NUOVA ANTOLOGIA MILITARE
RIVISTA INTERDISCIPLINARE DELLA SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DI STORIA MILITARE

N. 7
2026

Fascicolo 26. Aprile 2026

Storia Militare Antica e Bizantina

a cura di

MARCO BETTALLI, MICHAŁ FASZCZA E GIOACCHINO STRANO

Società Italiana di Storia Militare

Nuova Antologia Militare

Rivista interdisciplinare della Società Italiana di Storia Militare

Periodico telematico open-access annuale (www.nam-sism.org)

Registrazione del Tribunale Ordinario di Roma n. 06 del 30 Gennaio 2020

Scopus List of Accepted Titles October 2022 (No. 597)

Rivista scientifica ANVUR (5/9/2023) Area 11, Area 10 (21/12/2024)

Direzione, Via Bosco degli Arvali 24, 00148 Roma

Contatti: direzione@nam-sigm.org ; virgilio.ilari@gmail.com

Grafica: Nadir Media Srl - Via Giuseppe Veronese, 22 - 00146 Roma

info@nadirmedia.it

Gruppo Editoriale Tab Srl -Viale Manzoni 24/c - 00185 Roma

www.tabedizioni.it

ISSN: 2704-9795

ISBN Fascicolo 979-12-5669-372-6

Against the Great King

Biases on "Rebellion" in the Western Satrapies of the Persian Empire

by Vittorio Cisnetti
Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna

Abstract: The theme of "rebellion" and the figure of the "rebel" are not easily to define or to investigate, insofar as they represent categories that are very often formulated unilaterally, and retrospectively. This problem becomes all the more acute the further back in time one moves. Within the field of Ancient History, the *bias* that constrains the definition of "rebellion" and "rebels" proves to be extremely layered and difficult to circumvent, especially when one departs from the track provided – clearly, with all the issues they entail – by Classical sources. A striking case in point is the perspective that was offered by Greek authors on episodes of insubordination and sedition that occurred in the territories belonging to the Greeks' eternal, absolute enemies, namely the Persians, led by their Great Kings, and their empire. This study aims therefore to demonstrate the different levels and forms of *bias(es)* that contributed to the formation of the Greek and Classical view of "rebellion" in the ancient Persian Empire, and that continue to shape it to this day throughout 'Western' tradition. To this end, two exemplary case studies are examined, both relating to the intricate political and military situation that developed along the 'Mediterranean front' of the Achaemenid Empire, and especially around the island of Cyprus, during the first two decades of the fourth century B.C.

Keywords: Achaemenids / Achaemenid Empire, Assyrians, Artaxerxes II, Behistun Inscription, Cyprus, Diodorus Siculus (Ephorus), Greeks (Greek Tradition), Egypt, Euagoras I of Salamis, Glous, Ionia, Isocrates, Kition, 'Mediterranean Front', Persians / Persian Empire, Rebellion, Theopompus, Tyre.

1. The Enduring Difficulty of Defining a "Rebel" and a "Rebellion"

Within historical studies, and particularly in Military History, the concepts of "rebellion" and "rebel/rebels" resist clear or uniform definition.[1] Indeed, any attempt to define an event as a "rebellion"

1 This paper takes its point of departure from a communication held during the proceedings of the fourth edition of the *Military History School – Scuola di autoformazione di laurean-*

NAM, Anno 7 – n. 26
DOI: 10.36158/97912566937261
Aprile 2026

would require that all parties involved in it concur in, or at least reconcile, their usually divergent (when not outright opposed) perspectives. Yet acts of insubordination, sedition, or open revolt inherently defy such consensus, in any historical period. After all, it is rare for the actors involved in a "rebellion" to steadfastly define themselves and their own side as "rebels," therefore a "rebel" exists both as an actor and as a social phenomenon only when external opponents confer upon him and his side the status, or the 'label,' of "rebellious."

Common knowledge, but also broader lexical definitions aptly confirm this. For instance, the *Oxford Learner's Dictionary* defines «rebellion» both as (1) «an attempt by some of the people in a country to change their government, using violence» (namely, in a sense tied to 'major' state and political history); and (2) «opposition to authority within an organization, a political party, etc.» (that is, a broader nuance, that may be extended to narrower contexts as well).[2]

As said, these labels are almost always imposed externally. However, even external sources often show inconsistencies in defining episodes of sedition and revolt. Indeed, identifying "rebels" has always been a strong political act: declaring a faction or a region "in revolt," or the like, implies judgment and partisanship, and in many cases such a conflict can escalate (and it did, many times in history) into acts of violence carried out by both sides, culminating in the launching of full-scale military campaigns.[3]

---

di e ricercatori in Storia Militare della Società Italiana di Storia Militare (*SISM*), held in Faenza (Italy) on 3–5 September 2025. Some of the arguments that are developed here are the result of long-term reflections I have pursued over the course of my doctoral research. Preliminary presentations of parts of the material gathered in this study were delivered at the online seminar *Rivolte, rivoluzioni,* small wars *e misure di* counterinsurgency. *Prospettive diacroniche di Storia Militare e riflessioni metodologiche*, organized by the Comitato SISM di laureandi, dottorandi e ricercatori in Storia Militare (27 February 2024; title of the paper: *Una comoda ribellione? Evagora di Cipro e il 'fronte occidentale' dell'impero achemenide*), as well as at the *War in the Ancient World International Conference* (*WAWIC*) *2025* (Münster, 29–31 May 2025; title of the paper: *Double Dealing, Desertion, or Plans for Local Power? A 'Dynasty of Traitors' across the Troubled Mediterranean Satrapies of the Achaemenid Empire in the Early Fourth Century B.C.*). Accordingly, this venue appeared to be most appropriate to present the current results of this research, and its present stage of development.

2 *Oxford Learner's Dictionary* (*OLD*), online version, s.v. "rebellion," definitions 1–2 (https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/rebellion?q=rebellion).

3 Useful methodological frameworks on this subject in Ancient History are offered by Lee L. Brice, «Insurgency and Terrorism in the Ancient World, Grounding the Discussion», in *Brill's Companion to Insurgency and Terrorism in the Ancient Mediterranean*, I, Tim-

Based on these premises, the present contribution seeks to examine the sharply divergent perspectives on figures and events which were (and still are) commonly labelled as "rebellious" and "rebellions," in the field of Ancient History. To this end, rather than following the more familiar – and, on the whole, more straightforward – paths of the 'Classical' tradition, this study turns beyond the borders of Greece proper and Rome. More precisely, it focuses on that area(s) of sustained contact (and, consequently, of intermittent conflict) that existed for centuries, even prior to the advent of Hellenism, between the Greek world and what is conventionally labelled in scholarship as the 'Ancient Near East.' This "intermediate belt,"[4] encompassing the entire Asiatic littoral of the Eastern Mediterranean, from the Aegean Straits to Phoenicia, constituted the primary arena of interaction between the Greek *poleis* (including those of 'East Greece,' in Asia Minor) and what was historically, but even more so in common thought, the quintessential adversary of Greekness: namely, the Persian empire[5] (here referred to, just for the sake of convenience, also as Achaemenid).

Since most of our knowledge of this vast political entity – extending, as it did, from the Mediterranean to the Indus, and from Central Asia to Nubia[6] – derives from Greek and Latin historiography and literature, our perception of the Persian world is profoundly shaped by the many *biases* inherent in these sources and their

---

othy Howe, Lee L. Brice (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 3-27; and by Gruen, Erich S., «When Is a Revolt not a Revolt? A Case for Contingency», in *Revolt and Resistance in the Ancient Classical World and the Near East. In the Crucible of Empire* (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East, 85), John J. Collins, J.G. Manning (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 10-37 (the latter scholar provides examples from the Hellenistic Age and the Roman Republic).

4 We are here referring, in translation, to the Italian label of "fascia intermedia," which was coined by David Asheri (*Fra Ellenismo e Iranismo. Studi sulla società e cultura di Xanhos nella età achemenide*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1983) to denote the consistently connected and, at the same time, 'permeable' character of pre-Hellenistic Lycia and Asia Minor in general – a reality that was, indeed, "intermediate" between the Greek world and the Orient (i.e., the Asiatic empires). In our view, this designation could be effectively extended to the entire 'Mediterranean front' of the Achaemenid Empire.

5 To quote from Isocrates (see also below, especially *Section 4*): «… those who are both their [the Greeks'] natural enemies and their hereditary foes» (ἐπὶ τοὺς καὶ φύσει πολεμίους καὶ πατρικοὺς ἐχθρούς), with reference to the Greeks' attitude toward the Persians (4.184).

6 This is basically a quote from the two identical groups of Old Persian inscriptions on gold and silver tablets dated under Darius I, which were found in Persepolis (DPh) and Ecbatana (DH). See Amélie Kuhrt, *The Persian Empire. A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period*, Routledge, Oxon 2007, pp. 476-477.

authors. This is particularly (and, indeed, most conspicuously) true in the case of episodes, figures, or regions that were characterized as "rebellious" during the two centuries of Achaemenid rule over Asia, sixth to fourth centuries B.C.[7] Greeks living in and completely focussed on their *poleis*, as one might expect, were highly inclined to identify "rebellions" afflicting their imperial adversary. More often than not, they did so with limited concern even for the plausibility of such assumptions. To this end, above all and quite naturally, they looked especially and primarily at the empire's western provinces (satrapies), i.e., those closest to their own sphere: Asia Minor, the Levant, Cyprus, and Egypt.

In the following four *Sections*, we will thus examine the phenomenon of "rebellion" along the Persian Empire's 'Mediterranean front,' as seen through Greek eyes. In particular, we will offer a comprehensive analysis of two historical case studies – one which is well known, the other, instead, typically marginalized – that occurred between Western Asia Minor and Cyprus at the beginning of the fourth century, the latter following like a 'consequence' of the former. Before turning to these instances, however, we will first present (*Section 2*) some methodological considerations on the concept and the (re)interpretation(s) of "rebellion" in Greek and 'Eastern' sources. An earlier case from the history of Cyprus during the reign of the Neo-Assyrian king Sennacherib, at the end of the eighth century, will be our guide.

Next, in *Section 3*, turning properly to the chronologies of the Persian empire and drawing on the relevant documentary evidence, we will compare the Achaemenid imperial ideology regarding the theme of "rebellion" with the Greek label of *apostasis*.

In this way, we will have established both the historical and the methodological foundations for the analysis of the two main case studies. First, the alleged anti-Persian "rebellion" of Euagoras (king of Salamis in Cyprus, during the 380s) will be addressed (*Section 4*), and then the concurrent episode (happened in the second half of that same decade) involving Glous, a *hyparchos* in Ionia and an admiral of the Achaemenid imperial fleet that had been dispatched to Cyprus to fight Euagoras (*Section 5*).

Finally, the conclusion (*Section 6*) will attempt to synthesize the previous discussion, evaluating its findings in light of well-established modern interpretative

7 Unless explicitly indicated otherwise, all dates in the text are given B.C.

frameworks (like Eisenstadt's theory on empires as systems of centre(s) and periphery(ies)), as well as more recent and specialized approaches, highlighting their strengths and limitations.

2. *A Significant Parallel from the Neo-Assyrian Period*

Long before the Persians established their authority over the Levantine shore, it was the Neo-Assyrian Empire, under the rulers of the Sargonid dynasty, that expanded into Phoenicia and Palestine.[8] One of the most characteristic, yet also most elusive features of this new geopolitical arrangement was the alignment with Assyria of the kings of the various city-states that had meanwhile arisen on the island of Cyprus. As is well known, this land «in the midst of the sea»[9] stood directly opposite the Levantine coast and was inhabited by Greek, Phoenician, and indigenous groups.[10] It is worth keeping this earlier stage in mind, for Cyprus

8 Regarding the Neo-Assyrian expansion in the Levant, see e.g. the detailed historical enquiry of Fredrick M. Fales, «Phoenicia in the Neo-Assyrian Period: An Updated Overview», *SAA Bulletin*, 23, 2017, pp. 181-295. Besides, Josette Elayi, *History of Phoenicia*, Lockwood Press, Atlanta 2018, pp. 144-182, provides a more fluid account.

9 This expression frequently appeared in texts of the Akkadian tradition (already from the third millennium and down to the Neo-Babylonian period) to designate places extremely distant in space, and, more concretely, islands. Cyprus, therefore, fully (and historically) fell within this category. For a chronological analysis of the uses and implications of such a label, Robert Rollinger, Kai Ruffing, «World View and Perception of Space», in *Aneignung und Abgrenzung. Wechselnde Perspektiven auf die Antithese von 'Ost' und 'West' in der griechischen Antike*, Nicolas Zenzen, Tonio Hölscher, Kai Trampedach (Hrsgg.), Verlag Antike, Heidelberg 2013, pp. 93-134.

10 On the composition of the communities of Cyprus in the early fifth century and, notably, according to allegedly local informants (ὡς αὐτοὶ Κύπριοι λέγουσι), cf. Hdt. 7.90 (and, for the situation in the fourth century, e.g. Ps.-Skyl. *Per.* 103). A comprehensive overview of the origins and the ethno-linguistic affiliations of the inhabitants of Cyprus in the Archaic and Classical Ages is found, e.g., in Maria Iacovou, «'Greeks', 'Phoenicians' and 'Eteocypriots'. Ethnic Identities in the Cypriote Kingdoms», in *"Sweet Land…": Lectures on the History and Culture of Cyprus*, Julian Chrysostomides, Charalambos Dendrinos (ed. by), Porphyrogenitus, Camberley 2006, pp. 27-59. Highly specific yet excessively burdened by a contemporary and *nationalistic* framework (which basically identified a hypothetical ancient 'civilization' conflict between the Greek and Phoenician communities in the island, under Persian auspices, with the ethnic clashes occurred between the Greek and Turkish components of Cyprus in the twentieth century A.D.), was the work of P.J. Stylianou, *The Age of the Kingdoms. A Political History of Cyprus in the Archaic and Classical Periods*, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation, Nicosia 1989. At any rate, a valuable corrective to such largely ideological approaches to the ancient history of Cyprus was already provided by Franz G. Maier, «Factoids in Ancient History: The Case of Fifth-Century Cyprus»,

would later stand at the very centre of the events around which this discussion revolves. As would rather similarly occur around 530, when the Persians gained control of the Eastern Mediterranean, at the end of the eight century the Cypriot rulers preferred to align their policies and their cities with the dominant continental power of the moment – namely, the Assyrians –, in order to secure economic and commercial advantages and to avoid isolation, or worse, an armed threat from outside.[11] We may recall in passing, however, that in keeping with the celebratory exaggeration (often labelled as '*propaganda*') permeating the chancery records of ancient Near Eastern empires, the association between Cyprus and Assyria was presented at Nineveh as the outcome of an outright military conquest ordered by King Sargon II, and accomplished between 709 and 707.[12] Such a claim, however, strains credibility, and actually no external (i.e., non-Assyrian) or internal Cypriot evidence does exist for it.

Be that as it may, an illustrative example of the discrepancy – by no means

JHS, 105, 1985, pp. 32-39, although its lessons have yet to be fully embraced. For a detailed analysis of each city-kingdom under Persian rule, focussed on the role of Phoenician presence and influences, Edward Lipiński, *Itineraria Phoenicia* (*Studia Phoenicia XVIII*), Peeters, Leuven – Paris – Dudley 2004 (OLA, 127), pp. 77-104. On the main methodological issues of this field of study and their past and present approaches, Antigoni Zournatzi, *Persian Rule in Cyprus: Sources, Problems, Perspectives*, De Boccard, Athens 2005.

11 On Cyprus under Neo-Assyrian rule, very thoroughly tied to the sources is Christian Körner *Die zyprischen Königtümer im Schatten der Groβreiche des Vorderen Orients. Studien zu den zyprischen Monarchien vom 8. bis zum 4. Jh. V. Chr.*, Peeters, Leuven 2017, pp. 130-156. As we are going to see, his quite recent book is of utmost importance for the present study. Anyway, we should also take account of the other relevant *English* papers written by the same author on this same topic, such as (for the sake of our purposes here): Christian Körner, «The Cypriot Kings under the Assyrian and Persian Rule (Eighth to Fourth Centuries BC): Centre and Periphery in a Relationship of Suzerainty», *Electrum*, 23, 2016, especially pp. 29-33; and Christian Körner, «The Kings of Salamis in the Shadow of the Near Eastern Empires: A Relationship of 'Suzerainty'», in *Salamis of Cyprus. History and Archaeology from the Earliest Times to Late Antiquity, Conference in Nicosia, 21-23 May 2015*, Sabine Rogge, Christina Ioannou, Theodoros Mavrojannis (ed. by), Waxmann, Münster 2019, especially pp. 328-330.

12 Texts and translations of the relevant passages in the cuneiform inscriptions to be read in *RINAP* 2, 2, 436b–441a; 7, 16, 145b–149a; 8, 17; 9, 28; 74, vii 24b–44; 103, iv 28–42. See also their thorough analyses provided by Nadav Na'aman, «The Conquest of Yadnana According to the Inscriptions of Sargon II», in *Historiography in the Cuneiform World – Proceedings of the XLVe Recontre Assyriologique Internationale*, Tzvi Abusch *et al.* (ed. by), CDL Press, Bethesda 2001, pp. 357-363; and Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 133-144. Still on the point, Josette Elayi, *Sargon II, King of Assyria*, SBL, Atlanta 2017, pp. 72-78.

always one of mere detail – between the 'Eastern' accounts (in this case, the Neo-Assyrian court records) and their Classical (re)elaborations[13] is provided by the inscriptions of Sargon's son and successor, Sennacherib. In several versions, scattered between the palace at Nineveh and other sites in the north of present-day Iraq, but overall broadly consistent with one another, the Assyrian king recalled an episode dating to the year 701.[14] Accordingly, one of his subjects from the Levantine coast, Luli – styled as «king of Sidon»[15] in Phoenicia – had rebelled against him;[16] but, out of fear of Sennacherib's impending armed retaliation, he fled by sea to *Iadnana*,[17] the name by which Cyprus was designated in the Assyrian sources. The narrative scheme is straightforward: the Great King (Sennacherib) acknowledges the wrongdoing (though it is not specified) of his subject (Luli) and designates him as a "rebel."[18] Consequently, he threatens retaliation

13 Needless to say, both categories of sources were *and still are* heavily burdened by their own categories of *bias(es)*.

14 Texts and translations in *RINAP* 3.1, 22, ii 37–40; 34, 13b–14; *RINAP* 3.2, 44, 1, 17–20a; 46, 18–19a. For the historical context of Sennacherib's Third military campaign to the West, Josette Elayi, *Sennacherib, King of Assyria*, SBL, Atlanta 2018, pp. 52-88. An overall perspective on the event is provided by Elayi, *History* cit., pp. 160-164.

15 *Šar* URU *ṣi-du-un-ni*. The issues of the identity of this character, and the seat of his rule (Sidon and/or Tyre) in the last quarter of the eighth century are far from simple, as just a very limited glimpse to them in this *Section* might show. As it stands (see below), in that same period a king named Eloulaios was told by the Greek-writing author Josephus (apparently drawing from a recollection and a Greek translation of the old Tyrian archives) to have ruled in Tyre (*AJ* 9.14.2 [283], ἐπὶ Τύρον βασιλεύοντος αὐτῆς ᾽Ελουλαίου). However, one has to remind that, at the time, the two Phoenician cities seem to have formed a single entity, and to have shared their kings. A rapid, but useful note on this is found in Guy Bunnens, «Phoenicia in the Later Iron Age: Tenth Century BCE to the Assyrian and Babylonian Periods», in *The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean*, Brian R. Doak, Carolina López-Ruiz (ed. by), Oxford University Press, New York 2019, pp. 59-60. See also Elayi, *Sennacherib* cit., pp. 54-55; and the entry on "Luli" in *EDPC* I (the entry "Eloulaios" in the dictionary refers to "Luli," indeed). *Contra*, at least in part, Philip J. Boyes, «"The King of the Sidonians": Phoenician Ideologies and the Myth of the Kingdom of Tyre–Sidon», *BASOR*, 365, 2012, pp. 33-44.

16 We infer that this had been the case (i.e., of a rebellion) with Luli, since the kingdom of Sidon had already submitted to Assyria prior to his stance against Sargon. «On my third campaign, I marched to the land Ḫatti [the Levantine coast]. Fear of my brilliance overwhelmed Luli, the king of the city Sidon, and he fled from the city Tyre to Iadnana [Cyprus], which is in the midst of the sea, and disappeared.»

17 Collection and discussion of the sources in Rollinger – Ruffing, *World View* cit., pp. 110-111; Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 144-148.

18 On the framework of rebellions in the Neo-Assyrian period and according to its imperi-

and the use of armed force; or so, at least, one of the preserved texts suggests. Confronted with the extraordinary power of the god Ashshur, embodied in the imperial troops, the rebel can only abandon his seditious intent, seeking refuge in a place which was then beyond the reach of his suzerain's authority. That is, apparently Sennacherib did not chase Luli to the island: from which we may infer, incidentally, that at this point *Iadnana*/Cyprus was not (was no more) included among the nominal Assyrian possessions.[19]

However, beyond the 'propagandistic' framework of Sennacherib's inscriptions, the account of events linking Cyprus and Phoenicia in that period takes on a rather different shape in the historical text of the *Jewish Antiquities* by Flavius Josephus. As is well known, Josephus was a Jewish author, writing in Greek in the first century A.D.: that is, some eight centuries after the above-recalled events. Although he claimed to have drawn upon the royal archives of Tyre[20] for this section of his work,[21] there is no doubt that the version he presented diverges considerably from Sennacherib's. Its distortion lies not so much in any encomiastic agenda as in the considerable chronological distance, coupled with the evident confusion[22] that arose from the assemblage of sources of doubtful provenance by

al sources, Eckart Frahm, «Revolts in the Neo-Assyrian Empire: A Preliminary Discourse Analysis», in *Revolt and Resistance in the Ancient Classical World and the Near East. In the Crucible of Empire* (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East, 85), John J. Collins, J.G. Manning (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 76-89.

19 It should be added that, according to some versions of the story, Luli later met his death in Cyprus (Kition). I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to the work of Sophocles Hadjisavvas (*The Phoenician Period Necropolis of Kition*, II, Cyprus Department of Antiquities, Nicosia 2014, pp. 1-27), in which the author claims to have identified in a rich Archaic-period tomb at Larnaca (Kition) the burial of Luli. However, there is no definitive evidence to support this hypothesis.

20 Which Josephus told to have been recollected by Menander of Ephesus, explicitly quoted as his primary source in Jos. *AJ* 8.5.3 (324; = Menander *BNJ* 783 F 3), 9.14.2 (283; = Menander F 4, the very passage concerning Eloulaios and the Assyrians); *C. Ap.* 1.18 (116-117; = Menander F 1).

21 Cf. Jos. *AJ* 9.14.2 (283): … ἐν τοῖς Τυρίων ἀρχείοις ἀναγέγραπται: ἐστράτευσε γὰρ ἐπὶ Τύρον βασιλεύοντος αὐτῆς Ἐλουλαίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τούτοις Μένανδρος ὁ τῶν χρονικῶν ποιησάμενος τὴν ἀναγραφὴν καὶ τὰ τῶν Τυρίων ἀρχεῖα μεταφράσας εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν γλῶτταν, ὃς οὕτως ἐδήλωσε.

22 The confrontation of what was told by Sargon's inscriptions and by Josephus–Menander is at the heart of the works of Nadav Na'aman, «Sargon II and the Rebellion of the Cypriote Kings against Shilta of Tyre», *Orientalia*, 67, 2, 1998, pp. 239-247; *idem*, «Eloulaios/Ululaiu in Josephus, Antiquities IX, 284», *NABU*, 6, 1, 2006, pp. 5-6. However, his interpretations concerning Shilta, whom he interprets as the king of Tyre *before* Luli ruled at

an author fundamentally alien to the events he narrated.[23]

Indeed, Josephus placed, around the beginning of the final quarter of the eighth century B.C.[24] (thus, *before* the actual reign of Sennacherib, which started in 705), a "rebellion" – the Greek term employed was ἀπόστασις, and we will

Sidon (to justify the context delineated by Josephus), and the identity of Josephus' Eloulaios, ultimately render the whole picture even more confused. See, e.g., Bunnens, *Later Iron Age* cit., p. 63: "Confused reports from both Josephus (*AJ* 9.283-87, after Menander) and Sargon II's inscriptions […] may record one or two uprisings of Cypriote cities against the king of Tyre in the second half of the eighth century BCE. Whatever the reconstruction of events, it is in Cyprus that Lulî, king of the Sidonians, took refuge when Sennacherib invaded Phoenicia in 701 BCE and probably also Abdi-Milkutti when he was attacked by Esarhaddon."

23 The same problem pervades, more generally, the Classical tradition on the Near East, although – by virtue of distance and limited channels of communication – the dynamic was even more pronounced in the pre-Persian period. For an overview of Greek contacts with, and reception of, the Near East in the times of Assyrian rule (i.e., the Greek early Archaic Age), see Robert Rollinger, «The Ancient Greeks and the Impact of the Ancient Near East: Textual Evidence ad Historical Perspective (ca. 750–650 BC)», in *Mythology and Mythologies. Methodological Approaches to Intercultural Influences. Proceedings of the Second Annual Symposium of the Assyrian and Babylonian Intellectual Heritage Project Held in Paris, France, October 4-7, 1999*, R.M. Whiting (ed. by), The Neo-Assyrian Corpus Project, Helsinki 2001, pp. 233-264.

24 This is certainly one of the major problems of the text. It stems, first and foremost, from Josephus' indication of the Assyrian king under whose reign the events in Phoenicia – and the very revolt of Kition (and not of Cyprus as a whole: see the next footnote) – were supposed to have taken place. As a concluding remark to the *excerptum* from Menander, Josephus stated that this information had been drawn from the Tyrian archives pertaining to the reign of Salmanasses, that is, Shalmaneser V, the historical predecessor of Sargon II (cf. Jos. *AJ* 9.14.2 [287]: καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς Τυρίων ἀρχείοις γεγραμμένα κατὰ Σαλμανάσσου τοῦ Ἀσσυρίων βασιλέως ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν). However, as shown by Na'aman, *Shilta of Tyre* cit., p. 246, the majority of the surviving manuscripts that transmit Menander's words proper (namely, his fragment n. 4) do not in fact preserve the name of the Assyrian king. The reading (at Jos. 284) ἐπὶ τούτου Σελάμψας, in particular, appears to be a corruption, either predating Josephus or introduced/adopted by him, of an original sequence ἐπὶ τούτους πέμψας. Josephus, therefore, would then have simply 'normalized' this into the proper name Selampses, which appears moreover clearly distinct from the Salmanasses mentioned shortly thereafter (287). Here follows Na'aman's proposed translation for the vexed passage: «And Eloulaios, to whom they gave the name Py(1)as, reigned thirty-six years. This king, upon the revolt of the Kitians, put out to sea and reduced them to submission. Against them sent (ἐπὶ τούτους πέμψας) the king of Assyria [*the subject of the sentence!*], came up against all Phoenicia and invaded (it) and, after making a treaty of peace with all (its cities), withdrew from the land. And Sidon and A(r)ke and Old Tyre (Palaityrus) and many other cites also revolted from Tyre and surrendered to the king of Assyria. But, as the Tyrians…»

return on this subject in due time – of the *Kitieis*, the Greek name for the inhabitants of Kition.[25] That was a Phoenician-speaking city, founded on the south-eastern coast of Cyprus, which at that time appears to have been linked to Tyre,[26] either as a colony or, in any case, as a settlement placed under the authority of the Tyrian king. The current ruler at that time, according to Josephus and its source (Menander of Ephesus), had been a certain Eloulaios: whose name, after all, was clearly modelled on the Luli known from the Assyrian inscriptions.[27]

Acting as a subject of the Assyrian Great King,[28] this Eloulaios was said by Josephus to have dispatched a fleet to Cyprus and subdued the *Kitieis*, while the Assyrians themselves sent an army westward to reassert control over the Phoenician coastline, which was evidently in turmoil.[29] According to this version, how-

25 Jos. *AJ* 9.14.2 (284), οὗτος ἀποστάντων Κιτταίων, alt. Κιτιέων. Note, however, the diffusion of the name «Kitians» in many languages from the early Iron Age to Hellenistic times (KT(Y)M, *Kitt*(*y*)*im*, Κιτιεῖς, Κιτταίοι, etc.), attesting their presence and activities across the Eastern Mediterranean. In the later texts of the Hebrew Bible (and therefore in its translations in Greek and Latin), a shift in meaning could be observed, when the label «Kitians» comes to carry a reference to the «Cypriots» and «Cyprus» overall, and also more broadly to the "West" (the Macedonian, and then the Roman Empire). On this, see Christina Ioannou, «Les relations de la ville de Kition et le Proche-Orient selon les sources écrites de l'époque archaïque», *CCEC*, 41, 2011, pp. 265-282.

26 For a complete, yet quite rapid overview of Kition in the Archaic Age, one may look at Marguerite Yon, «Le royaume de Kition. Époque archaïque», in *Phoenicia and the East Mediterranean in the First Millennium B.C.* (*Studia Phoenicia V*), Edward Lipiński (ed. by), Peeters, Leuven 1987, pp. 357-374. On the dependence of Kition on Tyre, at least until Neo-Assyrian times, see also Einar Gjerstad, «The Phoenician Colonization and Expansion in Cyprus. The Pre-Phoenician Kition», *RDAC*, 1979, pp. 230-254 – regardless of the outdatedness of his interpretive framework. Also, more recently, Anna Cannavò, «The Phoenicians and Kition: Continuities and Breaks», in *Trasformazioni e crisi nel Mediterraneo. "Identità" e interculturalità nel Levante e nell'Occidente fenicio tra XII e VIII sec. a.C. – ISCIMA – CNR, 8-9 maggio 2013*, Giuseppe Garbati, Tatiana Pedrazzi (ed. by), Fabrizio Serra Editore, Pisa – Roma 2015, pp. 139-151.

27 In support of the identification of the two figures (Luli and Eloulaios) stand the more traditional (and more simplifying) interpretations, such as, e.g. and recently, Elayi, *Sennacherib* cit., p. 53, stating: "Lulî, probably corresponding to Ελουλαίος of Josephus, named 'king of the city of Sidon' (*šar* URU *ṣi-du-un-ni*) in Sennacherib's inscriptions." By contrast, see the hypotheses put forward by Na'aman, *Shilta of Tyre* cit.; and also, his discussion on the issue in Na'aman, *Eloulaios/Ululaiu* cit. (on which, next footnote).

28 Note, however, that according to Na'aman, *Eloulaios/Ululaiu* cit., even the name Eloulaios (derived, according to him, from the Akkadian *Ululaiu*), would in fact be Shalmaneser's own before his intronization.

29 Incidentally, this may also explain why Josephus relocated the events concerning Tyre and its dependencies some twenty years earlier than what we know from Sennacherib's testi-

ever, it was then many cities of southern Phoenicia – including Sidon and Tyre themselves, which at that time appear to have formed a sort of 'united kingdom' – that subsequently «rebelled» (Josephus employed here the verb ἀφίστημι). Tyre, in particular, was said to have withstood an Assyrian siege lasting five years.[30]

Be that as it may, in this narrative there was no mention, therefore, of the Sidonian-Tyrian king's flight to Cyprus. On the contrary, one encounters here a more neutral characterization of the figure (elsewhere portrayed as a "rebel") of the local Phoenician ruler, Luli.[31] Who after all, for the sake of convenience to the present discussion, we may take as corresponding to Josephus' Eloulaios - at least, logically.

The gap between the royal cuneiform inscriptions and Josephus' Greek *excerptum* from the early Imperial age (notwithstanding his alleged reliance on Menander and the Tyrian archives) is striking. Most importantly, it becomes particularly evident with regard to the identification and characterization of the "rebel," and of the theme of "rebellion." The stark dichotomy between Luli and Sennacherib in the cuneiform texts seems, in Josephus' version, to have been diluted into a far more intricate situation, involving acts of insubordination and unrest happened within the Tyrian kingdom itself (i.e., at Kition) and in terms of its relations with the superior Assyrian imperial power. Evidently, just as it had suited Sennacherib's purposes to present the revolt, in his official recordings, as a direct affront – albeit a failed one – to his royal authority, so too the sources that were available to Josephus (whether originally Greek or Phoenician) must have found it more expedient to portray a far more complex dynamic, for reasons that now elude our understanding.

---

mony, if we think, e.g., to the military activities of King Shalmaneser V in the West.

30 Jos *AJ* 9.14.2 (285-287): … ἀπέστη τε Τυρίων Σιδὼν καὶ Ἄκη καὶ ἡ πάλαι Τύρος καὶ πολλαὶ ἄλλαι πόλεις, αἳ τῶι τῶν Ἀσσυρίων ἑαυτὰς βασιλεῖ παρέδοσαν. δι᾽ ἃ Τυρίων οὐχ ὑποταγέντων πάλιν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὑπέστρεψε Φοινίκων συμπληρωσάντων αὐτῷ ναῦς ἑξήκοντα καὶ ἐπικώπους ὀκτακοσίους […] καὶ τοῦτο ἔτεσι πέντε γενόμενον.

31 To claim that Eloulaios in Josephus' account maintained an effectively 'pro-Assyrian' stance might seem excessive; nevertheless, the fact remains that nothing in the words of the Hellenized Jewish historian suggests that the king of Tyre had been a "rebel" in any way.

3. The Ideological Repertoire Concerning "Rebellion" and "Rebels" in the Official Records of the Persian Great Kings – and its Greek 'Counterpart'

Turning now to the more recent period that directly concerns us, it is clear that the place of the Achaemenid Persian Empire in Greek (above all, Athenian) history, politics, memory, and thus also ideology[32] represented an exceptionally fertile ground for the growth of multiple layers of *biases*, that have long weighed (and still continue to weigh) upon our understanding of ancient Persia. Although this is not the place to attempt to disentangle such a vast issue, it must first be observed that, within the framework of the Achaemenid religious ideology of the power of the Great King over *būmi* (Old Persian for the «earth,» that is to say, the «world» entrusted to him by the divinity Ahuramazdā),[33] "rebellion" was far more than the simple practical recognition of a group's insubordination.[34]

In a system – if we may simplify – that conceived of reality in terms of the dualism of Good (Ahuramazdā) and Evil (Ahriman), respectively embodied in the human action as the concepts of Truth (*arta*) and Lie (*draṷga*), to rebel against the authority of the «King of Kings, King of All the World, King of All Nations,»[35] whose legitimacy derived directly and indisputably from the supreme god, was equivalent to embrace openly the cause of the Lie. That is, of Evil. Indeed, it amounted not merely to disobedience against the political and military

32 The reference work in this regard, providing a survey of the principal Greek sources and authors dealing with Περσικά, is Dominique Lenfant, *Les Perses vus par les Grecs. Lire les sources classiques sur l'empire achéménide*, Armand Colin, Paris 2011.

33 On the symbolic and religious significance of *būmi* within Achaemenid imperial worldviews, see Briant, *Histoire* cit., pp. 191-194. On the conceptual apparatus to which it belonged, now Eduard Rung, «War and Ideology in Achaemenid Persia», in *Brill's Companion to War in the Ancient Iranian Empires*, John O. Hyland, Khodadad Rezakhani (ed. by), Brill, Leiden 2025, pp. 91-97. Note that already for Clarisse Herrenschmidt, «Désignation de l'empire et concepts politiques de Darius Ier d'après ses inscriptions en Vieux Perse», *StIr*, 5, 1976, pp. 33-65, the notion of *būmi* was considered equivalent to that of *xšaça* («rulership, kingdom, empire») by the Great Kings – and such a definition seems quite apt for our purposes.

34 Discussing the consideration and depiction of the "rebels" at Behistun (see below), Bruce Lincoln, «Rebellion and Treatment of Rebels in the Achaemenian Empire», *Archiv für Religionsgeschichte,* 7, 2005, pp. 167–179.

35 This being a reasonable adaptation and synthesis of the numerous royal titularies that are attested in the official inscriptions of Darius I and his successors. See Rung, *War and Ideology* cit., p. 91.

order represented by the Persian Empire and its institutions, but also to rejection of the sacred cosmic order created by Ahuramazdā and embodied in / enacted by the Great King.[36]

This is illustrated with particular intensity in the great trilingual cuneiform inscription (written in Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian) of Behistun (Bisotun/ Bisitun) in Media.[37] In this great royal scenography, Darius I (c. in 519/8) summarized[38] the campaigns he had fought against the rebellions which had spread across the empire between 522-521/0 and their leaders (i.e., the quest(s) for rule that had erupted after Cambyses' death and the murder of Bardiya).[39] As we

36 Again, Lincoln, *Treatment of Rebels* cit. More focused, instead, on the practical and military aspects of the rebellion(s) in the Persian Empire is now Orestis Belogiannis, «Revolts and the Persian Great Kings: Active Involvement or Careful Abstention?», *Klio*, 106, 2, 2024, pp. 421-441. See also the broader historical and ideological framework in the fluent paper of Elspeth R.M. Dusinberre, «Resistance, Revolt and Revolution in Achaemenid Persia: Response», in *Revolt and Resistance in the Ancient Classical World and the Near East. In the Crucible of Empire* (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East, 85), John J. Collins, J.G. Manning (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 122-137. Most recently, Jennifer Finn, «The Grand Strategy of Achaemenid Persia, 539–331 BCE», in *Brill's Companion to War in the Ancient Iranian Empires*, John O. Hyland, Khodadad Rezakhani (ed. by), Brill, Leiden 2025, pp. 120-156, more concretely introduces the dimension of "rebellion" against the Great King – and the royal response such an act entailed – as an integral and essential component of an Achaemenid "grand strategy." At any rate, see in particular her conclusions (pp. 149-150): "[… imperial control] strategies were not always successful or well received, and the Persians spent a significant amount of time and resources in quelling imperial rebellions […] there was truly a range of Persian reaction to rebellion and we should view them on an *ad hoc* basis: […] The result is not a single Achaemenid grand strategy, but one that was flexible within all chronological and geographical boundaries."

37 The (transliterated) text of its Old Persian version – which is most relevant for our purposes – is provided in Rüdiger Schmitt, *Die altpersischen Inschriften der Achaimeniden,* Editio minor *mit deutsche* Übersetzung, Reicher, Wiesbaden 2009, pp. 36-91. A useful English translation is given in Kuhrt, *Corpus* cit., pp. 141-158. The internal subdivisions of the text are taken from the reference edition of Roland G. Kent, *Old Persian. Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*, American Oriental Society, New Haven 1950 (DB: pp. 116-134).

38 On the assessment of the Behistun inscription as a properly 'historical' source, and the many issues it raises in this sense, Robert Rollinger, «Thinking and Writing about History in Teispid and Achaemenid Persia», in *Thinking, Recording, and Writing History in the Ancient World*, Kurt A. Raaflaub (ed. by), Wiley Blackwell, Malden (MA) – Oxford 2014, pp. 187-212.

39 For a brief overview, see Belogiannis, *Revolts* cit., pp. 423–425. Historical context and a useful summary of the events in Gundula Schwinghammer, «Imperial Crisis», in *A Companion to the Achaemenid Persian Empire*, vol. I, Bruno Jacobs, Robert Rollinger (ed. by), Wiley Blackwell, Hoboken (NJ) 2021, pp. 417-427. Showing the more strictly mil-

learn both from his inscribed wording and the accompanying bombastic reliefs, the King had presented those events precisely as a struggle of Truth and Justice against Lie (Falsehood) and Treachery.[40] For all the overtly 'propagandistic' character of such a testimony, Darius proclaimed with insistence and conviction the righteousness of his actions, declaring that he[41] had «rewarded the man who did good to [his] House, and punished the one who did it harm».[42] That is to say, he

itary aspects of these events, consult the extensive monograph of Sean Manning, *Armed Force in the Teispid–Achaemenid Empire. Past Approaches, Future Prospects*, Steiner, Stuttgart 2021 (Oriens et Occidens, 32), pp. 133-154.

40 According to such a logic, to betray also meant to break one's word, and therefore one's oaths, which held fundamental value within the ideological framework of royal power (cf., e.g., DB §8). For a detailed study on this conception, with a case drawn from the time of Xerxes' invasion of Greece in 480, see Matt Waters, «Xerxes and the Oathbreakers: Empire and Rebellion on the Northwestern Front», in *Revolt and Resistance in the Ancient Classical World and the Near East. In the Crucible of Empire* (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East, 85), John J. Collins, J.G. Manning (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 91-102. With regard to the long preceding tradition of the depiction of the King's word(s) as the "word(s) of truth" in the Near East, from the third millennium and culminating, indeed, in the official language of the Old Persian royal inscriptions of Darius and his successors, see now Nino Luraghi, «The Word of the King: Royal Truthfulness and Some Cases of Multilingualism in Ancient Eurasia», *Klio*, 107, 1, 2025, pp. 2-22.

41 However, as Belogiannis, *Revolts* cit., pp. 433–438 rightly notes, the fact that Darius personally led his troops in certain phases of the repression between 522 and 521/0 depended primarily on circumstances (which compelled him to do so, given the multiple contemporaneously active fronts), rather than on any *systematic* will or need, on the part of the Great King, to conduct 'counterinsurgency' operations in person. Quite the contrary: since these were not campaigns bound for conquest or aimed at extending divine order across *būmi* (on which, due to the venue of this paper, I may refer the Italian readers of this journal to my paper Vittorio Cisnetti, «La 'legge della conquista' achemenide e i preparativi militari dei Persiani. Necessità documentaria, necessità regia e necessità sul campo», *NAM*, 4, 14, 2023, pp. 5-78.), but merely efforts to restore an (imperial) authority which had already been established. Therefore, the King normally delegated the conduct of military repression on the field to his generals, subordinates, and relatives, who acted fully in his stead. This was demonstrated by numerous examples across the entire course of Achaemenid history, especially recorded in Greek sources. Indeed, the category of "rebellion" scarcely found a place between the states of 'war' and 'peace' within imperial ideology; rather, it occupied what might be termed a 'hybrid' position, to be treated accordingly in a manner neither equivalent nor commensurate with pure conquest. See, at any rate, Christopher J. Tuplin, «War and Peace in Achaemenid Ideology», *Electrum*, 24, 2017, p. 33, precisely on Behistun and other inscriptions like DNb: "by speaking of lack of panic in the face of rebels (the term found passim in the Behistun inscription to describe Darius' rivals), the text pictures war as essentially a response to disorder."

42 Cf. DB §8: «Among these peoples, the man who was loyal, him I rewarded; he who was faithless, I punished»; §63: «For this reason Ahuramazdā helped me […] because I was

punished those who did arm to the (his) empire by rebelling against him and his power: indeed, all the insurgent leaders that defied Darius' lordship were dubbed at Behistun properly as «rebel(s)» (Old Persian *arīkā*, *hamiçiyā*).[43]

Predictably, this deep Persian and Near Eastern ideological and religious substrate concerning the theme of "rebellion"[44] is entirely absent from the Graeco-Roman (Classical) historiographical and literary tradition. As is understandable in the wake of the collective memory of the great Persian Wars of the early fifth century (and their intermittent continuation over the subsequent decades), Greek writers remained consistently focused on identifying and describing acts of insubordination, sedition, and revolt within the boundaries of the Achaemenid Empire. Above all, for obvious reasons, attention was concentrated on those episodes that occurred (or were believed to have occurred) in the empire's westernmost regions: Asia Minor, the Levantine coast, and Egypt. It is worth noting that at the very centre of the 'Mediterranean front' of the Achaemenid Empire laid the island of Cyprus. And apparently Cyprus was, as we have already seen for Neo-Assyrian times, a particularly fertile ground for rebellions or purported seditions.

---

not disloyal, I was not a follower of the Lie, I was not an evildoer – neither I nor my family. I acted according to righteousness. Neither to the powerless nor to the powerful did I do wrong. Him who strove for my house, him I treated well; him who did harm, I punished well». See Rung, *War and Ideology* cit. pp. 106-110.

43 And as a matter of fact, this terminology occurred multiple times within the formulaic language of the inscription. We just put together here some instances: cf. DB §10 («When Cambyses had set out for Egypt, after that the people became disloyal [*arīka*], and Falsehood grew greatly in the land…»); §54 («These (are) the countries which became rebellious [*hamiçiyā*]. Falsehood made them rebellious, because these (men) lied to the people»); §§25–30, 33, 38, 41–42, 45–46 («By the favour of Ahuramazdā my army defeated that rebellious army [*kāram tayam hamiçiyam*] utterly»); §§18–19, 35 (the same utterances, but by Darius' generals). This collection of references is shown also in Rung, *War and Ideology* cit., p. 103.

44 For the attitude adopted by the King toward the figure of the rebel, according to the courtly lexicon of the inscriptions, one might consider also (e.g.): DNb §§7–9 («At once my intelligence stands in its (proper) place, whether I see a rebel, (before me) or not. Both by intelligence and by command at that time I regard myself as superior to panic, when I see a rebel (before me) just as when I do not see (one)»); or the Egyptian hieroglyphic text on the statue of Darius at Susa, DSab, section b («… the goddess Neith has given him the bow she holds, to throw back all his enemies, […] so that he may be effective in repelling those who rebel against him, to reduce those who rebel against him in the two lands» – Kuhrt, *Corpus* cit., pp. 477-482).

For Greek historiographers (writers of *historia*), but even more so in the highly rhetorical and purposefully directed works of orators, poets, and playwrights, the presence of unrest(s) within the rival empire provided tangible (albeit indirect) confirmation that centrifugal and internal pressures threatened the authority of the Great King, potentially jeopardizing the cohesion of the entire Achaemenid system.[45] The fact that insubordinations occurred with some regularity across almost all regions of the empire over more than two centuries,[46] and that they actually assumed an endemic character in certain territories – including, notably, Aegean Asia Minor[47] and Egypt[48] – could only lead Greek authors to perceive "rebellion" as a veritable 'Sword of Damocles.' A threat, that is to say, that was perpetually pending over the neck of the Great King, his administrators, and his army.

This perspective inevitably involved an extreme emphasis on individual events, exaggerating their scale and, in fact, conflating incidents that had been geographically distant and causally unconnected. This was the case, for instance, with the so-called 'Great Satraps' Revolt' of the 360s.[49] But it was also the case,

45 Cfr., e.g., Isocr. 4.161, 5.102, on the 'Mediterranean front' of the empire in a continuous state of insubordination.

46 Belogiannis, *Revolts* cit., is clear on this point, as he explicitly attempts a *longue-durée* survey of the various episodes of rebellion occurred within the empire in two centuries, drawing both on the Classical sources and (where possible) on local or imperial evidence. A more concise overview is likewise provided by Dusinberre, *Resistance* cit. For the articulation of the concept of rebellion in the Behistun inscription (basically, the only non-Classical source available on this topic), see Lincoln, *Treatment of Rebels* cit.

47 A territory which, of course, was engaged for a long time with the political affairs of mainland Greece. For a rich analysis of the troubles in Aegean Asia Minor before the King's Peace of 386 from an Achaemenid perspective, see John O. Hyland, *Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450–386 BCE*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2017.

48 Which, as is well known, in the fourth century successfully broke free of Persian control for roughly sixty years. See Stephen Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West. Egypt and the Persian Empire 525–332 BCE*, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2012, pp. 35-198; Agnieszka Wojciechowska, *From Amyrtaeus to Ptolemy. Egypt in the Fourth Century B.C.*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2016 (Philippika, 97), pp. 21-72.

49 On this cornerstone of fourth-century Greek interpretations on the inherent weakness(es) of the Persian Empire, as opposed to a reality that had been, in fact, extremely exaggerated, see in great detail the monograph of Michael Weiskopf, *The So-called "Great Satraps' Revolt", 366–360 B.C. Concerning Local Instability in the Achaemenid Far West*, Steiner, Stuttgart 1989 (Historia Einzelschriften, 63). Also, Briant, *Histoire* cit., pp. 675-694; Ruzicka, *Trouble* cit., pp. 134-150; and most recently Orestis Belogiannis, «La "grande révolte satrapique": un réexamen», *Ktèma*, 49, 2024, pp. 223-245.

two decades earlier and in roughly the same maritime regions, of the localized disturbances that had been linked to the famous «Cypriot War» fought by King Artaxerxes II against Euagoras, the ruler (himself, a king) of Salamis in Cyprus (to be discussed in *Section 4*). More broadly, the proliferation of "rebellions" in the empire's Western satrapies – especially, indeed, during the first half of the fourth century – served in the eyes of Greek intellectual circles as compelling evidence to substantiate the increasingly widespread view of the allegedly inexorable 'Persian decadence.' This was a narrative that has profoundly shaped and continues to shape conceptions of Achaemenid Persian history.[50]

In short, for the Greek writers of the Classical Age, "rebellion" within the Persian Empire was a theme, indeed a *trope* to be sought out, amplified, and exploited to the fullest. If not, we may fairly say, almost entirely invented: and all just to exhort their fellow Greek compatriots to take up arms against the old-standing 'barbarian' enemy. This was in fact particularly true of the voice of the great Athenian orator Isocrates,[51] and more generally of those who viewed the reign of Cyrus and his successors simply as one piece in the broader mosaic of the *translatio imperii*, whose baton (looking *ex post*, obviously) would shortly pass to Alexander's Macedonians (and ultimately to Rome).

In this respect, it is enough for us to observe the frequency with which the most widely used Greek noun for «rebellion,» ἀπόστασις (not considering here the various forms of the verb ἀφίστημι, from which it derived),[52] occurred among the foremost writers in contexts relating to the Persians. That is to say, more precisely, in passages describing rebellions or uprisings that (had) took place within the borders of the Achaemenid Empire, involving either entire subjugated populations, groups or individuals of non-Iranian descent, but also (sometimes: *and* also) Persian members of the royal administration. Among the seventy-seven rel-

50 For the theme (trope) of 'Persian decadence' – starting in Greek historical interpretation especially from the foundational case of the dynastic war between Artaxerxes II and Cyrus the Younger in 401/0 – Dominique Lenfant, «La «décadence» du Grand Roi et les ambitions de Cyrus le Jeune: aux sources perses d'un mythe occidental?», *REG*, 114, 2, 2001, pp. 407-438.

51 Briefly, on Isocrates' view(s) of Persia over the course of his long career as an orator, Dominique Lenfant, «Isocrate et la vision occidentale des rapports gréco-perses», in *Isocrate. Entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux politiques*, C. Bouchet, P. Giovannelli-Jouanna (éd. par), Université Jean Moulin, Lyon 2015, pp. 273-285.

52 *LSJ*, s.v. ἀπόστασις, "causing to revolt, defection, revolt, departure from, distance;" ἀφίστημι, "put away, remove, keep out of the way, cause to revolt."

evant occurrences we have collected through a search on the *TLG* (see *Chart 1*) the greatest frequencies appeared in Herodotus and Xenophon, both particularly concerned on and interested in the Persian world.[53] But above all, the most references to ἀπόστασις in the Persian Empire occurred in Diodorus Siculus.[54] Indeed, the work of the latter compiler (writing in the first century A.D.), known as the *Library of History*, constitutes an essential source for retracing and assessing the events under discussion in the next two *Sections*.

4. The Alleged Upheaval of Euagoras against Artaxerxes and its Accounts

In light of what has been discussed so far, the first of our two selected case studies concerns what, according to Diodorus (and also to the previously mentioned Isocrates), was known – and still is in scholarship – as the «Cypriot War» (*Kypriakos polemos*).[55] This was a conflict of considerable scale, lasting «ten years» (again, according to Isocrates and Diodorus)[56] roughly between 391/0 and 380,[57] and which was fought across various territories along the 'Mediterranean

53 With 16 and 7 relevant occurrences respectively. Herodotus: Hdt. 1.124.2-3, 130.2, 156.1; 3.128.3; 5.35 (three times), 104.1, 105.1, 113.2; 6.1.2, 2.1, 4.1, 9.3, 11.2, 18.1, 25.2, 46.1; 7.4.1; 9.103.2. Xenophon: Xen. *HG* 1.2.19; 4.1.27; *An.* 1.4.3, 6.7; 3.2.5; *Cyr.* 4.5.24; *Ages.* 7.7.

54 The total number of relevant occurrences in Diodorus is 20. References follow: Diod. Sic. 1.44.3; (2.33.3); 5.52.3; 11 introduction, 34.5, 71.6; (13.22.2), 46.6; 15.18.1, 90.4, 91.3-6, 92.1-5; 16.22.1, 34.2, 40.4-5, 41.6, 43.3, 45.2, 52.2-7.

55 Actually, there are many definitions (rather, labels) for the conflict in the relevant sources. All have their own value and nuances (even if their differences appear minimal), as each of them captures a particular aspect of the historical and geographical dimensions that were involved in this fully *Mediterranean* conflict. Cf. Isocr. 9.58, τὸν ἐν Κύπρῳ πόλεμον; 9.67, τὸν πόλεμον τὸν περὶ Κύπρον; and the most generic Diod. Sic. 15.9.2, ὁ Κυπριακὸς πόλεμος.

56 Cf. Isocr. 9.64: «… he [Artaxerxes II] had waged war against Euagoras for ten years» (Εὐαγόρα δὲ πολεμήσας ἔτη δέκα); Diod. Sic. 15.9.2, «So the Cyprian War, which had lasted for approximately ten years, although the larger part of the period was spent in preparations and there were in all but two years of continuous warfare, came to the end in this way» (ὁ μὲν οὖν Κυπριακὸς πόλεμος δεκαετὴς σχεδὸν γεγενημένος καὶ τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου περὶ παρασκευὰς ἀσχοληθείς, διετῆ χρόνον τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι συνεχῶς πολεμηθεὶς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατελύθη). However, as may be inferred from these rather approximate statements, the chronology of the «Cypriot War» is complicated by incoherences in Diodorus, and the span of ten years is a maximum. See next footnote.

57 This is the approximate, yet most reliable and accepted dating – that we adopt here, on the base of Diodorus' account, from P.J. Stylianou, *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998, pp. 143-154. See also, yet slightly differ-



Chart 1. The frequency of lemmas containing ἀπόστα- (the noun ἀπόστασις and verbal–adjectival forms derived from ἀφίστημι) in narrative contexts relating to the Persian Empire, in the major Greek authors and works. Designed by the Author.

front' of the Achaemenid Empire.

Briefly speaking, the war pitted the then Great King, Artaxerxes II, his armies, and his fleet against a bloc[58] which is commonly described as a "rebel/secessionist" one. In the more simplistic interpretations, derived from a cursory reading of the two aforementioned sources, such an alleged bloc had been centred on Euagoras I, king of the Greek (i.e., Greek-speaking) city of Salamis on the north-eastern coast of Cyprus.[59] As we learn from a few hints in Diodorus (here, as elsewhere

ently, in KÖRNER, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 249-262.

58 But rightly so, as we will note shortly, it was not a generalized uprising ("un embrasement généralisé") between Euagoras, Cyprus, Egypt, and the rest of the Achaemenid Levant overall, as observed by BRIANT, *Histoire* cit., pp. 668-671.

59 An essential biographical profile of Euagoras can be found in the entry by Peter HÖGEMANN in the online edition (2006) of *Brill's New Pauly*; also in *EDPC* I, pp. 85–87. For the cir-

for what concerns Persian matters, depending on Ephorus of Cyme)[60] and drawing from an exceptional Phoenician inscription discovered in nearby Kition,[61] toward the end of the preceding decade (i.e., from c. 393 to 391, if not already before) Euagoras had pursued a quite intense expansionist policy in the island. His aims had been to bring the other cities under his (Salamis') control. Yet he did never proclaim directly any intention to secede from the Persian Empire, nor to deny the supreme authority (i.e., the suzerainty) of the Great King.[62]

Artaxerxes, however, understandably perceived Euagoras' actions as a potential threat to the stability of the Persian hold over the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, as we read again most extensively in Diodorus, he decided to curb the ambitions of the Cypriot kinglet – who remained, in all respects, his subject (*doulos*)[63]. And

---

cumstances of Euagoras' accession to the throne, around 411, and the related Greek sources, an overview especially concerned with his early relations with the Persian suzerain was offered by Eugene A. Costa, «Evagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411 to 391 B.C.», *Historia (Stuttgart)*, 23, 1974, pp. 40-48. Now, Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 239-240.

60 See the opening discussion about sources and methods for Diodorus' Book 15 by Stylianou, *Commentary* cit., pp. 25-139 – whose conclusions are generally valid also for the end of Book 14 (see below). Note that Ephorus, writing around the mid-fourth century on previous and contemporary subjects, allegedly had been himself a pupil of Isocrates. Cf. Eph. *BNJ* 70 T 28a (= Suid. s.v. Ἔφορος Κυμαῖος καὶ Θεόπομπος Δαμασιστράτου Χῖος): ἄμφω Ἰσοκράτους μαθηταί (with reference also to Theopompus).

61 Cf. Diod. Sic. 14.98.2-4 (along with the discussed note of Eph. *BNJ* 70 F 76), 110,5. For a rapid reassessment of the historical and interpretive issues on the «trophy» inscribed at Kition by the local king Milkyaton (*KAI*[5] 288; Briant, *Histoire* cit., p. 666; Kuhrt, *Corpus* cit., pp. 384-386; Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 246-249), see Paul G. Mosca, «Facts or Factoids? Some Historical Observations on the Trophy Inscription from Kition (KAI 288)», in *Exploring the* Longue Durée. *Essays in Honor of Lawrence E. Stager*, J. David Schloen (ed. by), Eisenbrauns, Winona Lake 2009, pp. 345-349.

62 This, in fact, was the now-classical position of Costa, *Evagoras I* cit. Indeed, in the last decades it has been explored and discussed by many scholars, e.g. in Briant, *Histoire* cit., pp. 654-656, 664-671; Zournatzi, *Persian Rule* cit., pp. 33-47; and most recently, Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 239-249. See, however (as below in the text), the reassessment of the issue proposed by Antigoni Zournatzi, «Smoke and Mirrors: Persia's Aegean Policy and the Outbreak of the 'Cypriot War'», in *Salamis of Cyprus. History and Archaeology from the Earliest Times to Late Antiquity, Conference in Nicosia, 21-23 May 2015*, Sabine Rogge, Christina Joannou, Theodoros Mavrojannis (ed. by), Waxmann, Münster 2019, pp. 314-326.

63 It appears that the dispute reported by Diodorus concerning the terms of peace that had been proposed to Euagoras by Tiribazus – and that had been accepted by the Cypriot ruler with the exception of a single clause – hinged precisely on the definition of δοῦλος, and its practical implications for Euagoras. In fact, the Salaminian kinglet is said to have

he did so by dispatching two successive military expeditions to Cyprus.[64] These forces engaged, albeit intermittently, in both land and naval confrontations with Euagoras' bloc on the island and along the adjacent countries on the continent, from Cilicia to Phoenicia, while simultaneously contending with Egypt – which had achieved full independence from Persian control fifteen years earlier. It was Egypt, in fact, that constituted the true cohesive and driving anti-Persian force during the war, far more than Euagoras could have managed (or could have appeared to manage) on his own.[65]

---

refused to carry out the orders of the Great King Artaxerxes in keeping with the formula «as a slave to a master» (ὡς δοῦλος δεσπότῃ), insisting instead on doing so on a higher, more symmetrical footing, «as king to king» (ὡς βασιλέα βασιλεῖ). When negotiations with Tiribazus foundered on this point, Orontes himself, upon resuming the talks at a later stage, ultimately acceded to Euagoras' demand. This request, evidently, cannot be reduced to a mere matter of diplomatic or chancery formulae, but must have entailed very practical consequences for Euagoras' status within the imperial order, and therefore the criteria of suzerainty (see *Section 6*). This could have been so especially if, as seems more appropriate, the designation of δοῦλος attested in the Greek source is to be associated with the official courtly label of Old Persian *bandaka*, which in the Achaemenid royal inscriptions and titulary denoted a high-ranking military and/or administrative officer, *appointed by the imperial authority*. Cf. Diod. Sic. 15.8.2-3, along with STYLIANOU, *Commentary* cit., pp. 180-181 *ad loc.*; 9.2. A bombastic pro-Euagorean allusion to the issue and its outcome was in Isocr. 9.63: … οὐδὲν δὲ [the Persian Kings] κινήσαντες τῆς Εὐαγόρου τυραννίδος. STYLIANOU, *Kingdoms* cit., pp. 477-479; BRIANT, *Histoire* cit., p. 671; ZOURNATZI, *Persian Rule* cit., pp. 66-73; KÖRNER, *Cypriot Kings* cit., pp. 36-40; KÖRNER, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 262-265; KÖRNER, *Kings of Salamis* cit., pp. 330-334.

64 Here follow the relevant sources. For the first Persian attack to Cyprus (in 390, led by Hecatomnus and Autophradates): cf. Isocr. 9.58, 60-62, 64; Theopomp. *BNJ* 115 F 103, 4; Diod. Sic. 14.98.2-4 (and also Eph. *BNJ* 70 F 76). For the second imperial intervention (started in 387/6, led by Tiribazus and Orontes): cf. Isocr. 4.161, 9.63-64; Theopomp. *BNJ* 115 F 103, 9-11; Diod. Sic. 1.6-4.3, 8.1-9.3. This event in the war was actually testified also by non-Greek documents, such as: a passage in a Babylonian astronomical diary concerning Artaxerxes II's 23rd regnal year, 382/1 (on the cuneiform tablet BM 33478 [= No. -440], *verso* 4'–5'); possibly, a Sabaean inscription on a bronze plaque coming from Southern Arabia (*B-L* Nashq / Demirjian 1) and relating a war fought in Cyprus between the «Ionians» (Euagoras?) and the «Chaldeans» (the Achaemenid Empire?); the 'war' coins of the satrap–commander Tiribazus found in the military settlements of Eastern Cilicia, which are dated to those years.

65 On the participation of Egypt to the war, and its undisputable centrality (regardless of the Greek sources' primary focus on Euagoras), see BRIANT, *Histoire* cit., pp. 666-671; RUZICKA, *Trouble* cit., pp. 83-98; WOJCIECHOWSKA, *Amyrtaeus* cit., pp. 31-38. A detailed *aperçu* on the internal political and dynastic strives in Egypt during this period (i.e., under the reign of Achoris) is offered in Jean-Y. CARREZ-MARATRAY, «Psammétique le tyran. Pouvoir, usurpation et alliances en Méditerranée orientale au IVe siècle avant J.-C.», *Trans*, 30, 2005, pp. 37-63. Of limited practical significance was, instead, Athens' support to Eu-

Reconstructing the various phases of the «Cypriot War» is not among our objectives here,[66] not least because the chronology and the sequence of the events are notoriously matters of debate. It should be sufficient here to note that Artaxerxes II's investment in the war – both economic and military – was considerable,[67] so that the campaign ultimately resulted in a clear Persian victory, ensuring the retention of Cyprus under the Achaemenids until after the Battle of Issus.[68] What concerns us here is that, from the moment the Great King chose to confront him directly, Euagoras came to be universally regarded as a "rebel" by all parties involved in the war. He was so by the Persians, of course, since his resistance opposed the(ir) imperial order (which required them to curb Salamis' expansion). Likewise, he came to be considered a "rebel" by external observers in Greece, who (most notably, Isocrates) saw in his anti-Persian deeds during the 380s a renewed struggle against the 'barbarian,' casting Euagoras as a 'Pan-Hellenic'

agoras, which, in any case, lapsed even on the diplomatic level after the King's Peace of 386. For a discussion on the sources, P.J. Stylianou, «How Many Naval Squadrons Did Athens Send to Evagoras?», *Historia (Stuttgart)*, 37, 4, 1988, pp. 463-471.

66 To no comparison, the most comprehensive reconstruction of the *Kypriakos polemos* to date is that of Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 249-269. In our view, however, the political and strategic activity carried out by Euagoras over the preceding decade – and even prior to the Battle of Cnidus (394) – should also be considered part of the same conflict, beginning with the Salaminian kinglet's involvement in Conon's anti-Spartan naval campaign. For the relevant sources and their interpretation, see Costa, *Evagoras I* cit., pp. 48-50; Luca Asmonti, *Conon the Athenian: Politics and Warfare in the Aegean, 414–386 B.C.*, Steiner, Stuttgart 2015 (Historia Einzelschriften, 235), especially pp. 104–116; Körner, ibid., pp. 240-243. This would represent, after all, what one could term the '*phase zero*' of the «Cypriot War,» following e.g. the line of Zournatzi, *Smoke* cit.

67 Setting aside the extravagant sums reported by Isocrates – no less than 15,000 talents spent on the war (9.60) – and the long-standing issues surrounding the figures for Achaemenid mobilizations in Greek tradition, Diodorus (15.2.1) recorded no fewer than 300 triremes and 300,000 men that were deployed by the Persians on that occasion. In any case, that was undoubtedly a considerable commitment for the empire.

68 It is very difficult to understand the role of Cyprus during the period of the 'Great Satraps' Revolt,' only on the base of the mention of οἱ παραθαλάσσιοι found passingly in Diod. Sic. 15.90.3. On this, Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 272-273; Elayi, *History* cit., pp. 260-266. The only episode of further insurrection in Cyprus was, therefore, the uprising in the early 340s, which followed that of Sidon in Phoenicia and was led by Salamis and its king Pnytagoras (cf. Diod. Sic. 16.42.3-7, 46.1-3). According to Diodorus, however, this revolt required a minimal deployment of Persian forces to be quelled, especially if compared to those that had been mobilized forty years earlier against Euagoras. On this episode, see Körner, *ibid.*, pp. 273-276; Elayi, *ibid.*, pp. 268-273.

champion and Salamis as a bastion of Greek identity.[69] Last but not least, by in fact acting in revolt against the imperial authorities, Euagoras ultimately came to be regarded as such even by his subordinates and allies[70] (the Egyptians foremost among them).

As a matter of fact, most of the information we possess regarding this figure and these events derives, from no surprise, primarily from Greek sources. Therefore, this carries on all the forms of *bias* we have discussed so far. Yet, when comparing the most significant of these sources, it becomes evident that the very definition of Salamis' "rebellion" and of Euagoras as a "rebel"[71] was not understood or presented to audiences of listeners and readers in a univocal manner. On the contrary, a careful reading of specific passages reveals, in our view, some interesting – and not merely marginal – nuances concerning the motivations for the Persian intervention in Cyprus. And so, about the very characterization of Euagoras as the leader of a "rebellion" (ἀπόστασις). Let us now turn, therefore, to the most significant examples.

The earliest testimony at our disposal – and as such, the closest in time to the events at issue – is, of course, that preserved in Isocrates' encomiastic funeral oration *Euagoras*, composed after the death of the Salaminian kinglet around 370. Here, the author, praising the deeds of *his* great champion of 'Greekness' in Cyprus, asserted that it had been the Great King, Artaxerxes II, who in 391/0

69 On the roots and implications of Isocrates' political perspective in the *Euagoras*, see Evangelos Alexiou, «The Rhetoric of Isocrates' Evagoras: History, Ethics and Politics», in *Isocrate. Entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux politiques*, C. Bouchet, P. Giovannelli-Jouanna (éd. par), Université Jean Moulin, Lyon 2015, pp. 47-61.

70 Diodorus (15.2.3) referred to a *bona fide* alliance concluded by Euagoras with Achoris, an «enemy of the Persians» (ὁ δ᾽ Εὐαγόρας πρὸς μὲν τὸν Ἄκοριν τὸν Αἰγυπτίων βασιλέα, πολέμιον ὄντα Περσῶν, συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο). Yet, the *symmachoi* of the Salaminian should be understood in the literal, etymological sense of that word: namely, peoples and states who, due to various contingencies, came to "fight together," that is, on the same front as Euagoras (according to Diodorus, these had been: Egypt; Athens with Chabrias before 386; the conquered Phoenician cities; Hecatomnus himself, who complied with the Salaminians; and the mysterious ὁ τῶν Ἀράβων βασιλεὺς).

71 Among the instances in which the principal Greek words for "revolt," ἀπόστασις and ἀφίστημι, were explicitly applied to the case of Euagoras, cf. Isocr. 4.134-135: … περὶ Κύπρον… οἵ τε γὰρ ἀφεστῶτες…, 9.63: εἰθισμένων τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τῶν βασιλέων μὴ διαλλάττεσθαι τοῖς ἀποστᾶσιν πρὶν κύριοι γένοιντο τῶν σωμάτων, ἄσμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσαντο.

decided to attack Euagoras,[72] whom – quoting directly – he had long feared.[73] At first glance, such a statement might appear to absolve Euagoras from the charge of having provoked the empire's violent response through his political and military conduct. Indeed, scholars have often suggested a substantive 'innocence,' so to speak, on the part of the Salaminian ruler,[74] who may have expected to enjoy free rein in Cyprus in light of his prior services to Persia, without deliberately harming Artaxerxes' interests.[75]

Yet the words of the Athenian orator actually delineated a far more complex situation. For while the Persian intervention had been apparently in no way openly provoked by Euagoras, and was in fact decided while Artaxerxes was «still receiving benefits» from the Cypriot, as explicitly stated, this act was nonetheless formally «unjust» (δίκαια μὲν οὐ ποιῶν), though by no means «entirely illogical» in the perspective of the Great King (οὐ μὴν παντάπασιν ἀλόγως βουλευσάμενος).[76] In other words, Isocrates evidently recognized that Euagoras' activities in Cyprus[77] – motivating the «fear» (περιδεῶς) of him by Artaxerxes – could legitimately have prompted the Achaemenid court and military authorities

72 This historical moment appeared to be crystallized, very precisely, in the words of Diod. Sic. 14.98.2-4 (a passage discussed further below in this *Section*).

73 Isocr. 9.58: ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς [Artaxerxes].

74 Indeed, this is what one may deduce from such words as «… but when he [Euagoras] was forced to go to war, he proved so valiant…» (ἐπειδὴ δ' ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν, τοιοῦτος ἦν…, Isocr. 9.62). However, Zournatzi, *Smoke* cit., p. 315 is right in stressing that "Isocrates' insistence on the innocence of Evagoras for the feud with Artaxerxes would appear to be strictly dictated by the encomiastic purposes of Isocrates' oration."

75 The first scholar to advance such a perspective, concerning Euagoras' allegedly continued "loyalty" to Artaxerxes prior to the Persian attack of 390, was Costa, *Evagoras I* cit.: "It would appear that Evagoras expected Artaxerxes to turn a blind eye to his resumed program of conquest" (p. 54). As noted by Zournatzi, *Smoke* cit. (and here, below), however, the issue – even as Isocrates and Diodorus themselves recounted it – appears hardly reducible to such terms. In the words of Briant (*Histoire* cit., p. 681): "La frontière entre loyauté et rébellion était donc mince et poreuse: c'est le jugement du roi qui en décidait, comme le montre si clairement la comparution de Tiribaze, dénoncé par Orontès."

76 Isocr. 9.58: «… With regard to Euagoras, however, the King [Artaxerxes] had stood in terror of him for so long a time that even while he was receiving benefits from him he had undertaken to make war upon him – a wrongful act, indeed, but his purpose was not altogether unreasonable» (πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχεν, ὥστε μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ ποιῶν, οὐ μὴν παντάπασιν ἀλόγως βουλευσάμενος).

77 Namely, the military and diplomatic pressures imposed by Salamis upon its neighbours across the island in the (late) 390s.

to dispatch army and fleet to the island. The Persian attack of 390 was thus, if formally unprovoked, at least rendered highly required given Euagoras' previous conduct. This observation, articulated by the master of Pan-Hellenic oratory to exalt the virtue and the military skill of his Salaminian champion, amounts, for our purposes, to an implicit acknowledgment (also) of Euagoras' responsibility.[78] And, consequently, of his status as a "rebel," and provocateur.

If, then, Isocrates seems to have in some way acknowledged if not the justice, at least the underlying necessity of the conception and designation of Euagoras as a "rebel" by the Persians,[79] other Greek authors also adhered (albeit distantly and with varying tones) to that original binary schema of Truth/Lie and Loyalty/Sedition, which framed the figure and the actions of the "rebels" in the official Achaemenid narrative (see above, *Section 3*). According to such a narrative, Euagoras was, indeed, to be understood in essentially the same way as any of the numerous rebel leaders that had ultimately been subdued by Darius according to the text of the Behistun inscription.[80]

The notion of an Euagoras having been almost 'taken by surprise' by Artaxerxes' attack, yet simultaneously of a Great King that had been compelled to move against Cyprus by the pressing need to restore his authority there, re-emerged also in the *Philippika* by Theopompus of Chius, a mostly lost historical work from the fourth century. In particular, a surviving fragment from its Book 12, that basically summarized the events of the *Kypriakos polemos*, declared that Artaxerxes had been «persuaded» to wage war against Euagoras (ὁ βασιλεὺς Εὐαγόραι συνεπείσθη πολεμῆσαι).[81] That is to say, accordingly, that he had been

78 Nonetheless, and rightly, in her careful examination of the Greek sources concerning the motivations behind Artaxerxes' attack on Cyprus, Zournatzi, *Smoke* cit., emphasizes the extent to which Persian initiative shaped the course of events, as well as the pursuit of a genuinely imperial policy across the entire 'Mediterranean front' from the early 390s onward. Still, "Such a real threat [Euagoras' threat to Persian interests] is arguably possible to discern with reference to Evagoras' continuing involvement in Aegean affairs in the years immediately following the battle at Cnidus" (p. 320). On Artaxerxes' truly 'imperial' attitude, see Briant, *Histoire* cit., pp. 647-675.

79 Although no forms directly associated with the term ἀπόστασις or its derivatives appeared in the passage quoted above from Isocrates.

80 Thus, for instance, Belogiannis, *Revolts* cit., p. 430, who devotes only a few lines to the Euagorean episode within his broader survey of revolts in the history of the Persian Empire.

81 Theopomp. *BNJ* 115 F 103,4: ὅπως τε ὁ βασιλεὺς Εὐαγόραι συνεπείσθη πολεμῆσαι, στρατηγὸν ἐπιστήσας Αὐτοφραδάτην τὸν Λυδίας ἐξατράπην, ναύαρχον δὲ Ἑκατόμνων…

"compelled" to wage war in Cyprus not by external pressures or by suitable pretexts, but precisely (as noted in the preceding paragraphs of the same fragment) by circumstances derived from Euagoras' activities.[82] Here again, therefore, the Salaminian kinglet appeared, essentially and in a broadly justified manner, as a full-fledged "rebel."

Finally, a synthesis of the main two positions regarding Euagoras' 'responsibilities' that we have just observed through Isocrates and Theopompus – namely, whether the Cypriot king had provoked the Persian attack, or not – is offered by the most detailed account we dispose of regarding the beginnings of the «Cypriot War». As we read in a chapter of Book 14 of Diodorus' *Library*, the Sicilian historian appeared to outline two contributing causes for the outbreak of the conflict and the massive Persian military intervention on the island. On the one hand, in the year 391 (probably, in the late summer) Artaxerxes II is told to have received complaints from the rulers of certain Cypriot city-kingdoms which had been opposed to Euagoras' military[83] expansion (more specifically, Amathus, Soli, and Kition).[84] Resisting to Salamis' pressure, these cities had thus requested imperial military assistance, acting as subjects of the Great King in the typical framework of suzerainty.[85] In doing so, according to the historian, they highlighted that Euagoras' expansionist policy could indeed pose a serious threat to Persian

82 Cf. F 103,1-2: … περί τε Ἀκώριος τοῦ Αἰγυπτίων βασιλέως ὡς […] καὶ ὑπὲρ Εὐαγόρου ἔπραττε τοῦ Κυπρίου, ἐναντία πράττων τῶι Πέρσηι· ὅν τε τρόπον παρὰ δόξαν Εὐαγόρας τῆς Κυπρίων ἀρχῆς ἐπέβη, Ἀβδύμονα κατασχὼν τὸν Κιτιέα ταύτης ἐπάρχοντα…

83 At Diod. 14.98.2, however, we are told that Euagoras seized some cities by force, while others he won over by persuasion (τῶν δὲ πόλεων ἃς μὲν βίᾳ χειρωσάμενος, ἃς δὲ πειθοῖ προσλαβόμενος). That is, by inducing them to align with Salamis through diplomatic pressure or economic and commercial blockades, without resorting to arms.

84 Diod. Sic. 14.98.2: … Ἀμαθούσιοι δὲ καὶ Σόλιοι καὶ Κιτιεῖς ἀντέχοντες τῷ πολέμῳ πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέα περὶ βοηθείας: καὶ τοῦ μὲν Εὐαγόρου κατηγόρουν, […], τὴν δὲ νῆσον ὡμολόγησαν αὐτῷ [to Artaxerxes] συγκατακτήσασθαι. On the reference to the inhabitants of Kition, the Κιτιεῖς, behind the note on the Ὠτιεῖς found in Eph. *BNJ* 70 F 76 (= Steph. Byz., s.v. Ὠτιεῖς), see the article of Catherine I. Reid, «Ephoros Fragment 76 and Diodoros on the Cypriote War», *Phoenix*, 28, 1, 1974, pp. 123-143.

85 On this specific manifestation of the suzerainty relationship between the master (the *suzerain*: here, the Great King Artaxerxes II) and the subjects (i.e., the rulers of the Cypriot *poleis* that had opposed Evagoras' expansionism), see in particular Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., p. 250 (who dates this episode precisely to the year 391, see also the chronological table at p. 259). More generally, one should read this scholar's overall detailed discussion of the «Cypriot War», pp. 249-262.

control of the island. Therefore, on the basis of this circumstantial information[86] Artaxerxes decided to welcome the anti-Euagorean appeal. In fact, he did so not only «because he did not wish Euagoras to advance further» (οὐ βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν τὸν Εὐαγόραν ἐπὶ πλεῖον προκόπτειν), but also «because he appreciated the strategic position of Cyprus and its great naval strength whereby it would be able to protect Asia in front» (διανοούμενος τὴν Κύπρον εὐφυῶς εἶναι κειμένην καὶ ναυτικὴν δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχειν, ᾗ δυνήσεται προπολεμεῖν τῆς Ἀσίας).[87]

From this fairly extensive *excursus*, we thus learn that the official Persian definition of Euagoras' acts as a genuine sequence of "rebellion" had been grounded in strategic considerations of the highest importance and broadest scope. After all, as we have noted, from the perspective of many Greek authors the stability of the entire system of the Western maritime satrapies of the empire had been at stake in those circumstances.[88] The recognition of his Salaminian subject as a "rebel," together with the 'seal of legitimacy' conferred to his plans (if any were needed) by the previous appeal of the other island subjects, enabled the Great King to intervene directly and *manu militari* to quell a dangerous insubordination in a key island outpost. Thus, all of this suggests that Euagoras had by no means been an innocent Hellenic lamb sacrificed on the altar of the 'barbarians' greed.' Nor was Artaxerxes II an inexperienced king who had been "forced" into war

86 However, one could certainly not suppose that such basic strategic considerations as those presented by the adversaries of Euagoras in 391 had been entirely novel to Achaemenid strategic planning. Moreover, the strategic importance for the Persian Empire of maintaining control over Cyprus – as the keystone of the entire 'Mediterranean front' and a crucial outpost for projection both westward, into the Aegean, and southward, toward Egypt as well as in the Levant – remained steadfast throughout the *longue durée* of Achaemenid military activity in the Eastern Mediterranean. Long before the *Kypriakos polemos*, cf. for instance the circumstances that had led to Cyprus' alignment with the Persians around 530 (Hdt. 3.19.3; see Vittorio Cisnetti, forthcoming on *Syllogos*). Rember also the speed with which the Cypriot revolt of 499-498 had been suppressed through direct intervention by the imperial army and navy (Hdt. 5.108-116). Further, in the fifth century, the fortifications and supplies that were provided to Salamis against Cimon's attack, in 450–449 (Diod. Sic. 12.4.3). And still later, after Euagoras' time, the renewed promptness and initiative which was displayed by King Artaxerxes III in ordering the rapid reconquest of the island, following its rebellion in the early 340s (Diod. Sic. 16.42.3–7, 46.1–3). All of these events testify to the enduring significance of Cyprus within Persian strategic, imperial planning.

87 Diod. Sic. 14.98.3: ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς, οὐ βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν τὸν Εὐαγόραν ἐπὶ πλεῖον προκόπτειν, ἅμα δὲ διανοούμενος τὴν Κύπρον εὐφυῶς εἶναι κειμένην καὶ ναυτικὴν δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχειν, ᾗ δυνήσεται προπολεμεῖν τῆς Ἀσίας, ἔκρινε συμμαχεῖν…

88 Cf., e.g., again, Isocr. 4.161.

(against his intentions? Or against his will?), or merely "persuaded" by others.

In short, the scale of the «Cypriot War» and its impact on the contemporary and subsequent Greek imagination remains undeniable (despite the slight, yet significant interpretive divergences we have noted), with regard to the fact that Euagoras and his followers had indeed been considered by the Persians as "rebels," and confronted as such. However, we must repeat that the aforementioned (at times, almost obsessive) tendency of ancient Greek intellectuals to identify and to emphasize presumed instances of insubordination within the Persian Empire often led to an exaggeration of the significance of certain episodes. As well, and as a consequence, as to the ready application of the very strong and well-defined label of "rebel" (ἀποστάτης) even to figures who, in truth, never pursued genuine objectives of secession or an unyielding opposition to the Great King. Indeed, this had been the case with Euagoras.

5. A 'Phantom Rebel.' Glous against Artaxerxes?

Still remaining within the historical and geographical context of Euagoras' war, we can now introduce the second case study of this enquiry. This should help us in further demonstrating how those or that which a given party identified (or identifies) as a "rebel" or a "rebellion," in ancient times as well as today, were (and are) not always such, at least in the simplest sense of the term (see *Section 1*).

Its leading character was a 'minor' one – especially if compared with other major players like the Great King, the Egyptian Pharaoh, or even Euagoras himself –, yet nonetheless, one that was highly active during the years we have just outlined. And one that, after all and especially from our perspective, can be considered as a true representative of his times: Glous, the son of Tamos.[89] As we learn from a limited *corpus* of evidence scattered across Xenophon, Di-

89 Cf., respectively for Glous and Tamos, the brief biographical notes by Josef Wiesehöfer and Walter Eder that appear in the online edition (2006) of *Brill's New Pauly*. By contrast, neither figure has an entry in *EDPC* I. For the former, we here adopt the spelling "Glous," as it adheres more closely to the wording of the name by Xenophon (Γλοῦς), who is indeed our closest extant source in terms of chronology. Accordingly, indeed, the name is reproduced in this form by Sean Manning, «A Prosopography of the Followers of Cyrus the Younger», *The Ancient History Bulletin*, 32, 1-2, 2018, pp. 5-6. Diodorus, by contrast, used Γλῶς, a form that is transliterated as such by many modern scholars: e.g., Stephen Ruzicka consistently employs "Glos" in his studies cited in this paper.

odorus (Ephorus) and other minor or later authors,[90] this Glous had belonged to a family likely of Carian-Egyptian descent[91] that, from the final fifteen years of the fifth century onward, had served in the civil and, above all, the military administration of the Achaemenid Empire. Most importantly, his father Tamos had obtained governance (holding the title of *hyparchos*)[92] over a series of cities and harbours in Northwestern Ionia (and Southwestern Aeolia), located around the *poleis* of Cyme and Phocaea.[93] Their *service* – particularly, the command of the imperial fleets which were stationed in that area, under the authority of the satrap of Sardis[94] – was carried out during especially turbulent years, marred by

90 We bring here together all the references in (extant) Greek historiography where the name of Glous occurred: Xen. *An.* 1.4.6 (πέμψας Γλοῦν εἶπεν), 5.7 (καὶ ἔταξε Γλοῦν καὶ Πίγρητα); 2.1.3 (Γλοῦς ὁ Ταμώ), 4.24 (μέντοι ὁ Γλοῦς αὐτῶν ἐπεφάνη); Aen. Tact. 31.35 (Γλοῦς δὲ βασιλέως ναύαρχος); Diod. Sic. 14.35.3 (πλὴν ἑνὸς τοῦ καλουμένου μὲν Γλοῦ); 15.3.2 (ὁ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἡγούμενος, ὀνομαζόμενος δὲ Γλῶς), 3.6 (τοῦ τε ναυάρχου τῶν Περσῶν Γλῶ), 9.3 (ὁ δὲ τοῦ στόλου τὴν ναυαρχίαν ἔχων Γλῶς), 9.6 (διόπερ ἄσμενοι συνέθεντο πρὸς τὸν Γλῶ τὴν συμμαχίαν), 18.1 (Γλῶς ὁ ναυαρχήσας τῶν Περσῶν ἐν τῷ Κυπριακῷ πολέμῳ), 19.1 (μετὰ τὸν τοῦ Γλῶ καὶ τοῦ Ταχῶ θάνατον); Polyaen. 7.20.1 (Γλῶς ἦν ἐν Κύπρῳ); Ath. *Deipn.* 6.69 256c (ἐπὶ Γλοῦ τοῦ Καρὸς).

91 On the alleged Carian etymology of Glous' name (cf. again Ath. *Deipn.* 6.69 256c: ἐπὶ Γλοῦ τοῦ Καρὸς), see Manning, *Prosopography* cit., p. 5 fn. 24, with bibliography. Also, Stephen Ruzicka, «Glos, Son of Tamos, and the End of the Cypriot War», *Historia (Stuttgart)*, 48, 1, 1999, p. 23 fn. 1.

92 Cf. Thuc. 8.31.2 (Τάμως Ἰωνίας ὕπαρχος ὤν), 87.1 (Τάμων ἑαυτοῦ [Tissaphernes'] ὕπαρχον). On the position and role of the *hyparchoi* in the satrapies of Western Asia Minor toward the end of the fifth century, in the time – by way of example – of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, see now Rhyne King, *The House of the Satrap. The Making of the Ancient Persian Empire*, University of California Press, Oakland (CA) 2025, pp. 80-88.

93 This coastal region, which had crucial importance within the operational framework of the Achaemenid fleets already from the very beginning of the fifth century, centred around the major naval bases of Cyme and Phocaea (cf., e.g., Hdt. 8.130.1; Diod. Sic. 11.2.3, 27.1) as well as other minor harbours such as Clazomenae, came indeed to constitute, for Tamos, Glous, and their 'dynasty,' "the field of 'family' expertise" (here according to Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., p. 25). These locations continued to play a key role within the organizational structure of the King's fleets precisely during the *Kypriakos polemos*, in the early fourth century (cf. Diod. Sic. 15.2.2), especially when the other principal hubs of the naval system – i.e., Cyprus, Phoenicia, and Egypt – had become unavailable to the Persians due to "rebellion" and secession. See precisely Stephen Ruzicka, «Clazomenae and Persian Foreign Policy, 387/6 B.C.», *Phoenix*, 37, 2, 1983, pp. 104-108; and Stylianou, *Commentary* cit., pp. 157-158.

94 First under Tissaphernes (for Tamos: cf. Thuc. 8.31.2, 87.1-3), then under Cyrus the Younger (for Tamos again: Xen. *An.* 1.2.21, 4.2; Diod. Sic. 14.19.5-6; 35.3), and eventually under Tiribazus (for Glous; see further below).

events such as (first of all) the attempted usurpation of the imperial throne by Cyrus the Younger. Indeed, as we know from the above-mentioned sources, this had directly involved Glous' father, Tamos, who eventually had his life taken as a consequence of his allegiance to the defeated brother of Artaxerxes II.[95]

Far from attempting to retrace here the highly complex careers of these figures (a veritable 'dynasty of rebels') prior to the 380s,[96] the map accompanying this Section (*Map 1*) allows us to observe – using different colours for the various axes – the maritime movements that were undertaken first by Tamos, and subsequently by Glous, with the imperial fleets assigned to them across the most important junctions of the Achaemenid Eastern Mediterranean, between the late 400s and the 380s. All of these movements had been entangled, in one way or another, in the swirl of upheavals and conflicts occurred across the 'Mediterranean front' of the Persian Empire in the beginning of the fourth century.[97] In particular, the line in light blue, which departs indeed from Cyme and Phocaea and contin-

95 On the activity of Tamos between Ionia, Cilicia, and Egypt, cf. Thuc. 8.31.2, 87.1-3; Xen. *An.* 1.2.21, 4.2; 2.1.3; Diod. Sic. 14.19.5-6, 35.3-5. See Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., pp. 23-24; Ruzicka, *Trouble* cit., pp. 38-40; Manning, *Prosopography* cit., p. 5.

96 The most complete study on this subject is, of course, Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., I intend to explore this issue further, with regard to the theme of rebellion, in a separate study.

97 With regard to Glous' political and military activities in the phase preceding his appointment as *nauarchos* during the «Cypriot War,» although no sources spoke of them explicitly it must be assumed that he had resumed his father's tenure. Having been reinstated as *hyparchos* of Ionia after the Cyrus interlude, he probably took part, with the ships that were assigned to him, in the major movements of the Achaemenid fleets in the Aegean during the 390s and early 380s. This would have included, for example, Conon's campaign culminating at Cnidus in 394, as well as the Persian-backed naval operations in the Hellespont in 388 – thus, Glous' employment in the imperial navy followed the apparent shifts (but for this, see again Zournatzi, *Smoke* cit.) of Artaxerxes' political and strategic aims and means in that theatre. Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., confined himself to noting only the presence of Glous and his ships alongside Antalcidas' fleet, acting under Tiribazus' authority, in the Hellespont in 388/7. Indeed, the author emphasized (p. 26): "… In these circumstances, Glos may have appeared as a most useful expert, long familiar with local matters, known, thanks to his father, to local Greeks, and, again thanks to his father, conversant with naval matters. Glos may have been, in other words, an ideal candidate to take up his father's old position of hyparch of Ionia or, at the least, the position of Tiribazus' naval command […]. Finally, if Glos was closely associated with Tiribazus during 387, especially if Glos under Tiribazus' authority was commanding the Ionian Greek ships which supported the Spartan fleet led by Antalcidas (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28), important Spartans will have got to know Glos (and he them), and this may help to explain his adroit dealings with the Spartans in ca. 380." For a tentative indication of Glous' naval movements during "the blank years in his career, 400 to ca. 385," see the green line on our *Map 1*.

ues eastward to Cilicia, reaching Cyprus and (probably) also Tyre in Phoenicia,[98] shows the route that was undertaken by Glous as naval commander (*nauarchos*) during the «Cypriot War.» At the time, indeed, he had been dispatched with the ships and crews placed under his jurisdiction to fight in Cyprus, under the orders of the fleet's overall commander Tiribazus (Γλῶς ὁ ναυαρχήσας τῶν Περσῶν ἐν τῷ Κυπριακῷ πολέμῳ).[99]

According to the most reliable chronological reconstructions – but, as noted, this still remains a contentious matter –, this episode should be placed in the year 385/4.[100] At any rate, despite his primary role in the imperial naval hierarchy and the skill he had demonstrated during the early phases of the conflict,[101] Glous was later remembered for having dared (again, in the words of Diodorus Siculus, who is effectively our sole source here) to «consider rebelling against the King» (διέγνω τοῦ βασιλέως ἀφίστασθαι). And subsequently, for having acted in a way that made him, in all respects, a «rebel against the King» (ἀποστάτης ὢν τοῦ βασιλέως).[102] The *basileus* in question, of course, was (again) the Persian Great King, Artaxerxes II.

However, such an overly simplistic definition must be balanced by a closer

98 On the involvement of Tyre (and Phoenicia in general) in Euagoras' naval activities, cf. Isocr. 9.62 (Φοινίκην δ' ἐπόρθησε, Τύρον δὲ κατὰ κράτος εἷλε); Diod. Sic. 15.2.4 (ἐκυρίευε δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὴν Κύπρον τῶν πόλεων σχεδόν τι πασῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Φοινίκην Τύρου καί τινων ἑτέρων).

99 Quote from Diod. Sic. 15.18.1. Cf. also Aen. Tact. 31.35 (Γλοῦς δὲ βασιλέως ναύαρχος); Diod. Sic. 14.35.3 (Γλοῦ, μετὰ δέ τινας χρόνους ἀφηγησαμένου τῶν βασιλικῶν δυνάμεων); 15.3.2-6 (ὁ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἡγούμενος, ὀνομαζόμενος δὲ Γλῶς, τοῦ τε ναυάρχου τῶν Περσῶν Γλῶ). On the 'shared' military command of Tiribazus and Orontes and the consequent reasons for the tensions and rivalries between the two, see STYLIANOU, *Commentary* cit., pp. 155-157.

100 In this way, we think that the chronology proposed by STYLIANOU, *Commentary* cit. (especially, pp. 152-153), is the most reliable, since it leaves «two years» of continuous fighting (as stated by Diod. Sic. 15.9.2) between the actual start of Tiribazus' and Orontes' operations in Cyprus and the mainland Levant and the great *naumachia* of Kition, which apparently had been the last significant military feat of the war. By contrast, KÖRNER, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 251, 259, anticipates the naval battle fought off Kition in 387/6.

101 Cf. Diod. Sic. 15.3.2-3 (Glous' involvement in the suppression of the mutiny broken out among the Persian troops that had landed on Cyprus, by efficiently contrasting Euagoras' piracy in the channel of Cilicia), 6 (Glous' «gallant fight» in the great naval battle off Kition).

102 Cf., respectively, Diod. 15.9.3 and 18.1.

reassessment of the evidence that Diodorus himself provided concerning the actions of Glous, in the very first chapters of Book 15 of his *Library*. As noted, after roughly fifteen years in which he had (presumably) served loyally in the naval campaigns of the imperial fleet across the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, by the time of Artaxerxes' decision to dispatch a second and more substantial expedition (both naval and land-based) against Euagoras in 387 Glous had attained the rank of *nauarchos* and a senior command in the imperial navy. Indeed, he ranked subordinate only to the supreme authority of Tiribazus – with whom, notably, he had also become related by marriage to his daughter.[103] Yet, the military and diplomatic stalemate that developed before the walls of Salamis in the years following the naval victory of Kition brought to the fore rivalries and tensions that had for long time been brewing within the Persian high command in Cyprus. Particularly, as expected, those between Tiribazus and the original commander of the land army in the expedition, Orontes, who could have been superseded by Tiribazus in the meantime.[104]

Indeed, Diodorus' (and, through him, Ephorus') emphasis on rivalry and endemic intrigue among members of the Persian élite fell squarely within the Greek narrative convention of depicting 'barbarians' as inherently amoral and cowardly. Nevertheless, there is no reason to dismiss Diodorus' account of the evident rupture at the apex of Achaemenid command on the island, in the late 380s. Through a series of charges (no doubt an entire paper could be devoted to this topic alone),[105] Orontes succeeded in denouncing Tiribazus to the Great King for treason. In short, Tiribazus was arrested and brought to court, while Orontes assumed the coveted supreme command in Cyprus.[106]

It is thus quite clear that, in such a situation, Glous (who was doubly bound to

103 Cf. Diod. Sic. 15.9.3: ὁ δὲ τοῦ στόλου τὴν ναυαρχίαν ἔχων Γλῶς, γεγαμηκὼς τοῦ Τιριβάζου τὴν θυγατέρα. On the circumstances and possible reasons for the marriage, see Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., p. 26.

104 On the rivalry between the two satraps–generals and its background, see e.g. Weiskopf, *Satraps' Revolt* cit., pp. 19-23; for its impact on the career of Glous, Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., pp. 28 ff. For a closely comparable context of rivalry between satraps – a generation earlier than the Tiribazus–Orontes affair, yet unfolding within the same geographical settings, as well as the still later 'Great Satraps' Revolt' –, see now King, *House* cit., pp. 72–80.

105 Their list was provided by Diod. Sic. 15.8.4; see Stylianou, *Commentary* cit., pp.181-183 *ad loc.*; Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., p. 29.

106 Diod. Sic. 15.8.5; cf. also Polyaen. 7.14.1; Plut. *De Superstit.* 8 (*Mor.* 168e).

Map 1. The 'base of power' of Glous' family in Northwestern Ionia / Southwestern Aeolia, and the navigations of Tamos and Glous across the Eastern Mediterranean. The orange line shows Tamos' route eastwards to Cilicia at the command of «Cyrus' ships», in 401. Dark red is for the route of Tamos' flight to Egypt in late summer 400. Green line indicates the presumable participation of Glous' ships within Persian (or Persian-backed) naval operations between c. 396–387. Finally, the light blue line shows Glous' navigation to Cyprus, and naval command during the «Cypriot War» between 386–383. Designed by the Author.

Tiribazus, both by military hierarchy and by kinship) must have felt threatened by Orontes' coup. Diodorus, in fact, was explicit on this point.[107] Yet, the solution he chose to extricate himself from the deadlock was to attempt – quoting the historians' words – a «new plan of action» (ἔγνω καινῇ πραγμάτων).[108] In summarizing

107 Diod. Sic. 15.9.3 explicitly stated that Glous, in the aftermath of Tiribazus' arrest by Orontes, feared seriously (περίφοβος) for his own safety, as he could expect reprisals on account of his ties with the deposed general. The full quote of this passage is provided in the next footnote.

108 … ὁ δὲ τοῦ στόλου τὴν ναυαρχίαν ἔχων Γλῶς, γεγαμηκὼς τοῦ Τιριβάζου τὴν θυγατέρα, περίφοβος ὢν μήποτε συνεργεῖν δόξας τῷ Τιριβάζῳ περὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως τύχῃ τιμωρίας ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔγνω καινῇ πραγμάτων ἐπιβολῇ τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀσφαλίζεσθαι. As

this, therefore, Diodorus readily applied the label of "rebellion" on Glous; but the unfolding of events seems to suggest a rather different reality.

Glous' «plan of action» involved leaving Cyprus with a considerable number of ships, men, and funds in his charge.[109] These, together with his 'home base' in Northwestern Ionia – where he most likely found refuge – constituted the essential components of his personal power.[110] Indeed, in the roughly year and a half following his departure from Cyprus, occurred around 383 (according to the most reliable chronological estimate),[111] Glous appeared primarily concerned with preserving his position, possessions, and rank, rather than acting indiscriminately as a "rebel" against the Persians and the Great King.

His strategy seems, in fact, to have been far more nuanced than this. According to Diodorus, once he had fled from Cyprus the former *hyparchos* and *nauarchos* quickly managed to establish contacts with the main actual and *potential* adversaries of the Achaemenid Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean at the time.

Briant, *Histoire* cit., p. 349, noted: "… Lors d'une révolte, le rebelle entraîne généralement avec lui tous les membres de sa maison: […] cette conduite s'explique aisément par le principe de la solidarité familiale car […] ils sont tous supposés coupables et comme tels exécutés […] Dans ces conditions, on comprend que Glous, gendre de Tiribaze, ait craint d'être impliqué dans les accusations qui pesaient contre son beau-père."

109 Here is the translation of the passage quoted in the previous footnote: «Glous, who had been in command of the fleet and was married to the daughter of Tiribazus, fearful that it might be thought that he had co-operated with Tiribazus in his plan and that he would be punished by the King, resolved to safeguard his position by a new plan of action. Since he was well supplied with money and soldiers and had furthermore won the commanders of the triremes to himself by acts of kindness, he resolved to revolt from the King.» Cf. the same action scheme based on strong financial and naval backing which had been attempted by his father, Tamos, at the time of his flight toward Egypt in 400 – Diod. Sic. 14.35.3-5. About the material resources amassed and exploited by Glous for his flight, see Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., pp. 30, 33: according to him, the base of Glous' funds in 383 were the remains of the 2,000-talent treasury that Tiribazus had recently obtained from Artaxerxes (on which, cf. Diod. Sic. 15.4.2). On Glous' alleged (but eventually, never implemented) proposal to finance Spartan hegemonic ambitions with his own resources, Diod. Sic. 15.9.4.

110 Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., does not specify where had Glous fled to. However, it is quite clear that he went to his base(s) in North-western Ionia and South-western Aeolia, as we learn by reading the follow-up of his alleged "rebellion" at 18.1 (Stylianou, *Commentary* cit., p. 184 *ad loc.*: "he must in fact have moved to Ionia").

111 We continue following the proposal of Stylianou, *Commentary* cit. – see in particular p. 148: "The revolts of Glos and Tachos were over by early 382 at the latest," and his chronological table at pp. 152-153. Therefore, the archon-date of 383/2, under which Diodorus put the events concerning Glous and (probably) his son Tachos' "secession," would be correct.

Namely, respectively: Achoris, Pharaoh of Egypt, and the Spartans – though not Euagoras, the Achaemenid foe *par excellence* at the time, against whom the Great King (by means of Orontes) was still actively campaigning.[112] With the Pharaoh and Sparta, Glous, who commanded a modest naval force around the main naval bases on the Aegean, concluded some understandings or agreements, which Diodorus labelled as full-fledged «alliances» (*symmachiai*).[113] Yet it is difficult to consider them as such in proper sense, since (and the silence of other sources confirms this) they eventually amounted to *nothing*, in practical terms.

In other words, as we do not read anything on this in Diodorus (nor elsewhere, of course), during the year and a half that he remained in Ionia, Glous never exploited his military power to attack or to defend himself against the Great King. Nor did he truly capitalize on his external contacts to form an effective 'anti-Achaemenid bloc,' that might have seriously threatened Persian domination across the entire 'Mediterranean front.' Rather, Glous' primary objective must have been to stockpile actual and potential resources (money, ships, men, *supporters*) with which he could exert effective pressure[114] on the Great King and the empire's ruling class.[115] In this sense, his ultimate aim should have been to overcome the (evidently temporary) decline in favours that Tiribazus and his associates were

112 Diod. Sic. 15.9.4: εὐθὺς οὖν [Euagoras] πρὸς μὲν Ἄκοριν τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Αἰγυπτίων διαπρεσβευσάμενος συμμαχίαν συνέθετο κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους γράφων ἐπῆρε κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως, […], ὑπισχνούμενος συμπράξειν αὐτοῖς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν αὐτοῖς τὴν πάτριον συγκατασκευάσειν. See Stylianou, *Commentary* cit., pp. 184-186 *ad loc.* Regarding Sparta – for which, the report of an anti-Persian stance at this time would appear exceedingly unusual at first glance –, see the still relevant observations of T.T.B. Ryder, «Spartan Relations with Persia after the King's Peace: A Strange Story in Diodorus 15.9», *CQ*, 13, 1, 1963, pp. 105-109.

113 Cf. Diod. Sic. 15.9.4-5: [Euagoras] εὐθὺς οὖν πρὸς μὲν Ἄκοριν τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Αἰγυπτίων διαπρεσβευσάμενος συμμαχίαν συνέθετο κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους γράφων ἐπῆρε κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως […] διόπερ ἅσμενοι συνέθεντο [the Spartans] πρὸς τὸν Γλῶ τὴν συμμαχίαν.

114 For this reason, as indeed seems clear from Diodorus, the announcements of his *symmachiai* were made openly by Glous, without any restriction in their communication precisely in order to exert (more) pressure. It makes no sense, therefore, to claim that "it was done secretly," as for Stylianou, *Commentary* cit., p. 186.

115 See, on this, Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., p. 36: "The strategy behind Glos' ironic plan might be expressed as a maxim: "to gain power, become what your opponent fears most." As Glos well knew, over the last twenty years, the Spartans, the Egyptians, and Evagoras had made (at different times) the most trouble for Artaxerxes. Glos could anticipate that Artaxerxes would respond swiftly to the prospect of any Spartan–Egyptian–Evagorid combination…"

experiencing in those same years, and thereby to be eventually rehabilitated in the eyes of Artaxerxes II. After all, the hope of obtaining a 'royal pardon' and the restoration of the privileges acquired and maintained up to that point was by no means an illogical prospect for Glous: as, indeed, was demonstrated not long afterward by Tiribazus' acquittal in his trial and his full rehabilitation within the Achaemenid court (to the detriment of Orontes, of course).[116]

Nevertheless, before that process could even be concluded (most probably, in 382), Glous was killed by «some men.»[117] Diodorus did not specify more about the event and its reasons, nor on the nature or the identity of the murderers. Most likely, these had been murderers that had been sent in Ionia by Artaxerxes, in order to surgically eliminate Glous:[118] that is to say, to eradicate what – at least, *potentially* – was meant to represent yet another problem among the many which were troubling the turbulent Western satrapies at that time.

Such an action, which as we just said had surely been ordered by the Great

116 Diod. Sic. 15.11.1-2. On the demotion of Orontes within the imperial hierarchy, see Weiskopf, *Satraps' Revolt* cit., pp. 19-22, 70-75; Briant, *Histoire* cit., pp. 328-329, 333-334. On the practice and frequency of the 'royal pardon,' see Briant, *ibid.*, e.g. p. 50, with reference to Glous' reintegration into the imperial administration after his father Tamos' collusion with Cyrus ("même le fils de Tamos, Glous, qui avait obtenu le pardon royal, fut mis en charge de forces armées"). For other instances in the *longue durée* of the Persian Empire, cf. e.g. Megabyzus (Ctes. *BNJ* 688 F 14 §42, βασιλεὺς τέλος ἔπεμπε παραγενομένῳ συγγνώμην ἔχειν τῶν ἡμαρτημένων); Datames (Nep. *Dat.* 8.6); Rheomitres (Diod. Sic. 15.92.1); but also the sequence of pardons granted both by Artaxerxes II and Cyrus the Younger to Orontas, in the well-known episode recounted by Xen. *An.* 1.6. Royal pardon, moreover, was not granted exclusively to Persians or to former members of the imperial administration, but could also extend to external actors: cf., for instance, the Egyptian pharaoh Tachos, who fled to the Great King in 360 (Diod. Sic. 15.92.5, συγγνώμη ἠξίου περὶ τῶν ἡμαρτημένων).

117 Diod. Sic. 15.18.1: Γλῶς […] δολοφονηθεὶς ὑπό τινων οὐ συνετέλεσε τὴν προαίρεσιν.

118 Remaining within the framework of his proposal, and thus assuming that the killing of Glous occurred after the rehabilitation of Tiribazus, Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., p. 40 and fn. 31, identified Artaxerxes and Orontes as the main suspects, the latter in his momentary capacity as instigator of the first. "We cannot know with certainty who was responsible for Glos' murder, but it is natural to suspect Artaxerxes. [in the footnote:] Orontes is, of course, the other prime suspect, since Glos could easily be viewed as the figure most responsible for his downfall: Glos' apparent failure to support Orontes' siege of Salamis effectively compromised Glos' command, and Glos' dealings with the Spartans and Egyptians forced Artaxerxes to treat Orontes in ignominious fashion as part of his emphatic demonstration of favor toward Tiribazus." It is clear that suspicion falls on both figures; however, especially in the case of an order issued by Orontes, it would be far more plausible to date the assassination itself to the period preceding Tiribazus' eventual acquittal at the trial.

King (most probably, we guess, at the instigation of Glous' older foe, Orontes), involved the use of violence, but it was highly targeted and certainly not comparable in scale to the simultaneous massive imperial military operations taking place in Cyprus. This could therefore hardly be considered by the Persians an act of recognition of a full-fledged "rebellion", in the same way as had occurred not many years earlier with Euagoras (see above, *Section 4*).

Although Diodorus dismissively labelled Glous as an ἀποστάτης τοῦ βασιλέως, clearly drawing on the (at his time, already traditional) anti-Persian ideological framework, Glous had undertaken his «new plan of action» not of his own volition, but because he had been pressured by events over which he had no control. Namely, the unforeseen reversal within the Persian command hierarchy in Cyprus which had been prompted by Orontes' accusations against Tiribazus. Moreover, during the (albeit brief) period of his 'detachment' - this is certainly a more accurate term than full-fledged "rebellion" – from his position in Cyprus and from the rest of the Achaemenid authorities, he never expressed ambitions of secession from the Great King. Instead, as noted, he sought to expand his negotiating leverage, with a view to reintegration into the imperial order as soon as possible. [119]

For this reason, as well, there had been no need for the royal administration to launch any military campaign against Glous' base in Ionia–Aeolia. Indeed, it is plausible to suppose that, had Tiribazus' acquittal been achieved more swiftly, Glous' apparent sedition in the westernmost part of the 'Mediterranean front' of the empire would have immediately stopped. Defining Glous' actions as a "rebellion" *tout court* stands therefore undoubtedly as an exaggeration – or, better, a distortion – of what had been a far more complex reality. A greatly *biased* 'misunderstanding,' after all, for which the primary culprits are the highly ideological and ideologized nature of the Greek testimonies, compounded by the unquestionable confusion that generally characterized that region during that period. Not least, of course, under the influence of the very recent, rather contemporary model represented by Euagoras.

119 Ruzicka, *Glos* cit., p. 36, was not wrong to add that a further factor that could have prompted the Great King to seek an agreement with Glous in 383–382 (even though his proposed dating remains slightly earlier than ours) was Artaxerxes' simultaneous military campaign against the Cadusians. On this, cf. Diod. Sic. 15.8.5, 10.1, and Stylianou, *Commentary* cit., p. 183 *ad loc.*

6. Conclusion. Classical and Modern Biases on "Rebellion:" Usual and Better Practices

As the examples considered in the preceding *Sections* should have made clear, identifying and defining one or more "rebels" or a "rebellion" proves to be no easy task, particularly with regard to the ancient world, and even more when we move beyond the limits of Classical tradition. It becomes especially challenging when single events, theoretically amenable to such an investigation, are enmeshed in a complex web of prejudices and *biases*, which are found both in the ancient sources themselves and in the perspectives that modern scholars are accustomed to adopting based on them.

Moreover, another major problem arises from a rather common tendency within the field of Ancient History. That is to say, when attempts are made – very often quite *forcibly* – to interpret events and figures from a (very) distant past through (very) modern lenses, by applying (better: by trying to apply) criteria, categories, and theoretical frameworks that are extrapolated from much later periods, or right from other disciplines. Political science, in particular, has generated many models and labels that have long appealed to scholars of the ancient world, especially those engaged in Military History. It goes without saying that such operations carry their cost. Particularly, this is the case when they extend beyond mere analogies or metaphors without sufficient contextualization, and they risk therefore introducing further distortions into our understanding of the events under study, compounding the many forms of *bias* we have already identified.

The case of "rebellions" in the ancient world is particularly apt for illustrating this phenomenon. A model that has frequently been associated – more or less explicitly, depending on the context, but regardless here of the degree of precision – with the deeds of the great continental empires that succeeded one another in the Near East during the first millennium B.C., is that of «bureaucratic empires.» This concept was developed by the political scientist Shmuel N. Eisenstadt in his seminal 1963 monograph *The Political Systems of Empires*.[120]

According to his theory, an empire of vast size and ambition – such as had been, in Antiquity, the one ruled by Cyrus and his successors – would have had as its primary goal the consolidation of the main centres of power in its own hands.

120 Original edition: Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires*, Free Press of Glencoe, New York 1963.

Thereby, the imperial central authorities would have ensured in practice the elimination of *any* potential sources of resistance to assimilation, local or regional autonomy, and, above all, rebellion or insurrection. Although this conception has been applied quite successfully in more specific cases in ancient history – in the Near East, and not only, where such a framework appears at least *plausible*[121] –, it is clear that, in general terms, its image(ry) does not at all correspond to the far more complex, and obviously precisely contextualized historical realities of many centuries (or millennia) before such a paradigm was established in the Sixties.

Consider, for example, the two cases we have examined from the intricate vicissitude of the Western satrapies of the Achaemenid Empire in the early fourth century B.C. After all, Artaxerxes II's ultimate aim had been certainly neither the outright elimination of the kingdom of Salamis or of the entire system of Cypriot city-kingdoms (indeed, Euagoras himself eventually retained his title as king of Salamis, after the conclusion of the war).[122] Nor was the wholesale eradication of Glous' (Glous' family's) power base in Ionia – Aeolia. Rather, both issues were bound to circumstantial *Realpolitik*.[123] In other words, just as in 380 it was felt convenient and advantageous for the Persians to leave Euagoras in place after reorganizing Cyprus, so too slightly before, in approximately 382, it had seemed prudent to Artaxerxes and his high command to physically neutralize

121 We may consider as a workable example the article by Lisbeth S. Fried, «The Political Struggle of Fifth Century Judah», *Trans*, 24, 2002, pp. 9-21. Based on the reading of some relevant passages in the Biblical Books of *Ezrah* and *Nehemiah* through Eisenstadt's theories, the author reassessed some aspects of the Persian policy toward the Judeans face to the local claims of the other populations which were settled in Palestine in the early and mid-fifth century B.C. We can just read the statement opening her conclusions (p. 21): "In summary, Eisenstadt's model of the political systems of bureaucratic empires provides a useful framework in which to view the political struggle in fifth century Judah..."

122 Cf. Isocr. 9.63; Diod. Sic. 15.9.2 (ὁ μὲν οὖν Εὐαγόρας […] συνέθετο τὴν εἰρήνην, ὥστε βασιλεύειν τῆς Σαλαμῖνος καὶ τὸν ὡρισμένον διδόναι φόρον κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ὑπακούειν ὡς βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ προστάττοντι).

123 A crucial criterion, indeed, that was already highlighted in the seminal review of Cypriot studies of Maier, *Factoids* cit. The stress on *Realpolitik* factors and their influence in this field of studies does not need to provoke the kind of criticism raised (e.g.) by Stylianou, *Kingdoms* cit., who remained rather attached to earlier interpretative paradigms on Cypriot ancient history, in which contingent and circumstantial factors were usually downplayed in favour of broader historiographical designs. Such designs, however, were not always consistent with the actual course of events.

Glous, fearing that his Mediterranean network of contacts might, sooner or later, be employed against Achaemenid interests.

Therefore, since the recognition or non-recognition of a given episode of insubordination, or a likely conduct, as a "rebellion" has always depended on criteria tied to the utility, needs, ambitions, and the concrete geopolitical situations experienced by the parties involved or by external observers, it seems at least misleading (if not entirely counterproductive) to resurrect modern or contemporary political-theoretical frameworks in order to label cases that may have been very different from one another. It should be far more appropriate, instead, to develop theoretical models that are nonetheless fully grounded in the contexts under examination. Such a method should be capable of capturing the varying degrees of continuity, but also (and above all) of discontinuity, which characterized cases and theatres that have been perhaps too often summarily labelled as "rebellions" in Antiquity.

A particularly instructive example in this regard is offered by Christian Körner's masterful study published in 2017.[124] This work is devoted to the position and political fortunes of the Cypriot city-kingdoms during the period going from the eighth to the fourth century B.C. As such, it addresses the theme of the overarching authority of the continental Asiatic empires over them in those times – namely, as we have just glimpsed in the previous *Sections*, the Neo-Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian, and Achaemenid Persian ones.

The central criterion of his investigation is the concept of «suzerainty:» a term through which Körner defined the key to the relationship between the individual Cypriot rulers and their overlord, the Great King(s), to whom they submitted in turn over the decades. First, as we saw, to Sargon II; then to Nebuchadnezzar II; then (possibly) to the Egyptian Pharaoh Amasis; then again to Cambyses; and finally to Alexander the Great, Antigonus Monophtalmus, and Ptolemy I Soter. In his words, suzerainty describes «a relation in which the subordinate rulers accept their dependence on a supreme power – especially regarding foreign policies – but still retain autonomy in their interior affairs and foreign policy as long

124 Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit. It is, however, necessary to refer – by virtue of their undoubtedly easier availability, as well as their greater linguistic accessibility to non-German readers – to the numerous other studies that the same author has devoted to this topic over the past years. See again, therefore, Körner, *Cypriot Kings* cit., and Körner, *Kings of Salamis* cit.

as it does not collide with the interests of the superior monarch.»[125] Where these conditions were not respected – as it occurred in the case of Euagoras in Cyprus, and appears to us witnessed by Diodorus in the appeal of his Cypriot opponents to Artaxerxes –, it was therefore possible, and indeed *necessary* for the Great King to intervene in the territories affected by 'mismanagement,' in order to restore order and reclaim his sovereignty.[126]

In any case, the principle of suzerainty could rise, function, and was maintained solely through the practice of continuous negotiation between the parties involved. And those negotiations could be attempted both by the superior partner, the overruler (i.e., the Persian Great King), and by his subordinates (such as had been Euagoras himself, already before and especially in the final phases of the *Kypriakos polemos*, and also Glous). As a matter of fact, the outcomes of individual negotiations were never predetermined, just as the definition of this or that figure or episode as "rebellious" was never fixed – contrary to what a superficial reading of the Greek and Latin sources might suggest.

All things considered, the lesson we can draw from the two, apparently similar, yet in fact rather different cases of Euagoras and Glous – together with the previous example from Neo-Assyrian times – is twofold. First and foremost, a methodological one: insofar as the conclusions reached in the present study may readily be applied not only to the contexts of the ancient Near East or the Eastern Mediterranean of roughly two and a half millennia ago, or earlier, but more broadly, to the topic (to the *theme*) of "rebellion" and its study from a more extended diachronic perspective. Second, and more specifically in the context of Graeco-Persian relations and their interpretation(s) in tradition: that the message conveyed by Isocrates and his contemporaries (namely, that wherever rebels existed within the Achaemenid Empire, they would be 'brothers' to the Greeks of *Hellas*, who sought to exploit their perceived 'decadence'), this representation

125 This quotation is from Körner, *Kings of Salamis* cit., p. 329 (the same as in Körner, *Cypriot Kings* cit., p. 32). More extensively on the subject, Körner, *Die zyprischen Königtümer* cit., pp. 171-181.

126 This was, after all, one of the many strategies that were available to the Great Kings in the political and military management of their empire, as Jennifer Finn, *Grand Strategy* cit. (in particular, the conclusion at p. 150), now highlights. Notably, she eventually, and rightly, thinks that it should be better to omit entirely the adjective "grand" from that label. In our view, indeed, the label of "grand strategy" itself is all too often applied to the study of Military History in the ancient world, sometimes rather gratuitously.

finally remains no more than a distortion. A *bias* that was set deliberately by those same authors that lead us to identify "rebels" and "rebellions" in the(ir) enemy empire, even where no such phenomena actually occurred.

Bibliography

Alexiou, Evangelos, «The Rhetoric of Isocrates' Evagoras: History, Ethics and Politics», in *Isocrate. Entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux politiques*, C. Bouchet, P. Giovannelli-Jouanna (éd. par), Université Jean Moulin, Lyon 2015, pp. 47-61.

Asheri, David, *Fra Ellenismo e Iranismo. Studi sulla società e cultura di Xanhos nella età achemenide*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1983.

Asmonti, Luca, *Conon the Athenian: Politics and Warfare in the Aegean, 414–386 B.C.*, Steiner, Stuttgart 2015 (Historia Einzelschriften, 235).

Belogiannis, Orestis, «La "grande révolte satrapique": un réexamen», *Ktèma*, 49, 2024, pp. 223-245.

Belogiannis, Orestis, «Revolts and the Persian Great Kings: Active Involvement or Careful Abstention?», *Klio*, 106, 2, 2024, pp. 421-441.

Boyes, Philip J., «"The King of the Sidonians": Phoenician Ideologies and the Myth of the Kingdom Tyre–Sidon», *BASOR*, 365, 2012, pp. 33-44.

Briant, Pierre, *Histoire de l'Empire perse. De Cyrus à Alexandre*, Fayard, Paris 1996 (Engl. trans. *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*, Eisenbrauns, Ann Arbor, 2002).

Brice, Lee L., «Insurgency and Terrorism in the Ancient World, Grounding the Discussion», in *Brill's Companion to Insurgency and Terrorism in the Ancient Mediterranean*, I, Timothy Howe, Lee L. Brice (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 3-27.

Bunnens, Guy, «Phoenicia in the Later Iron Age: Tenth Century BCE to the Assyrian and Babylonian Periods», in *The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean*, Brian R. Doak, Carolina López-Ruiz (ed. by), Oxford University Press, New York 2019, pp. 56-73.

Cannavò, Anna, «The Phoenicians and Kition: Continuities and Breaks», in *Trasformazioni e crisi nel Mediterraneo. "Identità" e interculturalità nel Levante e nell'Occidente fenicio tra XII e VIII sec. a.C. – ISCIMA – CNR, 8-9 maggio 2013*, Giuseppe Garbati, Tatiana Pedrazzi (ed. by), Fabrizio Serra Editore, Pisa – Roma 2015, pp. 139-151.

Carrez-Maratray, Jean-Y., «Psammétique le tyran. Pouvoir, usurpation et alliances en Méditerranée orientale au IVe siècle avant J.-C.», *Trans*, 30, 2005, pp. 37-63.

Cisnetti, Vittorio, «La 'legge della conquista' achemenide e i preparativi militari dei Persiani. Necessità documentaria, necessità regia e necessità sul campo», *NAM*, 4, 14, 2023, pp. 5-78.

Cisnetti, Vittorio [forthcoming], «Cambyses' Fleet. Herodotus on the First Naval Endeav-

our of the Persians and Its Features», *Syllogos*.

Costa, Eugene A., «Evagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411 to 391 B.C.», *Historia (Stuttgart)*, 23, 1974, pp. 40-56.

Dusinberre, Elspeth R.M., «Resistance, Revolt and Revolution in Achaemenid Persia: Response», in *Revolt and Resistance in the Ancient Classical World and the Near East. In the Crucible of Empire* (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East, 85), John J. Collins, J.G. Manning (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 122-137.

Eder, Walter, «Tamos», in *Brill's New Pauly Online*, Brill, 2006, https://doi-org.ezproxy.unibo.it/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e1200080.

EDPC I: Xella, Paolo, Zamora López, José A., Niehr, Herbert (ed. by), *Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Phoenician Culture*, vol. I, *Historical Characters*, Peeters, Leuven – Paris – Bristol 2018.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., *The Political Systems of Empires*, Free Press of Glencoe, New York 1963.

Elayi, Josette, *Sargon II, King of Assyria*, SBL, Atlanta 2017.

Elayi, Josette, *History of Phoenicia*, Lockwood Press, Atlanta 2018 (1st edn. *Histoire de la Phénicie*, Perrin, Paris 2013).

Elayi, Josette, *Sennacherib, King of Assyria*, SBL, Atlanta 2018.

Fales, Frederick M., «Phoenicia in the Neo-Assyrian Period: An Updated Overview», *SAA Bulletin*, 23, 2017, pp. 181-295.

Finn, Jennifer, «The Grand Strategy of Achaemenid Persia, 539–331 BCE», in *Brill's Companion to War in the Ancient Iranian Empires*, John O. Hyland, Khodadad Rezakhani (ed. by), Brill, Leiden 2025, pp. 120-156.

Frahm, Eckart, «Revolts in the Neo-Assyrian Empire: A Preliminary Discourse Analysis», in *Revolt and Resistance in the Ancient Classical World and the Near East. In the Crucible of Empire* (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East, 85), John J. Collins, J.G. Manning (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 76-89.

Fried, Lisbeth S., «The Political Struggle of Fifth Century Judah», *Trans*, 24, 2002, pp. 9-21.

Gjerstad, Einar, «The Phoenician Colonization and Expansion in Cyprus. The Pre-Phoenician Kition», *RDAC*, 1979, pp. 230-254.

Gruen, Erich S., «When Is a Revolt not a Revolt? A Case for Contingency», in *Revolt and Resistance in the Ancient Classical World and the Near East. In the Crucible of Empire* (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East, 85), John J. Collins, J.G. Manning (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 10-37.

Hadjisavvas, Sophocles, *The Phoenician Period Necropolis of Kition*, II, Cyprus Department of Antiquities, Nicosia 2014.

Herrenschmidt, Clarisse, «Désignation de l'empire et concepts politiques de Darius Ier d'après ses inscriptions en Vieux Perse», *StIr*, 5, 1976, pp. 33-65.

Högemann, Peter, «Evagoras – I. City king of Salamis on Cyprus since approximately 411 BC», in *Brill's New Pauly Online*, Brill, 2006, https://doi-org.ezproxy.unibo.

it/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e403540.

Hyland, John O., *Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450–386 BCE*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2017.

Iacovou, Maria, «'Greeks', 'Phoenicians' and 'Eteocypriots'. Ethnic Identities in the Cypriote Kingdoms», in *"Sweet Land…": Lectures on the History and Culture of Cyprus*, Julian Chrysostomides, Charalambos Dendrinos (ed. by), Porphyrogenitus, Camberley 2006, pp. 27-59.

Ioannou, Christina, «Les relations de la ville de Kition et le Proche-Orient selon les sources écrites de l'époque archaïque», *CCEC*, 41, 2011, pp. 265-282.

KAI[5]: Donner, Herbert, Röllig, Wolfgang, *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften*, vol. I, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2002 (1st edn. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1960–1964).

Kent, Roland G., *Old Persian. Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*, American Oriental Society, New Haven 1950.

King, Rhyne, *The House of the Satrap. The Making of the Ancient Persian Empire*, University of California Press, Oakland (CA) 2025.

Körner, Christian, «The Cypriot Kings under the Assyrian and Persian Rule (Eighth to Fourth Centuries BC): Centre and Periphery in a Relationship of Suzerainty», *Electrum*, 23, 2016, pp. 25-49.

Körner, Christian, *Die zyprischen Königtümer im Schatten der Groβreiche des Vorderen Orients. Studien zu den zyprischen Monarchien vom 8. bis zum 4. Jh. V. Chr.*, Peeters, Leuven 2017.

Körner, Christian, «The Kings of Salamis in the Shadow of the Near Eastern Empires: A Relationship of 'Suzerainty'», in *Salamis of Cyprus. History and Archaeology from the Earliest Times to Late Antiquity, Conference in Nicosia, 21-23 May 2015*, Sabine Rogge, Christina Ioannou, Theodoros Mavrojannis (ed. by), Waxmann, Münster 2019, pp. 327-336.

Kuhrt, Amélie, *The Persian Empire. A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period*, Routledge, Oxon 2007.

Lenfant, Dominique, «La «décadence» du Grand Roi et les ambitions de Cyrus le Jeune: aux sources perses d'un mythe occidental?», *REG*, 114, 2, 2001, pp. 407-438.

Lenfant, Dominique, *Les Perses vus par les Grecs. Lire les sources classiques sur l'empire achéménide*, Armand Colin, Paris 2011.

Lenfant, Dominique, «Isocrate et la vision occidentale des rapports gréco-perses», in *Isocrate. Entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux politiques*, C. Bouchet, P. Giovannelli-Jouanna (éd. par), Université Jean Moulin, Lyon 2015, pp. 273-285.

Lincoln, Bruce, «Rebellion and Treatment of Rebels in the Achaemenian Empire», *Archiv* für Religionsgeschichte, 7, 2005, pp. 167–179.

Lipisiński, Edward, *Itineraria Phoenicia* (*Studia Phoenicia XVIII*), Peeters, Leuven – Paris – Dudley 2004 (OLA, 127).

Luraghi, Nino, «The Word of the King: Royal Truthfulness and Some Cases of Multilingualism in Ancient Eurasia», *Klio*, 107, 1, 2025, pp. 2-22.

Maier, Franz G., «Factoids in Ancient History: The Case of Fifth-Century Cyprus», *JHS*, 105, 1985, pp. 32-39.

Manning, Sean, «A Prosopography of the Followers of Cyrus the Younger», *The Ancient History Bulletin*, 32, 1-2, 2018, pp. 1-24.

Manning, Sean, *Armed Force in the Teispid–Achaemenid Empire. Past Approaches, Future Prospects*, Steiner, Stuttgart 2021 (Oriens et Occidens, 32).

Mosca, Paul G., «Facts or Factoids? Some Historical Observations on the Trophy Inscription from Kition (KAI 288)», in *Exploring the* Longue Durée*. Essays in Honor of Lawrence E. Stager*, J. David Schloen (ed. by), Eisenbrauns, Winona Lake 2009, pp. 345-349.

Na'aman, Nadav, «Sargon II and the Rebellion of the Cypriote Kings against Shilta of Tyre», *Orientalia*, 67, 2, 1998, pp. 239-247.

Na'aman, Nadav, «The Conquest of Yadnana According to the Inscriptions of Sargon II», in *Historiography in the Cuneiform World – Proceedings of the XLVe Recontre Assyriologique Internationale*, Tzvi Abusch *et al.* (ed. by), CDL Press, Bethesda 2001, pp. 357-363.

Na'aman, Nadav, «Eloulaios/Ululaiu in Josephus, Antiquities IX, 284», *NABU*, 6, 1, 2006, pp. 5-6.

Reid, Catherine I., «Ephoros Fragment 76 and Diodoros on the Cypriote War», *Phoenix*, 28, 1, 1974, pp. 123-143.

RINAP 2: Frame, G. (ed. by), *The Royal Inscriptions of Sargon II, King of Assyria (721–705 BC)*, Eisenbrauns, University Park (PN) 2021.

RINAP 3.1 – 3.2: Grayson, A.K., Novotny, Jamie (ed. by), *The Royal Inscriptions of Sennacherib, King of Assyria (704–681 BC)*, I-II, Eisenbrauns, Winona Lake (IN) 2012–2014.

Rollinger, Robert, «The Ancient Greeks and the Impact of the Ancient Near East: Textual Evidence ad Historical Perspective (ca. 750–650 BC)», in *Mythology and Mythologies. Methodological Approaches to Intercultural Influences. Proceedings of the Second Annual Symposium of the Assyrian and Babylonian Intellectual Heritage Project Held in Paris, France, October 4-7, 1999*, R.M. Whiting (ed. by), The Neo-Assyrian Corpus Project, Helsinki 2001, pp. 233-264.

Rollinger, Robert, «Thinking and Writing about History in Teispid and Achaemenid Persia», in *Thinking, Recording, and Writing History in the Ancient World*, Kurt A. Raaflaub (ed. by), Wiley Blackwell, Malden (MA) – Oxford 2014, pp. 187-212.

Rollinger, Robert, Ruffing, Kai, «World View and Perception of Space», in *Aneignung und Abgrenzung. Wechselnde Perspektiven auf die Antithese von 'Ost' und 'West' in der griechischen Antike*, Nicolas Zenzen, Tonio Hölscher, Kai Trampedach (Hrsgg.), Verlag Antike, Heidelberg 2013, pp. 93-161.

Rung, Eduard, «War and Ideology in Achaemenid Persia», in *Brill's Companion to War in the Ancient Iranian Empires*, John O. Hyland, Khodadad Rezakhani (ed. by), Brill, Leiden 2025, pp. 84-119.

Ruzicka, Stephen, «Clazomenae and Persian Foreign Policy, 387/6 B.C.», *Phoenix*, 37, 2,

1983, pp. 104-108.

Ruzicka, Stephen, «Glos, Son of Tamos, and the End of the Cypriot War», *Historia (Stuttgart)*, 48, 1, 1999, pp. 23-43.

Ruzicka, Stephen, *Trouble in the West. Egypt and the Persian Empire 525–332 BCE*, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2012.

Ryder, T.T.B., «Spartan Relations with Persia after the King's Peace: A Strange Story in Diodorus 15.9», *CQ*, 13, 1, 1963, pp. 105-109.

Schmitt, Rüdiger, *Die altpersischen Inschriften der Achaimeniden,* Editio minor *mit deutsche Übersetzung*, Reicher, Wiesbaden 2009.

Schwinghammer, Gundula, «Imperial Crisis», in *A Companion to the Achaemenid Persian Empire*, vol. I, Bruno Jacobs, Robert Rollinger (ed. by), Wiley Blackwell, Hoboken (NJ) 2021, pp. 417-427.

Stylianou, P.J., «How Many Naval Squadrons Did Athens Send to Evagoras?», *Historia (Stuttgart)*, 37, 4, 1988, pp. 463-471.

Stylianou, P.J., *The Age of the Kingdoms. A Political History of Cyprus in the Archaic and Classical Periods*, Archbishop Makarios III Foundation, Nicosia 1989.

Stylianou, P.J., *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998.

Tuplin, Christopher J., «War and Peace in Achaemenid Ideology», *Electrum*, 24, 2017, pp. 31-54.

Waters, Matt, «Xerxes and the Oathbreakers: Empire and Rebellion on the Northwestern Front», in *Revolt and Resistance in the Ancient Classical World and the Near East. In the Crucible of Empire* (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East, 85), John J. Collins, J.G. Manning (ed. by), Brill, Leiden – Boston 2016, pp. 91-102.

Weiskopf, Michael, *The So-called "Great Satraps' Revolt", 366–360 B.C. Concerning Local Instability in the Achaemenid Far West*, Steiner, Stuttgart 1989 (Historia Einzelschriften, 63).

Wiesehöfer, Josef, «Glos», in *Brill's New Pauly Online*, Brill, 2006, https://doi-org.ezproxy.unibo.it/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e425270.

Wojciechowska, Agnieszka, *From Amyrtaeus to Ptolemy. Egypt in the Fourth Century B.C.*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2016 (Philippika, 97).

Yon, Marguerite, «Le royaume de Kition. Époque archaïque», in *Phoenicia and the East Mediterranean in the First Millennium B.C.* (*Studia Phoenicia V*), Edward Lipiński (ed. by), Peeters, Leuven 1987, pp. 357-374.

Zournatzi, Antigoni, *Persian Rule in Cyprus: Sources, Problems, Perspectives*, De Boccard, Athens 2005.

Zournatzi, Antigoni, «Smoke and Mirrors: Persia's Aegean Policy and the Outbreak of the 'Cypriot War'», in *Salamis of Cyprus. History and Archaeology from the Earliest Times to Late Antiquity, Conference in Nicosia, 21-23 May 2015*, Sabine Rogge, Christina Joannou, Theodoros Mavrojannis (ed. by), Waxmann, Münster 2019, pp. 314-326.

Busto di Pirro re dell'Epiro, Ercolano, da un originale del 290 a.C.
Ora al Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli
(Wikimedia Commons, foto Catalaon)

Storia Militare Antica e Bizantina

Articoli / Articles - Military History

Storia Greca

• *Against the Great King. Biases on "Rebellion" in the Western Satrapies of the Persian Empire*, by Vittorio Cisnetti

• Nautai *ed* epibatai *in età classica. La reputazione politica e sociale dei soldati di marina nell'Atene di età classica* di Giulia Icardi

Storia Romana

• *Ship-Binding and the Roman* Corvus, by Bryant Ahrenberg

• *Facing Logistical and Tactical Challenges - Maintaining and Protecting Horses and Mules during the Crossing of the Alps (218 BC),* by Annelies Koolen

• *Camp thefts in the Roman Army during the Republic and Principate*, By Michał Faszcza

• *Cinque questioni storiche e militari del principato Augusteo. Gli effetti a lungo termine del* bellum Germanicum *da Cesare ad Augusto*, di Maurizio Colombo

• *Riflessioni sul richiamo di Germanico da parte di Tiberio*, di Alessandro Pagano

• *Camps – Legions – Logistics. Deployment strategies and infrastructure in the area of Carnuntum* (Pannonia Superior) *during the Marcomannic Wars* (bellum Germanicum, *172 and 178–180 AD)*, by Stefan Groh and Helga Sedlmayer

• *Elementi di poliorcetica in Polieno*, di Francesco Fiorucci

Storia Bizantina

• *The Battle of Anglon (540 CE): A Victory of Archery?* by Kaveh Farrokh

• *Note al* Nomos Stratiōtikos. *Tradizione romanistica e disciplina militare nell'Impero Romano d'Oriente*, di Danilo Ceccarelli Morolli

• *Il frammento 8 di Malco di Philadelphia: biografia di un "seduttore in armi"*, di Fabiana Rosaci

• *La spedizione di Manuele Foca in Sicilia (964) e il fallimento della riconquista bizantina dell'Isola: una rilettura delle fonti*, di Francesco Dalbon

• *Motivi topici e agiografici nella storiografia bizantina a proposito delle relazioni fra Bisanzio e la Rus' di Kiev (X sec.)* di Gioacchino Strano

---

Recensioni

• Giuseppe Zanetto, Polemos. *La guerra in Grecia,* (di Andrea Madonna)

• Giulia Icardi, *Affirmer sa puissance par la Mer La rivalité pour l'hégémonie en Grèce Dans la première moitié du IV^e siècle avant J.-C.*, (di Elisabetta Bianco)

• Domenico Carro, *I classiarii. I precursori romani delle moderne fanterie di marina* (di Giulia Icardi)

• Sophie Hulot, *Corpora et arma. La violence de guerre dans le monde romain* (di Gabriele Brusa)

• Umberto Roberto, *Domiziano* (di Fabiana Rosaci)

• Oliver Berck, *Riding for the Powerful Buccellarii and the Ideal of Retainer Loyalty*, (di Marco Canton)

• Orazio Licandro, *Il manoscritto ritrovato. Politica, religione e diritto al tempo di Giustiniano* (di Gioacchino Strano)

• Sophie Hulot, *Corpora et arma. La violence de guerre dans le monde romain* (di Gabriele Brusa)