmond. Entscheidungsjahr 1683*. Graz–Wien–Köln: , Verlag Styria, 1982, 173.

3 Max Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaft vornemlich in Deutschland*, Zweite Abteilung. München und Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von R. Oldenburg, 1890, 1049–1056.; József Kelenik, “A kézi löfegyverek jelentősége a Hadügyi Forradalom kibontakozásában. A magyar egységek fegyverzete a tizenöt éves háború időszakában,” *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 104, no. 4 (1991), 113.; Luca Domizio, „The Italian contribution to the Transformations of Cavalry, XVI–XVII centuries,” In Jeremy Black ed. *Cavalry Warfare, From Ancient Times to Today*. Roma: Nadir Media, 2024, 196–198.

4 About the harquebusier.; Kelenik, “A kézi löfegyverek jelentősége a Hadügyi Forradalom kibontakozásában,” 100–106.

in Italian in 1611, and then in German in 1625, we read that the service of the musketeers on horseback was spreaded by the French military leadership on the battlefields of Piedmontese (the last Franco-Spanish) war, which ended with the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. They were called dragoons, a name that stuck. Recognizing the usefulness of these mercenaries on the battlefield, units of this type were also begun by the Spanish army to recruit and deploy. According to Melzo, when the Duke of Alba, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo y Pimentel had been appointed by King Philip II of Spain (1556–1598), as governor of the province in the summer of 1567 to pacify rebellious Flanders, the Spanish commander, who was also fighting on the Piedmontese front, several companies of dragoons was recruited and took with him to Northern Europe.

Melzo also explained and illustrated with numerous examples how and where these horsemen, armed with wheellock rifles and possibly unarmored, could be most effectively deployed. In the case of defense, he considered dragoons to be most suitable for quarters, camps, strategically important crossings, and for escorting wagons carrying baggage and supplies, as they could quickly deploy their horsemen in the most dangerous places and, dismounting, take up a suitable position to prevent an enemy attack.

According to Melzo, their rapid movement and great firepower could also be used in an attack. Dragoons were sent out to attack the enemy from all sides, to harass him, or to lure him into a trap. Soldiers who only wore breastplates and backplates, or, as Melzo recommended, even not at all, therefore needed to be supported in battle by the lance-armed horsemen or cuirassiers.⁵

The next work I should mention regarding dragoons from the early 17th century is Giorgio Basta's book *Il governo della cavalleria leggiera*, published in Italian in Venice in 1612 and in German in Oppenheim two years later. Unlike Melzo, the Albanian-born Italian general, who was well-versed in Hungarian and Transylvanian conditions and knew of the existence of dragoon companies created at the end of December 1602,⁶ did not use the term dragoon, but instead

5 Ludovico Melzo, *KriegsRegeln von der Reutereij*. Jena, 1625, 31–33.; Hermann Meynert, *Geschichte des Kriegswesens und der Heerverfassungen in Europa*, Band 2. Wien: Beck'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1868, 301.; Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaft vornemlich in Deutschland*, 1050.; Domizio, „The Italian contribution to the Transformations of Cavalry, XVI-XVII centuries,” 196–197.

6 The Aulic War Council ordered Basta on October 20, 1604, to report on the condition of

used the term *harquebusier* or *carabinier*. Although I should also note that, similarly to what I read in Melzo's work, Basta also wrote that this cavalry, equipped with a wheellock rifle and lightly armed (if possible without armor), was first created and used in the Piedmontese theater of the Franco-Spanish War in order to drive enemy cavalry from the battlefield and the surrounding villages, and to dismount and take up positions in order to secure places of strategic importance. Accordingly, the *carabiniers* were mainly used as infantry.⁷ The Italian general and military scientist described the equipment and possible uses of the *carabinieri* cavalry in the same way as Melzo did in the case of the dragoons, but he did not use the word itself.

In Melzo's work, the words *dragoon* and *harquebusier* appeared as synonyms. Basta, on the other hand, endowed the *carabinier* with weapons, equipment and tactical characteristics that were strikingly similar to those formulated by Melzo. In contrast, Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen, who was the head of Europe's first military academy, the *Kriegsschule* founded in Siegen by Count John VII the Middle of Nassau-Siegen from the spring of 1617, distinguished between these types of cavalry in his book *Kriegskunst zu Pferd*, published in 1616. He discussed the *harquebusiers*, i.e. *Archibusers* or *carabiniers*, and the dragoons in a separate chapter. The author explained this by saying that various rapid attacks and raids often required the use of infantry companies in addition to cavalry. Therefore, these foot soldiers must be mounted on horses, on the worst possible mounts, and equipped for this type of fighting. So the dragoon is only mounted

the dragoon and cuirassier companies stationed in Esztergom. The war councilors wanted to transfer these units to Upper Hungary to help Giovanni Giacomo Barbiano di Belgiojoso. However, this did not happen, as the four companies were still stationed in Esztergom at the beginning of November 1604. According to the same letter written by Archduke Matthias on June 26, 1605, he was also eagerly awaiting the arrival of dragoons in his camp, as he had hardly any combat-ready mercenaries left with which to fight against István Bocskai's advancing troops. ÖStA KA Hofkriegsrat (HKR) Protokollum (Pr.) Registratur (Reg.) Band (Bd.) 212. fol. 447r. No. 96. October 20, 1604.; Endre Veress, *Basta György hadvezér levelezése és iratai (1597–1607). I. kötet: 1597–1602*, Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1913, 507., 647., 670., 689–690.

7 Giorgio Basta, *Governo della Cavalleria, Das ist/ Bericht Von Anführung der leichten Pferde: dabey auch was die schweren belanget/ so viel den Capitänen zuwissen vonnöthen / begriffen*. Frankfurt: Iohann Theodor de Bry, 1614, 19–20.; Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaft vornemlich in Deutschland*, 1054.; Virgilio Ilari, „Il Governo della Cavalleria Leggera.” Domizio, „The Italian contribution to the Transformations of Cavalry, XVI-XVII centuries,” 196.



infantry, which does not actually fight on horseback. According to Wallhausen's description, they first had to dismount, and in a group, each person threw their bridle around the neck of the horse next to them. The mounts, thus „tied together”, could not escape, and a separate person hadn't to be let to guard them.

Moreover, unlike Melzo and Basta, Wallhausen believed that dragoons should be formed not only and exclusively from riflemen. According to him, each company should be formed half from riflemen and half from pikemen. The famous military scientist also implied that in their case they were only infantry mounted on horseback, since he recommended a similar division of arms for infantry.⁸ However, it should be noted that although Walhausen considered dragoons to be infantry mounted on horseback, the chapter on them appeared in his work *Kriegskunst zu Pferd* and not in his volume on infantry (*Kriegskunst zu Fuß*).⁹

Reviewing the surviving archival sources regarding the four companies, we can assume that, like Melzo and probably Basta, the councilors and secretaries of the Aulic War Council and the Court Chamber used the words dragoon, harquebusier and carabinier as synonyms. As I have already mentioned, the term dragoon cavalry was clearly used in the recruitment document dated December 29, 1602.¹⁰ In the following period, until the summer of 1605, only this word can be found in the entries in the protocol books of both the Aulic War Council and the Court Chamber. However, on June 10, 1605, the Aulic War Council issued a new *Bestallung* for Ramée, in which we can read that he was entrusted with the issue of 500 harquebusiers, i.e. *Archibusiers*. According to the document, the Walloon-born general was to organize the unit in such a way that he would recruit a fifth company in addition to the four companies that already existed. However, the issuer of the *Bestallung* did not call the existing units dragoons, but rather harquebusiers.¹¹ This is not surprising, since the report on the last muster

8 Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen, *Kriegskunst zu Fuß*. Oppenheim: Iohann Theodor de Bry, 1615, 80–82.; Kelenik, “A kézi löfegyverek jelentősége a Hadügyi Forradalom kibontakozásában,” 85.

9 Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen, *Kriegskunst zu Pferd*. Frankfurt: Iohann Theodor de Bry, 1616, 35–41.; Meynert, *Geschichte des Kriegswesens*, 302.; Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaft vornemlich in Deutschland*, 1056.

10 Erre lásd még: ÖStA Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv (FHKA) Alte Hoffinanz (AHF) Pr. Expedit (Exp.) Buch (B.) No. 557. fol. 13v–14r. December 23, 1602.

11 ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605; Eugen Heischmann, *Die Anfänge des stehenden Heeres in Österreich*. Wien: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1925, 258.

of the four companies on April 20, 1605, directly states: „*ain Compagnia Traganischer Archibuser Reutter*”, i.e. a company of dragoon mounted riflemen.¹² So the two names were used in the same text.

To further increase the confusion in the use of the terms, I must mention that Ramée's cavalry, in addition to the names dragoon and horse rifleman, is also mentioned by our sources several times under a third name, *carabinier* (*Carpi-ner*). For the first time, we can read the word in the muster report of Sixtus Meillen dated November 18, 1604, in the following form: „*mitt den vier Tragonischen Compagnien Carabiener Reutter*,” i.e. with a dragoon company of *carabinier*.¹³ The term remained in use later on. On July 20, 1605, the Aulic War Council commissioned Gilberto de Santhilier¹⁴ to mediate between Ramée and his dragoons (!).¹⁵ Six days later, in the protocol book of the same government body, the cavalry of the same four companies was again mentioned as *carabinier*.¹⁶ In the same way, a document sent to the Court Chamber on August 26, 1605, called the newly recruited cavalymen of a company *carabinier*.¹⁷ However, the word dragoon still appears in the protocol entries after this, the last time on June 13, 1606.¹⁸ All this means that for both the Aulic War Council and the officials of the Court Chamber – contrary to Wallhausen – the term dragoon meant both a *carabinier* and a *harquebusier*. Although in the case of the latter, I must note that in this late stage of the Long Turkish War this term was also used in the earlier sense, i.e. to designate cavalymen equipped with *harquebuses*/*carbines*. Based on all this, we can also rightly assume that for Basta the terms *carabinier* and *dragoon* meant the same type of troop, but we cannot state this with all certainty.

With the help of the two *Bestallung* available, it is worth revisiting Wallhausen's claim that the dragoons were merely mounted infantry, who were „mounted” only for the purpose of rapid movement, but who participated in the battle on foot. In both the 1602 and 1605 recruitment documents, we can read that

12 ÖStA KA Hofkriegsrat Akten (HKRA) Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.

13 ÖStA KA HKRA Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.

14 About the career of Gilberto de Santhilier: Zoltán Péter Bagi, „Gilbert de Santhilier katonai szolgálata a tizenöt éves háborúban.” *Aetas* 34, no. 1 (2019), 69–79.

15 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 214. fol. 457v. No. 152. July 20, 1605.

16 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 214. fol. 460r. No. 201. July 26, 1605.

17 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 579. fol. 249r. August 26, 1605.

18 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Reg. B. No. 591. fol. 242r. June 13, 1606.

this cavalry was obliged, without contradiction or new agreement, to serve the ruler in full force, in whole or half companies, on horseback or on foot as necessary, on the battlefield or in a fortress, wherever necessary. In addition, the *Bestallungs* also stipulated that those recruited should take an oath on the *Artikelbrief* prepared for the cavalry.¹⁹ All this means that – albeit with certain restrictions – the members of the Aulic War Council clearly treated the mercenaries recruited into the dragoons as cavalry.

The names of the dragoon officers

Today, all the armies of the world, whether conscripted or volunteer-based, are well-structured, comparable to a pyramid, based on a subordinate-superior relationship. Those in each rank know and are familiar with their tasks and powers. However, this was not typical of the military organization of the late 16th and early 17th centuries, in which a person experienced in warfare was given tasks, powers and mandates for a specific period of time. This is also why it may happen that a word or expression has an adequate equivalent in today's Hungarian language, but its meaning at the time was completely different from what we understand by it today.

First of all, I must deal with the word captain, since four persons holding such a position were commissioned by the Aulic War Council to field 400 dragoons at the very end of 1602. In the case of the Walloon, French and Lorraine mercenaries recruited during the Long Turkish War, the soldiers were organized into companies (*Compagnie*)²⁰ or cornets (*squadrigelie oder cornette*),²¹ each of which was headed by a captain (*Capitan*).²² This title was also known and used in the Hungarian language in the 16th century. The word comes from the Latin *caput*, which means head, namely the head of something, in Hungarian the prince. It is important at that time captain word was still used alternated with the Hungarian *hadnagy* and Latin *dux* or *ducator*. The last ones had the same meaning as the captain: commander of the army.²³

19 ÖStA KA Best. 727/1602; ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605

20 ÖStA KA Best. 515/1596

21 ÖStA KA Best. 516/1596

22 ÖStA KA Alte Feldakten (AFA) 1600-11-1

23 Gábor Sztálóczi, *Vár a várban, A várak népe és a mezei hadak a 16. század közepén, I. A*

In addition to the word captain, however, the term *Hauptmann* also appeared in documents related to the dragoons.²⁴ This word had a very comprehensive meaning in the era. The duties of the holder of the position extended not only to military but also to other administrative matters.²⁵ Accordingly, in the case of both infantry and some cavalry troops, the title was used in the sense of „head-man”, „leader of the small banner, i.e. the *Fähnlein*”, and “commander”. The word was therefore used as a synonym for captain in contemporary documents. No distinction was made between the two, just as at that time there was no distinction between cavalry *Fähnleins* and companies or *cornets*.

However, a third term also appears in our sources, *Rittmeister*.²⁶ The word's current meaning in Hungarian is cavalry captain or cavalry centurion, and as a military rank it was known in the *Wehrmacht* in armored and cavalry units until 1945. At the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, the word also denoted a position, not a military rank. This term was used in the era similarly to captain and *Hauptmann*. It differed from the other two only in that the position of *Rittmeister*, and in later centuries the military rank, was used only in the case of cavalry, while captain and *Hauptmann* were also used in the case of infantry. It can therefore be stated that the Aulic War Council used the names of the three positions as synonyms for each other, just as it did for dragoon, harquebusier and carabinier.

The Aulic War Council appointed Ramée *Obrist* on June 10, 1605. This word is translated as *ezredes* (colonel) in Hungarian, but nowadays it means a military rank that does not correspond to the duties of the 16th century officer. The original meaning of the term itself suggests that he is the highest, the highest-ranking person, since it is the superlative form of the German adjective *ober*, meaning ‘upper’. We should not be surprised that, accordingly, the German word *Obrist* had a very comprehensive meaning, and the holder of the position had a much more diverse range of rights and duties in the era than today's colonels. The

várak népe. Szeged: Missiles Kiadó, 2016, 6–7.

24 ÖStA KA Best. 727/1602; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 20v–21r. January 3, 1603.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 579. fol. 249r. August 29, 1605.

25 Zoltán Péter Bagi, *A császári-királyi mezei hadsereg a tizenöt éves háborúban. Hadszervezet, érdekérvényesítés, reformkísérletek*. Budapest: Históriaantik Könyvesház, 2011, 145–147.

26 ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 555. fol. 392r–v. August 13, 1603.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 579. fol. 210r. July 26, 1605.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 579. fol. 249r. August 29, 1605.

person entrusted with the display of the army played a patriarchal role towards his recruits, as part of which, in the case of the infantry, all persons appointed to the position held the supreme legislative power within the unit.²⁷ According to German literature, at the very beginning of the organization of the given unit, he made his own men the officers who carried out the recruitment. It is also important to note that the *Obrist* of each time was also the *Hauptmann*, Captain or *Rittmeister* of the first *Fähnlein* or company.²⁸ As was the case with Ramée.²⁹

Ramée is mentioned in our sources as *Obristleutnant* before his commission in 1605. The first mention of the position in relation to him can be found in a protocol entry of the Aulic War Council of 18 January 1604, but he held this position in addition to his *Rittmeistership* of his company from February 1603, for which he received an additional salary of 80 crowns, i.e. 120 Rhenish gulden.³⁰ We also have information that in August 1603 he requested the payment of two months' salary for all four companies from the Court Chamber in Prague.³¹ According to his duties, the *Obristleutnant* of the time had to serve as a vice to the *Obrist*, and in the event that his superior was not present with his unit – which often happened – he had to take over its full command and organization of its daily life. Accordingly, in Ramée's *Bestallung* as an *Obrist*, we find a vice who was also the captain or *Rittmeister* of one of the companies.³²

However, all this raises an interesting problem. For if Ramée was demonstrably an *Obristleutnant* from mid-January 1604, then someone as *Obrist* had to be his superior. Who were the dragoon companies under? In my opinion, the four companies were directly subordinate to the *Obrist-Feldmarschall*,³³ who commanded the entire cavalry, during their entire service. If the military situation or other matters required it, the dragoons were temporarily assigned to a designated officer. Eugen Heischmann had already drawn attention to the fact in his work

27 Heischmann, *Die Anfänge des stehenden Heeres*, 37–38.; Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force. A Study in European Economic and Social History*. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1964, 41., 55–57.

28 ÖStA KA Best. 403/1589; Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser*, 55.


29 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 579. fol. 249r. August 26, 1605.

30 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 212 fol. 385r. No. 87. January 18, 1604.; ÖStA KA HKRA Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.

31 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 555. fol. 392r–v. August 13, 1603.

32 ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605; Bagi, *A császári-királyi mezei hadsereg*, 145.

33 Bagi, *A császári-királyi mezei hadsereg*, 65.



published in 1925 that in January 1603 the four captains were temporarily placed under the command of Philippe-Otto zu Salm Wild- und Rheingraf *Obrist*, who led the six cuirassier companies.³⁴ Although he did not support his claim with a source, what he described does indeed reflect reality. The first evidence that the Rheingraf cavalry and the dragoon units were treated together is a protocol entry dated 11 January 1603. The Aulic War Council then requested an order from the Court Chamber for Hungarian commissioners to lead the aforementioned cavalry to the muster place.³⁵ At the end of the month, on 25 January 1603, Rheingraf himself reported to the war counselors that the four companies were together, but without muster, and thus without pay, they were robbing the inhabitants of the area.³⁶ It is characteristic of the seriousness of the situation that Rheingraf wrote again to the Aulic War Council on this matter on 1 February, reporting on the rebellion of the unpaid dragoons.³⁷

Rheingraf was replaced in command of the dragoons by Seifried von Kollonich in mid-February 1603. On the 13th of that month, the Aulic War Council instructed him to take care of the mustering of the four companies.³⁸ The decision did not fall on Kollonich by chance. In its order dated January 22, 1603, the he was appointed by Aulic War Council to command the Christian army that had wintered in Lower Hungary in the absence of the *Obrist-Feldmarschall*, i.e. Hermann Christoph von Russworm.³⁹

However, I must note that not only the dragoons, but also Rheingraf's cuirassiers came under Kollonich's command. This meant that both types of cavalry had to leave their stationing area in Upper Hungary and march to Transdanubia, to be precise, to Vas County. Kollonich was in charge of the defense here as a border *Obrist* after the loss of Kanizsa. On April 18, 1603, Rheingraf was ordered by the Aulic War Council to accept Kollonich's command and orders together

34 Heischmann, *Die Anfänge des stehenden Heeres*, 255.; Péter Sahin-Tóth, „Lotaringia és a tizenöt éves háború.” *Századok* 138, no. 5 (2004), 1176.

35 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 553. fol. 64v. January 11, 1603.

36 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Exp. Bd. 210 fol. 628r–v. January 25, 1603.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 45r–46r. January 31, 1603.

37 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Exp. Bd. 210 fol. 639r. February 1, 1603.

38 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 209 fol. 193r. No. 52. February 13, 1603.; ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 209. fol. 193r. No. 56. February 13, 1603.

39 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 209. fol. 134r. No. 113. January 22, 1603.; ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 209. fol. 390r. No. 107. January 22, 1603.

with the captains under him.⁴⁰ Kollonich raided the Kanizsa and Babócsa regions with the troops entrusted to him in March 1603, and then in June they recaptured Lak and Bolondvár.⁴¹ The dragoons took part in these battles, as they received food from the food officer in Körmend in the amount of 15 Rhenish gulden and 15 kreuzers.⁴² However, it is certain that by the end of the summer of 1603 the four companies had already been removed from Kollonich's command⁴³ and were again directly subordinated to the *Obrist-Feldmarschall*, Hermann Christoph von Russworm, who commanded the entire cavalry. On August 10, 1603, he wrote to the Aulic War Council regarding their payment.⁴⁴ Then, from the Esztergom camp, on August 30 and September 5, he again urged the war councilors to pay part of their allowance.⁴⁵ From there, their journey led to the Pest region, where they took part in the autumn clashes. In the only significant battle of the campaign, on September 29, 1603, the four banners of Walloon horse riflemen mentioned by Hieronymus Ortelius in the first line were actually the four dragoon companies. The cavalry encountered the enemy at noon, whom Ferenc Nádasdi attacked with his Hungarian cavalry. The Hungarian nobleman's army was also caught up with the armies of Kollonich and Heinrich Matthias von Thurn. Then Russworm arrived with the main army.⁴⁶ According to Endre Veress, twenty-two of the Walloons fell during this time. Fifteen of the corpses were mutilated by the enemy, their ears and noses cut off.⁴⁷ The events were also recorded by François de Bassompierre in his *Journal de ma vie*. This also reveals that the four companies of „harquebusiers of Liège” were sent by Russworm himself to help the

40 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 209. fol. 398r. No. 65. April 18, 1603.

41 Hieronymus Ortelius, *Ausführliche Beschreibung der Ungarischen und Siebenbürgischen Kriegs-Händel von Anno 1395 biß an das 1665 Jahr*. Nürnberg: Paul Fürsten Kunst- und Buchhändler, 1665, 333.; Sahin-Tóth, „Lotaringia és a tizenöt éves háború,” 1176.

42 ÖStA KA HKRA Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.

43 On July 31, 1603, Leonhard von Harrach received instructions from Archduke Matthias to send Rheingraf's cavalry and dragoons from Óvár to Banská Bystrica. ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr Exp. B. No. 553. fol. 587r. July 31, 1603.

44 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 202v–203r. August 10, 1603.

45 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 223v–224r. August 30, 1603.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 231v. September 5, 1603.

46 Istvánffy Miklós *Magyarok dolgainról írt históriája Tállyai Pál XVII. századi fordításában*. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2009, 415.

47 Ortelius, *Ausführliche Beschreibung*, 343–344.; Endre Veress, „Buda és Pest 1602–1603-iki ostroma.” *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 11, (1910), 401.

Hungarians in trouble. The dragoons fought very well, as they stopped the enemy pursuing the fleeing Hungarian cavalry, killing forty of them. Then Kollonich and Thurn arrived with their cavalry. After repelling the counterattack of the Ottoman cavalry, Russworm formed the main Christian army and set off in pursuit of the enemy. However, in the renewed battle, the Walloons got into trouble. This time, the dragoons were saved by a counterattack, which prevented the formation from breaking up.⁴⁸ It is likely that the losses mentioned by Veress were also suffered by Ramée's mercenaries at this time. In this connection, it is worth noting that according to the report compiled by Meillen in April 1605, a total of 27 cavalymen had been missing from the companies since the muster the year before, but of these, Pierre Dufort de Sanct Julien, who had been captured in the clash at Adony on 29 September, had already been freed. The other 26 people probably died later in the aforementioned battle or from wounds received there.⁴⁹

After the 1603 campaign, until August 1604, we have no information that the *Obrist-Feldmarschall* had placed the dragoons under the subordination of anyone. However, on the first day of this month, the Aulic War Council instructed Ramée *Rittmeister* (!) to accept his orders and instructions as long as Georg Andreas von Hofkirchen *Obrist* was in Pest.⁵⁰ So, like Rheingrafé and Kollonich, this can also be considered a temporary assignment or subordination, although we do not know exactly how long it lasted. However, we can be sure that until Ramée was appointed as *Obrist*, the dragoons were again placed under the direct command of the *Obrist-Feldmarschall*, or in his absence, under the person appointed in his place, *Obrist* of Érsekújvár and one of the captain-generals⁵¹ of Hungarian Kingdom, Kollonich.

In the meantime, there was also a change among the captains. After the death of De Mariloff in October 1604, his company was taken over and managed by Martin de Tregne.⁵²

48 François de Bassompierre, *Journal de ma vie*. Vol. 1. Paris: Librairie de la Société de l'Histoire de France, 1870. 109–117.

49 ÖStA KA HKRA Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.

50 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 212. fol. 430v. No. 7. August 1, 1604.; Sahin-Tóth, „Lotaringia és a tizenöt éves háború,” 1177.

51 Géza Pálffy, „Kerületi és végvidéki főkapitányok és főkapitány-helyettesek Magyarországon a 16–17. században.” *Történelmi Szemle* 39, no. 2 (1997), 271.

52 ÖStA KA HKRA Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.

Documents of commission dragoon companies and their content

If a ruler or an imperial district or province wanted to raise an infantry or cavalry army, they commissioned a person to recruit, equip and lead the soldiers into battle. The ruler gave his military entrepreneur a letter/document of commission, called *Bestallung*, in which he specified the number of troops to be raised, their armament, equipment, the time and manner of service, as well as the monthly salary for the period of the assignment, and he also tried to prevent any financial abuse in advance. The documents issued by the Aulic War Council in Vienna to the four Walloon captains on 29 December 1602 and to Ramée on 10 June 1605 were, in terms of their type, so-called “short *Bestallung*” or, as contemporaries called them, *Bestallungsbriefts*,⁵³ which were also received by those appointed to lead the *Fähnleins* or companies of harquebusiers, cuirassiers and horseguard (*Hoffahne* and *Rehnfahne*) recruited and employed during the Long Turkish War.⁵⁴ In contrast to the so-called *Reiterbestallung* compiled for the German cavalry, which was a collection of painfully detailed provisions for maintaining discipline, the documents issued to the other cavalry divisions contain only a single-sentence reference to the fact that both the military entrepreneur and his subordinates must maintain order and discipline based on the provisions of the cavalry article letter (*Reiter Artikelsbrief*).⁵⁵

In the *Bestallungsbrief*, the members of the Aulic War Council described in great detail how recruits should be armed and equipped. Accordingly, according to the document dated December 29, 1602, captains were to provide each of their mercenaries with a good horse, a sword (sidearm), a long rifle with a wheellock on a shoulder strap, a pistol or short firearm in a belt or on the saddlebag, and everything that a good dragoon needs.⁵⁶ In contrast, the recruitment document of June 10, 1605, deals with this issue in less detail, since according to its compilers, the horsemen of the fifth company were to be provided with a long rifle and other

53 The *Bestallungsbrief* used for cavalry was largely identical in structure and elements to the similar document issued for infantry recruitment. ÖStA KA Best. 464/1593; ÖStA KA Best. 477/1594.

54 Vö. ÖStA KA Best. 516/1596; ÖStA KA Best. 531/1597; ÖStA KA Best. 557/1597; ÖStA KA Best. 589/1598; ÖStA KA Best. 587/1598; ÖStA KA Best. 611/1598; ÖStA KA Best. 711/1602; ÖStA KA Best. 731/1602.

55 ÖStA KA Best. 727/1602; ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605.

56 ÖStA KA Best. 727/1602; Kelenik, “A kézi löfegyverek jelentősége a Hadügyi Forradalom kibontakozásában,” 114.

equipment necessary for this cavalry.⁵⁷

In the vast majority of cases, the documents of commission precisely specified the duration of service in three months. In contrast, in the *Bestallung* issued on December 29, 1602, we can only read that those recruited had to serve as long as the ruler saw fit. Until then, they were obliged to remain in the army and be available without contradiction, without a new commission agreement and without an increase in their salary.⁵⁸ Of course, in this case, we cannot rule out that the exact period of service was omitted from the document due to the negligence or inattention of the scribe. In the recruitment document issued on June 10, 1605, the passage about the three-month service can be found again. Of course, it was supplemented by the fact that they were obliged to remain in the army and be available after this period had expired, if necessary.⁵⁹

Another important element of the *Bestallungsbrief* was the definition of the salary. According to both documents issued for the recruitment of dragoons, the captain of each company or cornet was entitled to 120 thalers per month, their vice (*Leutnant*) to 52 and a half, their ensign to 48, and the two trumpeters and dragoons to 12 Rhenish guldens each. In addition, the captain received an additional 120 Rhenish guldens for the so-called empty places (*Lucken*). The amount of this was determined based on the salary of ten horsemen.⁶⁰ According to the *Bestallungsbrief* of 29 December 1602, the captains could also receive additional income. The ruler and the military entrepreneur agreed that instead of the per daily allowance (*Anrittgeld*) for moving to the theatre of war and the half-monthly salary (*Abdankgeld*) upon dismissal, the captains would receive a total of 1,000 thalers or 1,250 Rhenish guldens.⁶¹

In the document of commission issued on June 10, 1605, the Aulic War Council also determined Ramée's obrisst staff and salary. Accordingly, the *Obrist* was entitled to 300, his vice (*Obristleutnant*) 120, a chaplain 16, a *Wachtmeister* responsible for the security and guarding of the dragoon camp and the organization

57 ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605.

58 ÖStA KA Best. 727/1602.

59 ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605.

60 ÖStA KA Best. 727/1602.; ÖStA KA HKRA Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.; ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605.

61 ÖStA KA Best. 727/1602.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 20v–21r. January 3, 1603.



of the unit's march 40, a *Quartiermeister* responsible for the accommodation of the cavalry 40, a provision master (*Proviantmeister*) ensuring the provision of the mercenaries 30, a surgeon (*Feldscherer*) caring for the wounded 16, two trumpeters 12 each, a provost (*Profoß*) responsible for the order of the camps 40, and his assistants an additional 20 Rhenish gulden per month.⁶²

The drafters of the recruitment documents also took care to prevent any possible financial abuse. For this reason, on the one hand, they precisely recorded in the *Bestallungsbrief* that one Rhenish gulden was worth 60 kreuzers, so that no additional profit could be made from the conversion values between the different currencies in circulation.⁶³ On the other hand, they regulated the so-called *lange Reihe* (*Gleve*), i.e. the number of men who could also be called up for military service, marching with the cavalry. They were the armed escort of the noble horseman. In the first half of the 16th century, only the name of the nobleman recruited for cavalry service had to be entered in the muster list, so it happened that only thirty names were included, while the *Fähnlein* itself consisted of a hundred men. To avoid the difficulties arising from this, the treaty of Francis I. of Saxe-Lauenburg, who entered Spanish service in 1568, stipulated that a nobleman could not bring more than six, seven or eight accompanying horsemen with him, or if he did, he had to support them at his own expense during the campaign. In addition, he was obliged to equip one for every sixth accompanying person with a pistol or later with a rifle.⁶⁴ The *Reiterbestallung* compiled by Lazarus von Schwendi for the reception of German horsemen stipulated that Rittmeisters could not muster more than 12 horsemen, nobles 6 or 8, and count and noblemen 10 or 12, whom they were obliged to equip well.⁶⁵ The determination of the *lange Reihe* varied by troop type during the Long Turkish War. According to Schwendi's *Reiterbestallung*, German horsemen were also allowed to have an escort of 6-12 men. In contrast, there were only two each for the harquebusiers and the cuirassiers, while none for Ramée's dragoons.⁶⁶

62 ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605.

63 ÖStA KA Best. 727/1602; ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605

64 Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser*, 43.

65 Wilhelm Janko, *Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi oberster Feldhauptmann und Rath Kaiser Maximilian's II.* Wien: Wilhelm Branmüller k. k. Hof- und Universitätsbuchhändler, 1871, 176–177.

66 ÖStA KA Best. 581/1598; ÖStA KA Best. 516/1596; ÖStA KA Best. 587/1598; ÖStA KA

The recruitment, or from Tilly's Walloon foot soldiers into dragoons

Together with the document or documents regarding the recruitment, the military entrepreneurs also received a so-called recruitment patent (*Werbepatent*), in which the client determined in advance which area they could send their officials to collect and lead the appropriate number of mercenaries under the banners.

This was not necessary in the case of the recruitment of the dragoons, since the mercenaries of the four companies were drawn from the Walloon-French infantry regiment of Jean t'Serclaes de Tilly, who was wintering in Nyitra County, and recruited in 1602. The famous and infamous general of the later Thirty Years' War received an order from the Aulic War Council on May 7, 1602, on behalf of the monarch, to raise an army of 3000 men and lead it to the Hungarian theater of war.⁶⁷ However, the regiment never reached this number. An imperial order of September 9, 1602 reveals that the muster commissioners assigned to them mustered 2700 infantry and 200 horses for the first time. However, this number decreased, and by early September 1602, Tilly's mercenaries barely exceeded 1700 men.⁶⁸ This depleted Walloon regiment distinguished itself with its courage several times during the siege of Buda. About 300 selected Walloon infantrymen, led by Tilly, Karl Ludwig Graf zu Sulz, and Stefano Ciancherotti, approached and attacked the Watertown (*Víziváros*) of Buda on barges on the night of October 2-3. The raid was a complete success, as they slaughtered about 200 of the defenders and took control of the strategically important part of the city.⁶⁹

While the capture of the Watertown of Buda was a significant success with few casualties, the attack on the Upper Town on 22 October, led by Tilly, ended in complete failure. It is said that after about two hours of fierce fighting, barely four hundred mercenaries remained from the Walloon regiment, and *Obrist* himself was wounded, hit in the arm by a rifle bullet.⁷⁰

The Christian army finally withdrew from the walls of Buda on 14 November

Best. 727/1602; ÖStA KA Best. 808/1605

67 ÖStA KA AFA 1602-5-1

68 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 545. fol. 824v–827r. September 16, 1602.

69 ÖStA KA AFA 1602-13-1; Ortelius, *Ausführliche Beschreibung*, 322.; Veress, „Buda és Pest,” 58–60.; Sándor László Tóth, *A mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború*. Szege: Belvedere, 2000, 353.

70 ÖStA KA AFA 1602-13-1; Ortelius, *Ausführliche Beschreibung*, 324–325.; Veress: *Buda és Pest*, 66.

1602, and Tilly's remaining mercenaries were ordered by the Aulic War Council to Sempt in Nyitra County (now Šintava, Slovakia).⁷¹ As early as 19 November 1602, Archduke Matthias suggested to the monarch that the best one hundred and fifty mercenaries from Tilly's departing regiment be mounted on horses and used as harquebusiers from then on. Accordingly, the newly formed company had to be armed and financed. According to the Archduke, Russworm *Obrist-Feldmarschall* was only waiting for the ruler's approval.⁷²

A week later, on November 26, 1602, the ruler's reply arrived, in which he agreed to raise a company of one hundred and fifty harquebusiers from Tilly's remaining mercenaries. He also considered placing this unit under the command of Peter von Asselborn.⁷³ He served that year as *Hauptmann* of the so-called *Rehnfhahne*, an unit whose task was to protect and give prestige to the *Obrist-Feldmarschall*.⁷⁴ However, his one hundred and fifty harquebusiers left at the end of the year, so the Walloons were intended to replace them.⁷⁵

At the same time, the organization of dragoon companies also began. Archduke Matthias approved the proposal of the Aulic War Council, so on December 22, 1602, the government body in charge of military affairs turned to the Court Chamber with the request that four hundred of Tilly's remaining mercenaries be selected and organized into four companies of one hundred men each.⁷⁶ A week later, on December 29, the four captains received their appointments. Recruitment also took place quickly, as Rheingraf reported to the Aulic War Council on January 25, 1603, that the four companies had been filled.⁷⁷

The recruitment of the fifth company mentioned in Ramée's *Bestallung* of *Obrist* took place in a similar manner. That is, Baldwin de Clé did not have to go to the Rhineland, the Low Countries or Lorraine to field a hundred horsemen, but had to recruit Walloons who had been recruited or were waiting to be recruited in the Kingdom of Hungary and the hereditary provinces. He was even allowed to

71 ÖStA KA AFA 1602-11-ad2

72 ÖStA KA AFA 1602-11-2

73 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr Prag Reg. B. No. 551. fol. 612r–613r. November 26, 1602.

74 ÖStA KA Best. 720/1602.

75 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr Prag Reg. B. No. 561. fol. 19v–20v. January 16, 1603.

76 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 13v–14r. December 23, 1602.

77 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Exp. Bd. 210. fol. 628r–v. January 25, 1603.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 45r–46r. January 31, 1603.



employ Walloons who served in the artillery.⁷⁸

There had been no shortage of applicants before. According to a protocol entry dated 6 April 1604, Ramée asked the Aulic War Council to recruit twelve more horsemen in addition to the 100 horsemen he had been assigned, and he also demanded an additional month's salary for them. However, the war councilors opposed this procedure in a letter to Archduke Matthias, saying that recruitment above the number of horsemen was not permitted. The captains could only increase their companies to a hundred men, a change that muster master Arnold Helio had to introduce into the muster list. For the same reason, they could not pay monthly wages to the new cavalymen issued by Ramée who were in excess of the number of men.⁷⁹

Mercenaries in excess of the number of men were also a problem in the spring of 1606. It is likely that Meillinn had to muster Cle's company in camp Szombathely and chase out all those whose names were not on the muster list from the quarters.⁸⁰ This means that there were enough people waiting to be recruited as mercenaries even in the final stages of the war.

Arming of the Dragoons

The dragoons had to go into battle with the equipment and weapons specified in the *Bestallung*. The court took care of their procurement, but the distribution of the supplies purchased by the state among its recruits, especially among the infantry, was carried out by the person in charge of their recruitment, in effect selling the necessary goods to his recruits at the expense of their future salaries.

According to an entry dated January 3, 1603, found in the protocol of the Court Chamber, it was agreed with the four captains that the daily allowance for marching to the battlefield and the half-monthly salary upon discharge would be handed over in a lump sum of 1,000 thalers or 1250 Rhenish gulden, so that they could arm their mercenaries with this money. According to the emperor's instructions, the 1,000 thalers were paid to the dragoons before mid-January.⁸¹

78 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 214. fol. 421r. No. 59. April 19, 1605.

79 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Exp. Bd. 211. fol. 483r. April 6, 1604.; ÖStA KA HKRA Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.

80 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Exp. Bd. 215. fol. 45r. April 14, 1606.

81 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr Prag Reg. B. No. 561. fol. 19v–20v. January 16, 1603.

However, based on the available sources, it seems that some of this amount was not used to provide the dragoons with the appropriate weapons. On August 2, 1603, Wolf Eglauer reported to the Aulic War Council that Ramée had requested 200 rifles of harquebusier.⁸²

A letter from the Court Chamber in Prague to the Court Chamber in Vienna five days later, on August 8, 1603, reveals that the latter ordered two thousand horse rifles made in the Low Countries and the corresponding saddle cases from a certain Balthasar Vischet from Cologne. In the case of the dragoons and Rheingraf's horsemen, it was the first time that the armory sold weapons to the horsemen. The military paymaster (*Kriegszahlmeister*), Michael Zeller did not even know how much to ask for the redemption price for the rifles. The unprecedented situation was resolved by the expert opinion of the members of the Aulic War Council, according to which they could not charge more than 12 Rhenish gulden for the equipment. In addition, the Chamber Councilors in Prague negotiated an additional 3000 rifles, but without the rifle cases on the saddles.⁸³

However, the weapons ordered from Vischet did not arrive before the end of September. The Court Chamber in Vienna reported on October 2, 1603, that the rifles from the Low Countries had been delivered. According to the plans of the Chamber Councilors in Prague, most of these, like those previously ordered, were to be sent to Transylvania and Upper Hungary to equip the armies there. The mercenaries were to pay 15 Rhenish gulden for them. The remaining rifles and equipment were to be distributed among the dragoons and Rheingraf's horsemen.⁸⁴

The acquisition of weapons continued to be a key issue for the dragoons. On April 19, 1605, the Aulic War Council ordered Tilly, as *Obrist-Feldzeugmesiter*, to hand over to Ramée the four hundred rifles on the belt from the Vienna arsenal against a receipt.⁸⁵ According to the contract concluded at that time, the cavalry had to be re-armed. This probably happened within a short time, since we know from Basta's correspondence that two companies of dragoons were already ex-

82 ÖStA KA HKR-Wien Pr. Exp. Bd. 210. fol. 385v. August 2, 1603.

83 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr Prag Reg. B. No. 561. fol. 437v. August 8, 1603.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr Prag Reg. B. No. 561. fol. 439r. August 9, 1603.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr Exp. B. No. 553. fol. 643r–v. August 13, 1603.

84 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 555. fol. 543v. October 16, 1603.

85 ÖStA KA HKR-Wien Pr. Reg. Bd. 214. fol. 267v. No. 62. April 19, 1605.

pected in Óvár on May 15. Archduke Matthias reported in his letter of June 24, 1605 that the dragoons would soon arrive at the army of the Albanian-born Italian general.⁸⁶

Unfortunately, even less information is available about the arming of the fifth company of dragoon recruited at the same time. The report sent by Kollonich to the Aulic War Council on 21 April 1605 shows that Ramée had already equipped his recruits by this time.⁸⁷ However, as we learn from a letter to Archduke Matthias, the *Obristleutnant* did this at his own expense, and therefore requested to receive 1,000 thalers for his company, similar to what was stipulated in the *Bestallung* of December 1602.⁸⁸

The first muster

The first muster or inspection was of great importance for both the recruits and the recruits. It was here that it was decided whether the skills and armament of those applying for service were suitable. According to Article 18 of the so-called *Reiterbestallung* compiled by Schwendi, the recruits had to march in a specific order of 50 riders, one after the other, under the leadership of the Rittmeisters, in front of the commissioners assigned to the inspection. During the muster, the first and last names of the riders had to be entered in the muster register.⁸⁹ After that, the recruits were divided into units, and if their weapons and equipment needed to be supplemented, they were replaced. Naturally, the amount of this was also deducted from their pay.

After a successful inspection, the points of the *Reiterbestallung* were read out to the recruits, to which those who appeared had to take an oath at the request of the muster commissioners. Then they introduced their officers and paid them their first monthly salary.⁹⁰

86 Veress, *Basta György*, 669–670., 690–691.

87 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Exp. Bd. 213. fol. 144r–v. April 21, 1605.

88 ÖStA KA HKRA Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.

89 Janko, *Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi*, 176–177.

90 Hermann Meynert, *Geschichte der K. K. österreichischen Armee. Ihrer Heranbildung und Organisation, so wie ihrer Schicksale, Thaten und Feldzüge von der frühesten bis auf die neuere Zeit. Geschichte des Kriegswesens und der Heeresverfassung in der Österreichischen Monarchie zur Zeit Kaiser Maximilian's I. und bis zum dreissigjährigen Kreige*. Wien: Auf Kosten des Verfassers, 1854, 99.



The new dragoons were looking forward to the latter, as they could no longer support themselves without a daily wage, as the date of their muster kept getting pushed back. In its decree of December 22, 1602, the Aulic War Council had already proposed that the four companies be inspected within two or three weeks, and then ordered to Pest, which had been captured on October 7, 1602.⁹¹ According to the protocol entry of the Court Chamber on January 3, 1603, the councilors calculated that the captains could muster their fully armed mercenaries within three weeks.⁹²

As I have already mentioned, the captains were paid 1000-1000 thalers per company, but the Court Chamber was not yet able to raise the first monthly salary of the 400 dragoons,⁹³ about 6500 Rhenish guildens, although the Aulic War Council even sent the Court Chamber a reminder decree regarding the payment of salaries on January 7, 1603.⁹⁴ Thus, the Walloons chose the only way available to them to ensure their livelihood, which was to plunder the population. The first alarming news about this from Rheingraf reached the Aulic War Council on January 25, 1603. For this reason, the war councilors inquired at the Court Chamber whether the first monthly salary, which had now increased to almost 7000 Rhenish gulden, was available to hold the muster.⁹⁵ Meanwhile, Heliot, who was in charge of mustering the Walloon, French and Lorraine mercenaries, was ordered on 28 and 30 January to be ready to receive the money and travel to the dragoons.⁹⁶ The protocol entry of the Court Chamber in Vienna on 31 January 1603 reveals that the councilors of the chamber instructed the military paymaster to hand over the dragoons' pay and travel expenses to the muster master.⁹⁷

The muster itself took place on 10 February, 1603.⁹⁸ On 13 February the Au-

91 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 13v–14r. December 23, 1602.

92 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 20v–21r. January 3, 1603.

93 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 13v–14r. December 23, 1602.

94 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 553. fol. 59r. January 7, 1603.

95 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Exp. Bd. 210. fol. 628r–v. 1603. január 25.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 45r–46r. January 31, 1603.

96 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 209. fol. 193r. No. 52. February 13, 1603.; ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 209. fol. 193r. No. 56. February 13, 1603.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 45r–46r. January 31, 1603.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 46r. January 31, 1603.

97 ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 557. fol. 46r. January 31, 1603.

98 ÖStA KA HKR Exp. 1605. April, No. 110.

lic War Council sent two instructions to Kollonich. In the first, they requested a report on the inspection. In the second, they instructed him to warn the captains that their cavalymen should be well armed in full (with a good rifle and a magazine).⁹⁹

The dragoon muster of the newly recruited company in the spring of 1605 was similarly delayed. On 19 April 1605, the Aulic War Council sent a decree to the Court Chamber, according to which the first monthly salary of Cle's cavalymen, 1564 Rhenish guldens and 30 kreuzers, needed for their muster, should be paid as soon as possible, since the money already sent to Kollonich was no longer sufficient for this. Ramée therefore requested that until the muster took place, at least until the next payment, an advance (*Lehen* or *Vorlehen*) be granted to them against the salary.¹⁰⁰ The Aulic War Council finally appointed Meillen and Simon Schröttl to the muster on 4 June 1605, and they presumably soon completed the task assigned to them.¹⁰¹

Following the successful inspection, the first dragoon companies had begun serving in the Habsburg Empire's army in the Hungarian theatre of war and they fought the armies of the Ottoman Empire till the end of the Long Turkish War.

Conclusion

Based on the above, we can make two very important statements. On the one hand, the dragoon companies created at the end of 1602 are the forerunners of modern cavalry, since the escort characteristic of other cavalry arms in the 16th century, which was a remnant of feudalism, is not found among the dragoons. The professional cavalry was created in the Habsburg Empire during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), and was organized into regiments, similar to the infantry. On the other hand, similarly to the regimental histories that were fashionable in the 19th and 20th centuries, we have the opportunity to look into the recruitment, arming and everyday life of the mercenaries and formations that entered the service

99 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 209. fol. 193r. No. 52. February 13, 1603.; ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 209. fol. 193r. No. 56. February 13, 1603.

100 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 214. fol. 67v–68r. No. 74. 1605. April 20, 1605.; ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Exp. Bd. 213. fol. 144r–v. April 21, 1605.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 579. fol. 128v. April 21, 1605.; ÖStA FHKA AHF Pr. Exp. B. No. 579. fol. 131r–v April 23, 1605.

101 ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Reg. Bd. 214. fol. 361r. No. 27. June 4, 1605.

of the Habsburg Empire at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries. Of course, the sources provide a very narrow cross-section for the researcher, but the undertaking is by no means impossible. The systematic processing and mosaic-like compilation of protocol entries, recruitment documents, muster reports and other types of documents available in connection with a regiment, flag or company may seem too time-consuming a task at first glance, but the energy invested will definitely pay off. Each such case study brings us closer to understanding the functioning and difficulties of the military organizations of the time, so we can answer the whys instead of the hows.

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