MARTIN FERGUSON SMITH

URBI ET ORBI

The Epicurean Inscription and Prescription of Diogenes of Oinoanda

DOXAI
Testi e studi di filosofia antica

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For Jürgen Hammerstaedt

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Preface

The Epicurean philosopher Diogenes, active in the first half of the second century AD, was a native of Oinoanda, a small city in the southwest of what is now Turkey. His work was unknown until the late nineteenth century. After its discovery, he was often represented as a second-rate thinker and writer. But he was a clever man, with a sound grasp of Epicureanism, whose writings usefully supplement our knowledge of one of the most influential systems of thought in the ancient world.

However, what distinguishes his work from any other and makes it of first-class interest and value is the remarkable form in which he published it, and the motive behind his decision to do what he did. What was his motive? And what did he do? He had a message of moral salvation and healing for people – the great majority of them – who are plague-stricken with false opinions about how to live their lives. It is a message he wanted to convey to the citizens of Oinoanda in his time and in time to come, and also to so-called foreigners, who, he says, are actually our fellow citizens in a world which is one country and home for humanity. If he had lived today, he might have used the internet to make known his thoughts *urbi et orbi* – to the city of Oinoanda and the world. Not having this option, he had his writings carved on about 260 square metres of wall-space in the city-centre, so creating the largest Greek inscription known to us and the only one expounding a complete system of philosophy.

This translation, the first in English to include all the latest discoveries and research, aims to introduce Diogenes to as wide a read-

ership as possible. It is intended for all who are interested in ancient philosophy, in the intellectual and cultural history of the Greek world under the Roman Empire, and in the story of an impressive and moving human document whose investigation combines an unusually wide range of disciplines, involving archaeology, epigraphy, and history as well as Greek language, philosophy, and religion. If it also benefits anyone in need of "the medicines of salvation", so much the better. Diogenes' message is addressed to us no less than to his contemporaries, and the Epicurean ethical ideal of *ataraxia*, "freedom from disturbance" or "tranquillity of mind", achieved through the elimination of unnecessary fears and desires, is as relevant today as it was two millennia ago. Diogenes, with his philanthropic and cosmopolitan attitudes and motives and his evident tranquillity in the face of illness, old age, and death, is himself a fine advertisement for the efficacy of the "medicines" he prescribes, and we should do well to pay attention to his message at this time when the pursuit of wealth and power is rampant in many quarters, while philanthropy and cosmopolitanism often seem in short supply.

Martin Ferguson Smith
Isle of Foula, Shetland
November 2025

Acknowledgements

I thank all those who have assisted in the exploration of Oinoanda during the 58 years of my engagement with it. They include participants in the survey carried out by the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara (1974-2003) and the one led, until his death in 2016, by Martin Bachmann, Deputy Director of the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Abteilung Istanbul (2007-2017).

I gratefully acknowledge my debt to Bachmann, but I owe still more to Jürgen Hammerstaedt. But for his energy and enthusiasm, the work directed by Bachmann would not have happened, and since September 2007 he and I have collaborated closely in the recording, decipherment, editing, and publication of the numerous pieces of Diogenes' inscription which have come to light. He is a fine Greek scholar, whose papyrological experience and expertise have stood him in good stead in the study of Diogenes, the display of whose writings in stone imitates that of an unrolled papyrus scroll. He and I usually but by no means always agree, even on some quite big issues. But the disagreements are always respectful, amicable, and for me stimulating. Some of them are mentioned in this book. What will not be evident to the reader is that my translations and interpretations often owe not a little to his input and influence. It is right and proper, as well as a pleasure, to dedicate the book to him.

I thank also all who have encouraged my work on Diogenes. They are far too numerous to name, but I make exceptions of the following: Oinoanda colleagues Jim Coulton (died 2020) and Nicholas Milner; Hüseyin Köktürk of Fethiye and H. Nur Erkızan of

Muğla; Sami Işık and the members of the Işıklı family of İncealiler who treated me like one of their own throughout my independent work at Oinoanda in 1968-1973; the government representatives and watchmen who have assisted over the years; and Lucinda Ferguson Smith, whose help in preparing this book for publication has been invaluable.

Finally, I warmly thank Francesco Verde and his editorial colleagues for accepting the book in the Doxai series, and Bibliopolis of Naples for permission to incorporate in the translation revised passages from my 1993 edition.

Abbreviations

See also Bibliography, pp. 165-168

Diogenes of Oinoanda
D = Diogenes of Oinoanda
Fr. = Fragment(s) of D's inscription, unless otherwise indicated. The numbering is that of Sm, unless otherwise indicated.
HK = Fragment(s) of D's inscription, quoted from the edition of Heberdey/Kalinka (1897)[1]
HS = Hammerstaedt/Smith (2014)
NF = New Fragment(s) of D's inscription[2]
S = Smith (1996)
Sm = Smith (1993a)
Theol. = D's Theological *Physics*-Sequence
YF = Yazı Felsefi (Philosophical Inscription). The YF numbers are the inventory numbers of the fragments of D's inscription.

Section abbreviations
FLCL = Fourteen-Line-Column Letters
MM = Monolithic Maxims

1. Where a fragment was published in HK, but not rediscovered by the editors, its number is bracketed, e.g. HK fr. (47).

2. NF 1-124 were first published by MFS between 1970 and 1984 and republished in Sm and, with drawings and photographs, in S. NF 125 was first published in S. NF 126-135 were first published in Smith (1998) and republished with revisions in Smith (2003). NF 136 was first published in Smith (2004), and NF 137-219 were first published by JH and MFS in eight articles in *EA* in 2007-2012, 2016, and 2018. NF 136-212 are collected in HS.

TLCW = Ten-Line-Column Writings

Other sources for Epicurean philosophy
Cic. = Cicero
Div. = De Divinatione (On Divination)
DND = De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods)
Fin. = De Finibus (On Ends)
Epic. = Epicurus
Hdt. = Letter to Herodotus
Pyth. = Letter to Pythocles
Men. = Letter to Menoeceus
Nat. = On Nature
PD = Principal Doctrines (*Kyriai Doxai*)
Us = Usener (1887)
VS = Vatican Sayings
Lucr. = Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things)*
Phld. = Philodemus
Sen. = Seneca

Archaeological Schools
BIAA = British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara
DAI = Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Istanbul

Diogenes scholars
JH = Jürgen Hammerstaedt
MFS = Martin Ferguson Smith

Journals
AS = Anatolian Studies
CErc = Cronache Ercolanesi
EA = Epigraphica Anatolica

Introduction

1. Oinoanda

Oinoanda occupies upland territory northeast of Telmessus (Fethiye) in southwest Asia Minor. Colonised around 200 BC from Termessus in neighbouring Pisidia and therefore often known as Termessus-at-Oinoanda, it is built on the southern ridge of a wooded hill which projects into a high plain watered by the upper River Xanthos. The substantial ruins, which include a stretch of beautifully built Hellenistic city-walls, an aqueduct, a theatre, two market places, a heroon, bath buildings, various civic buildings, private houses, churches, and cemeteries, stand at about 1,400 m above sea level, and access from the village of İncealiler at the foot of the eastern side of the hill involves a climb of about 350 m.

At the time of writing there is alarming talk of building a road to the site. That would certainly make it more accessible to visitors, but also to local treasure hunters who have already plundered it in the search for coins and other marketable antiquities. Fortunately, inscriptions are not usually reckoned to be marketable and are often too bulky to be carried, so the unauthorised excavations have not deliberately targeted them. However, some of them have been disturbed during the search for other items. This is the case with not a few fragments of D's inscription, while at the same time the illegal activities have often exposed new pieces which were previously buried. It is to be noted that Oinoanda is unusually rich in inscriptions, being home not only

to D's work, but also to a very long genealogical inscription on the walls of a mausoleum, and numerous honorific and dedicatory inscriptions. No wonder Martin Bachmann used to call it "an epigraphic El Dorado".

Until 84 BC Oinoanda was the southernmost member of a tetrapolis with Cibyra, Bubon, and Balbura. On the dissolution of this arrangement, it joined the Lycian League – unwillingly it seems. During the Roman civil war it assisted Brutus in his siege of Xanthos and may have been expelled from the League. In AD 43 Claudius dissolved the League and created the province of Lycia-Pamphylia, with Oinoanda part of it. Through the second half of the first century and all through the second century, the city enjoyed stability and prosperity, as is evidenced by its buildings and inscriptions, and some of its citizens accumulated great wealth. It continued to be prosperous until well into the third century, when, like other places in Asia Minor, it was affected by anarchy in the Empire and threats posed by foreign invaders. It was around this time that the Oinoandans built a new fortification wall enclosing the central part of their city. It is strongly built, but much of its material is reused and included many pieces of D's inscription. So, by this time the philosophical inscription had been dismantled and was being dispersed.

The later history of the city involves many uncertainties. It continued to be inhabited as long as the water supply was maintained, and the failure of that cannot be dated. There were bishops of Oinoanda until at least 879, but the episcopal residence need not have been on the hilltop site. Even at the time when the city was flourishing, many Oinoandans will have lived in villages and other settlements around the fertile plain below, and, although there are remains of two churches in the city itself, there was at least one sizeable church, converted to Christian use from being a temple of the Dioscuri (Castor and Pollux), near the village of Çukurceylan, a little east of Oinoanda.

2. Diogenes and His Inscription

All our information about D comes from his inscription. Since he was able to set it up in a public building, a stoa, on Oinoanda's "Esplanade", now known to have been the market place of the city in the Hellenistic and early Roman periods, he must have been a member of a very wealthy and influential family. He would have studied rhetoric and philosophy, probably in that order, in Rhodes or some other centre of learning, very likely Athens, and perhaps in both places. He sometimes resided in Rhodes to improve his health and avoid the harsh winter weather at Oinoanda, and he had Epicurean friends in Greece, specifically Athens, Chalcis, and Thebes. Nine of his friends and acquaintances, several of them in Rhodes, are named by him. One of them, Niceratus, was allegedly the only survivor of a dramatic shipwreck on the island of Syme, between Rhodes and the Asia Minor mainland.

The date of the inscription is most accurately indicated by the 117-line inscription (long except by Diogenic standards!) concerning the establishment of a musical festival at Oinoanda by C. Iulius Demosthenes in 125. Its style of lettering is remarkably similar to that of D's inscription, the only significant difference being that the letters of the Demostheneia inscription are smaller. It can be reasonably assumed that the stonecutter who executed it was one of the team of stonecutters employed by D, perhaps a few years later, but still in the reign of Hadrian (117-138).

The principate of Hadrian would have been a good time to think of setting up an Epicurean inscription in a public place. The emperor's beloved adoptive mother, Pompeia Plotina, widow of Trajan, was an Epicurean who was closely involved with the school in Athens until her death, probably early in 123, and he was supportively interested. The enthusiasm of the imperial house for Epicureanism and philosophy generally no doubt boosted the fortunes of the school throughout the empire, and not only among the male population. An intriguing passage of D (NF 186 in *TLCW*) reveals that he is doing his best to help unnamed females in their philosophical studies.

When the stoa used by D was demolished, the blocks of the inscription were re-used for the building of later structures over a wide area of Oinoanda. But the densest concentration of them is on and around the Esplanade, along the so-called Great Wall, which bounds the Esplanade on its west side, and on what my Oinoanda colleagues in the 1970s named "Martin's Hill", rising ground south of the Esplanade and east of the paved court identified as the later market place. Archaeological investigations point to the south side of the Esplanade having been the site of the stoa.

The inscription is not a single piece of writing, but an assembly of several writings, the main components being three treatises, two collections of letters, and maxims. They occupied seven horizontal courses of a wall. The courses varied in height, but the stones in each course were of roughly equal height. The texts were carved in columns, as often on papyri, but the number of lines in each column varied with the height of the stones and their location in the ensemble: writings high up in the inscription were carved in larger letters than those at or near eye level. The positions occupied by the different sections are discussed below in the prefatory notes to each of them.

If one disregards the titles of the treatises and letters, with their extra-large letters, one can broadly distinguish three sizes of lettering which I call "large" (average c. 2.9-3.0 cm), "medium" (average c. 2.3-2.4 cm), and "small" (average c. 1.8-1.9 cm). This tripartite division is a little crude, but convenient and serviceable.

The dimensions of the complete work cannot be precisely calculated, because so much (maybe 70%) of it is missing, but the total length of each of the two main treatises, the *Physics* and *Ethics*, seems to have been in excess of 80 m, and the total height of the seven courses about 3.25 m, with an uninscribed course at least 50 cm tall below. The total number of words will have been at least 25,000 and probably more.

D's own words imply that he used an existing building rather than a new, purpose-built one (fr. 3 V). The stoa may have been given to the city by one of his ancestors. Recently, I raised a ques-

tion which, to my knowledge, has not been addressed before (Smith [2020] 242 n. 4). Was the inscription carved on an interior wall or an exterior one? Having it on the outside wall(s) would have been easier not only for the stonecutters, but also for readers, except in adverse weather. But, if the stoa faced what used to be a significant public space, one would probably expect the long inside wall to have been used rather than the back of the building. The possibility that it was displayed partly inside and partly outside, like the Monumentum Ancyranum, cannot be ruled out. One group of writings, the *Monolithic Maxims*, has no obvious place in the arrangement of the inscription mentioned above, and may indeed have been separate from it.

3. The Discovery of Diogenes

Oinoanda received its first European visitors in 1841, but it was not until December 1884 that the first pieces of D's inscription came to light. The discoveries – five of them – were made by two young French epigraphists, Maurice Holleaux and Pierre Paris. In June 1885 the investigation was continued by two of their compatriots, Georges Cousin and Charles Diehl, and in October 1889 by Cousin alone. All the French finds, 64 fragments in total, were published by Cousin (1892). His work, although important, had serious deficiencies, lacking photographs, drawings, and measurements. Much superior was the edition of the Austrians Rudolf Heberdey and Ernst Kalinka (HK [1897]), who visited Oinoanda in June 1895. It included measurements and scale-drawings of the 24 new pieces they discovered and all of the "French" fragments which they were able to locate. Except that Heberdey briefly revisited Oinoanda in 1902, without ever publishing the two fragments he found, no further search for D was to be made for over 70 years. The inscription was re-edited by Johann William (1907), Alberto Grilli (1960), and Cecil ("Dick") Chilton (1967), but they only knew the texts found in the nineteenth century and were unable to check the accuracy of

HK's drawings. Chilton did visit Oinoanda in 1962, but only for one day. He saw only four known fragments of D and nothing new.

In 1967, just after completing a translation of Lucretius, I decided to take D as my next research project. In 1968 I made my first visit to Oinoanda and rediscovered 39 of the 88 fragments found by the French and Austrians. The following year, I returned to find four more of them and also four new fragments. Hitherto, I had relied on my drawings and photographs to read the texts, but in 1970 for the first time I made epigraphic "squeezes" – impressions created by using a brush to beat wetted filter paper into the inscribed surface, then letting the paper dry. At that time, before digital technology arrived, squeezes were usually the best way of recording inscriptions. 1970 was an exceptionally productive year for new finds. The 12 fragments which came to light contributed about 650 words to the text, more than have been added in any other year since 1889. Three further visits, in 1971, 1972, and 1973, yielded more new fragments, bringing their total to 38.

The fruitfulness of my independent work persuaded the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara (BIAA) to commence a topographical and epigraphical survey of Oinoanda in 1974. It was directed by Alan Hall, and I remained responsible for recording and publishing D. Its start was not auspicious because it coincided, almost to the hour, with the landing of Turkish troops in Cyprus, and the ensuing crisis played havoc with our plans. For most of the time we were forbidden to work at Oinoanda, despite it being perfectly peaceful. The survey continued in 1975, 1977, 1981, and 1983. Another 86 pieces of the inscription came to light during the BIAA survey. They included some valuable texts, but most of them were disappointingly small, with the result that they contributed fewer words than "my" 38 had done. The need for an excavation, or at the very least for authorisation to expose likely-looking blocks, was obvious. Hall died in 1986, and, despite my frequent attempts to renew interest, Oinoanda had to wait until 1994 before it received any more attention. That year Stephen Mitchell of BIAA led a team of four to Oinoanda and its territory. I was a member, and in 1997 I was ap-

pointed scientific director of an excavation in collaboration with the Fethiye Museum. Because of bureaucratic delays the available team was very small, and the time was short – just two full-timers and one part-timer working for ten days in chilly November conditions. But the results were excellent, notably the discovery of eight substantial blocks, including the largest yet known, in a trench opened on the south side of the Esplanade. Also they showed the sort of finds which can be expected if and when larger-scale work is permitted.

Disappointingly, applications to continue BIAA work in the following seasons were unsuccessful. A brief visit in 2003 brought to light one new text. In March 2006 BIAA's commitment to Oinoanda was formally ended. I welcomed this development because it made it possible for others to try their luck with the Turkish authorities. I approached JH (Jürgen Hammerstaedt) of Cologne about the possibility of a collaborative project. He had just completed a lengthy article on D's inscription (Hammerstaedt [2006]). He responded to my enquiry with enthusiasm, and, thanks to his efforts, in December 2006 Martin Bachmann agreed to direct a new survey of Oinoanda.

The survey led by Bachmann ran for six consecutive seasons (2007-2012). Given that there was no permit for excavation, the results were outstanding. Many more new pieces of D's inscription were found, others were rediscovered, and full use was made of the latest technology. Extensive areas of the city, including subterranean structures, were investigated and recorded by means of geophysical prospection and terrestrial scanning, and 3D documentation of all the visible fragments of D by laser-scanning was achieved. Another major achievement, in 2010, was the construction on the Esplanade of a steel depot for the storage and protection of the inscription and other significant finds. After an international appeal, the funds for it were contributed by numerous institutions and individuals, with by far the largest donation coming, thanks to the writer and philosopher Alain de Botton, from the Gilbert de Botton Memorial Foundation.

The new texts discovered during British work at Oinoanda (mine and BIAA's) were edited and published by me, batch by batch, as

they came to light. In 1993 my edition of all the fragments known at that time appeared, in 1996 a companion volume of drawings and photographs, and in 2003 a supplementary volume containing additions to the 1993 edition, including ten new pieces of the inscription discovered during the excavation in 1997. The new texts recovered during the German-led project of 2007-2012 were published jointly by JH and myself in six articles in *Epigraphica Anatolica* (*EA*). They were reprinted, together with other contributions of ours and Greek Indices, in our book *The Epicurean Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda: Ten Years of New Discoveries and Research* (2014).

After the end of the survey, Bachmann began collecting and editing reports contributed by the expert participants in it. As part of the preparation a brief visit was made to Oinoanda in 2015 to check measurements and other data. One new D text was recorded. The work on the Oinoanda volume was gathering pace, when on 3 August 2016 it was halted by Bachmann's sudden death. So severe was this setback that the book's publication has been delayed for over nine years, and I still have not seen it. During that interval, in 2017, one more brief visit was made to Oinoanda by JH and five others. During it, JH recorded six more D texts, two of them exceptionally important. The discoveries of both 2015 and 2017 were published by him and me in *EA*. The total number of D fragments is now 305.

The future of Oinoanda in uncertain, but one must hope that the large-scale excavation it so obviously needs will happen soon.

4. Diogenes' Importance

D does not aim or claim to be an original philosopher. His lack of doctrinal originality, typical for an Epicurean, has the advantage for us that he can be accepted as a faithful communicator of Epicurus' teachings. It is an additional advantage that he writes in Greek, like his master, and often preserves his terminology.

Unlike Lucretius, who focuses most attention on physics, and Philodemus, who is more concerned with ethics, D gives a balanced

summary of the whole system, while making clear that physics is to be studied not as an end in itself, but as a necessary means to achieving the end, which is ethical. The inscription is a powerful witness to Epicureanism's flourishing existence, four hundred years after its founder's death, as a philosophy for whose adherents it was a way of life, the advantages of which they did not keep to themselves but were moved to communicate to others. D's philanthropic and cosmopolitan attitudes and motives, his firm faith in Epicurus as the moral saviour of humanity, and his fervent sense of missionary purpose are something special, as is his prediction of a time in the future when human beings, living in a world free from war, social strife, and slavery, will enjoy an Epicurean heaven on earth characterised by "righteousness and mutual love" (fr. 56).

In the Preface I suggested that, if D had been alive today, he might have used the internet to propagate his ideas. It needs to be added that the establishment of a website could not be exactly comparable to the method of publication employed by D. In order to find a website, one needs to search for it on a computer, whereas his message, displayed in the city centre, was visible to all Oinoanda's citizens and visitors. Of course they did not have to read it (and by no means all those who saw it will have been literate), but they could not help being aware of its presence. D's advertisement for "the medicines of salvation" was as unavoidable as the advertisements which confront people as they wait for a train in a metro station. Or rather, it was more unavoidable on account of its massive extent. Its sheer bulk must have made an impression on those who saw it. Even if many thought, both when the inscription was *in situ* and when its blocks were taken away to be reused as building materials, that D had been a fool to waste money in having "turned so many letters to stone" (fr. 116), when he might have spent it, if not on himself, then on things that would have been of real benefit (as they saw it) to the community, the survival of his work nineteen centuries after its execution shows how far-sighted his decision to publish it in epigraphical form was. There is no other way in which he could have secured the survival of his writings. Moreover, by means of the inscription,

he was able to get across his message in public, while still complying with Epicurus' advice to keep out of the public eye.

5. Diogenes' style

In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries scholars sometimes made unfavourable assessments of D's style, calling it "lacking in clarity", "not always correct", "precious", "stilted", "artificial", "tortuous", "long-winded", "repetitive", and characterised by "senile talkativeness" (see Sm 109-111). Are these criticisms fair? I do not think so.

Certainly his style is "artificial", but what Greek writer's style is not? Like all educated men of his time, he had received a rhetorical training, and this shows in his writing: for example, his word order is partly influenced by a striving for clausal rhythm and a desire to limit hiatus. His employment of hyperbaton and other rhetorical devices is not extravagant and extreme, but shows some moderation and restraint; and although nobody could argue that his writing is quintessentially elegant, it is competent and clear. Where his meaning is obscure, this is usually, so far as I can see, due to the fragmentary state of the text.

The charges of repetitiveness and long-windedness remain to be addressed. It is certainly true that he sometimes repeats points and often uses more words than one would expect of someone who is having to pay for them to be carved on a wall. But it is difficult to understand why anyone, with the possible exception of his heirs and his bank manager, should ever have been bothered about this. He is a man with a mission, which is to advertise the Epicurean message of moral and spiritual salvation to Oinoanda's citizens and visitors. Repetition of key points is a natural and necessary part of this missionary endeavour. Such repetition is particularly understandable, given the great extent of the inscription and the way it is divided into several different writings. D cannot seriously have expected anyone to read the whole inscription on one occasion. Another con-

sideration which makes some repetition justifiable and necessary is the close relationship between Epicurean physics and ethics: both are founded on the validity of sensation, and physics is the necessary means to achieving the ethical end. As for the chattiness which D sometimes displays, including in the prefaces to his writings (fr. 3; fr. 2; fr. 29 + NF 207; fr. 30; fr. 62-63), one can plausibly attribute it not to a propensity for senile rambling, but to a sensible calculation that adoption of a conversational style, such as one would employ if one were actually talking to someone, might be an effective way of engaging the attention of his readers.

Translation

Editorial Note

The primary aim has been to reproduce the meaning of the Greek both accurately and in comprehensible English. Another aim has been to preserve, as far as possible, the flavour of D's style, although some features, such as his rhythmic clauses, are inevitably lost.

Words inside square brackets are wholly or partly restored. Although many of the restorations, especially of single words, are likely or certain to be correct, others, especially those of more than a word or two, are less secure, although it is hoped that in most cases the restorations give the gist of what D wrote, if not his exact words.

The number in bold centred above each translated passage is specific to this book. The same number, also in bold, is shown in the Notes and in the Index. But to avoid the nightmare of adding a new series of numbers to the multiple existing series, I show the "Fr." and "NF" numbers as well, also in the Notes the HK fr. and YF (inventory) numbers. It is these old and now-standard series which are used in the Introduction and Notes. "Fr." indicates a fragment or fragments in Smith (1993a) and "NF" is "New Fragment(s)". For details of the NF series, see Abbreviations.

Bracketed bold Roman figures in the translation are the numbers of the columns or part-columns in the Greek text.

The order of passages within each section of the inscription is often uncertain. Where the order of passages is secure and the length

of the gaps between them is known, even if only approximately, this information is given.

Every piece of the inscription, of whatever size, has value as part of the complete jigsaw puzzle. But it was not appropriate to include in the translation those numerous fragments which are too small and/or too weathered and worn to yield anything of significance.

Physics

1

Fr. 1

[Diogenes of Oinoanda's epitome on nature].

2

Fr. 3

(I) ... [of benefit] ...

In this way, [citizens], even though I am not engaging in politics, I say these things through the inscription just as if I were taking action, and in an endeavour to prove that what is of benefit to our nature, namely freedom from disturbance, is identical for one and all.

And so, now that I have set out the second reason **(II)** for the inscription, I go on to describe my mission and explain its character and nature.

Having already reached the sunset of my life (being on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] **(III)** fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are of a suitable make-up.

If those in a bad predicament numbered only one, two, three, four, five, or six or any larger figure you choose, reader, provided that it is not very large, I would address them individually and **(IV)** do all I could to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another like sheep). Moreover, [it is] right to help [also] generations **(V)** to come (for they are our concern, although they are still unborn); and, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid the foreigners who come here as well.

Therefore, since the remedies of the inscription reach a larger number of people, I resolved to make use of this stoa **(VI)** to advertise publicly the [medicines] of salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test; for we have dispelled the fears [which grip] us without justification and, as for pains, those which are groundless we have completely excised, while those which are natural we have reduced to an absolute minimum, making their magnitude minute.

(*Gap of at least one column*)

3

Fr. 2

... **(I)** [the body] bringing significant just [accusations] against the soul, alleging that it is unwarrantably mauled and maltreated by it and dragged to things which are not necessary. In fact, the wants of the body are small and easy to obtain, and the soul too can live well by sharing in their enjoyment, while those of the soul are both great **(II)** and difficult to obtain and, as well as being of no benefit to our nature, actually involve dangers.

So, to reiterate what I was saying, when I saw these people in this predicament, I lamented their behaviour and bewept the wasting of their lives, and I considered it the responsibility of a good man to

give [benevolent] assistance, to the utmost of one's ability, to those of them who are of a suitable make-up, **(III)** [acting through] the inscription.

[Well then, I declare that] the [groundless] fear of [death, and that] of the gods, [grips many] of us, [and that] joy [of real value is generated not by theatres] and [gymnasia and] baths [and perfumes] and ointments, [which we] have left to [the] masses, [but by philosophy (*or* study of physics)] ...

(*Gap of unknown length, probably not long*)

4

Fr. 4

... to us ... [as is supposed by] **(II)** some of the philosophers and especially by Socrates and his followers. They say that studying physics and busying oneself with investigation of [celestial phenomena] is superfluous and unprofitable, and they do [not even] deign [to concern themselves with such matters]. ...

(*Gap of unknown length, probably not long, perhaps only a few lines*)

5

Fr. 5

(I) [Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] physics [as unnecessary], being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what are they saying other than that there is no need for us to study physics? After all, who will choose to seek what they can never find?

Now Aristotle and those **(II)** who belong to the same school as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are

continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand, although we agree about their flux, do not agree about its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible **(III)** by sense-perception. And indeed [by no means would the upholders of] the view under discussion [ever] have been able [to say] – and this is just what they do [maintain] – that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

And the so-called [ephectic philosophers], of whom Lacydes [of Cyrene is a prominent representative] ...

(*Gap of unknown length*)

6

Fr. 6

(I) ... [As for the first bodies, also] called elements, which on the one hand have subsisted from the beginning [and] are indestructible, and [on the other hand] generate things, we shall explain what [they are] after we have demolished the theories of others.

Well, Heraclitus of Ephesus identified fire as elemental, Thales of Miletus water, Diogenes of Apollonia **(II)** and Anaximenes air, Empedocles of Acragas fire and air and water and earth, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae the homoeomeries of each thing, and the Stoics matter and god. As for Democritus of Abdera, he did well to speak of indivisible entities (*i.e.* atoms), but since his conception of them was in some respects mistaken, he will be considered in the exposition of our theories.

(III) Now we shall bring charges against [the] men mentioned, not out of contentiousness towards them, but because we wish the

truth to be safeguarded; and we shall deal with Heraclitus first, since he has been placed first on our list.

"You are mistaken, Heraclitus, in saying that fire is elemental, for neither is it indestructible, since we observe it being destroyed, nor can it generate things ..."

7

NF 142

... [it is impossible] to protect them (*i.e.* the elements of Empedocles or Anaxagoras) [completely] from the destruction that [hangs over them] when they change, as we said in our arguments against Heraclitus, and these are no more [indestructible] than all those things that change [and are visibly destroyed].

8

Fr. 7

(I) ... this ... is nothing ... void ... to be acted upon. ... to be acted upon ... boundless ... nothing ... cannot ... **(II)** the last, because he knows it.

Even Democritus went astray in a manner unworthy of himself when he said that atoms alone among existing things have true reality, while everything else exists by convention. For, according to your account, Democritus, it will be impossible for us even to live, let alone to discover the truth, since we shall be unable to protect ourselves from either fire or slaughter **(III)** or [any other force] ...

(*Gap of unknown length*)

9

Fr. 8

[Since the first bodies cannot be broken up by anyone], **(I)** whether god or human being, one is left to conclude that these things are [absolutely] indestructible, [beyond the reach of] necessity. For if [they were destroyed], in accordance with [necessity, into the non-existent, all things would have perished]. ... **(II)** ...

10

Fr. 9

(I) ... [And] often mirrors too will be my witnesses [that likenesses] and appearances are real [entities]. For what I say will certainly not be denied at all by the image that will give supporting evidence on oath in mirrors. We would not see ourselves in them, nor indeed would [any reflection] be created, **(II)** [if there were not a continual flow being borne from us to the mirrors and returning an image] to us. For this too is convincing proof of the effluence, seeing that each of the parts is carried to the point straight ahead.

Well, the images that flow from objects, by impinging on our eyes, cause us both to see external realities and, **(III)** [through entering our soul, to think of them. So it is through impingements] that the soul receives in turn the things seen by the eyes; and after the impingements of the first images, our nature is rendered porous in such a manner that, even if the objects it first saw are no longer present, images similar to the first ones are received by the mind, **(IV)** [creating visions both when we are awake and in sleep].

[And let us not be surprised] that this happens even when we are asleep; for the flow of images to us occurs in the same way at that time too. How so? When we are asleep, with all the senses as it were

paralysed and extinguished [again in] slumber, the soul, which is [still wide]-awake [and yet is unable to recognise] **(V)** the predicament and condition of the senses at that time, on receiving the images that approach it, conceives an untested and false opinion concerning them, as if it were actually apprehending the solid nature of true realities; for the means of testing the opinion are asleep at that time. These are the senses; for the rule and **(VI)** the standard [of truth] with respect to [our dreams] remain [these].

[In opposition to] your [argument, Democritus, we now say this]: the [nature of dreams is in no way god-sent, as you maintain, or monitory, but rather dreams are produced, we say, by] certain [natural entities, with the result that the fallacious argument is turned aside]; for, [as I have shown, the same images that cause vision cause dreams as well as thought].

11

Fr. 10

(I) ... asleep ... So visions are not empty illusions of the mind, as the Stoics hold. For indeed, if on the one hand they call them empty on the ground that, while they have a corporeal nature, it is exceedingly subtle and does not impinge on the senses, they have expressed themselves **(II)** badly, [since it was necessary to call] them corporeal, despite their subtlety. If on the other hand they call them empty on the ground that they have no corporeal nature at all (and it is in fact this rather than the former that they mean), how can the empty be represented?

What then are they? Visions in fact have a composition which is subtle and eludes our sight, **(III)** [but which is not empty. For the mind, being superior in subtlety], ... provides the starting-point and ... things ... and moves ... imagining that we will be struck with a sword or will fall from a precipice, we spring up in consequence

of our fear, even when we are in company. To these examples **(IV)** [I add this further one: since in our dreams], as well as when we are awake, we perform sexual acts, it is no good arguing that the pleasure we derive from them is unreal because we are asleep. So one must not call these visions empty, when they actually possess such great power.

On the other hand, however, if they are not empty, that does not mean they are sentient and rational and really chat to us, **(V)** as Democritus supposes; for films that are so subtle and lack the depth of a solid nature cannot possibly possess these faculties.

So these theorists, the Stoics and Democritus, went astray in opposite directions: the Stoics deprive visions of a power they *do* have, while Democritus endows them with a power they do *not* have. In fact the nature of [dreams] ...

12

Fr. 11

... they came from [embryonic] . . . [Then the ancestors] of human beings, born, [according to] the present account, [from the] earth, [received in addition] a particular kind of strength [inherent] in nature ...

13

Fr. 12

[The caves which they frequented **(I)** with the advance of time, as they sought shelter from] wintry storms, gave them the conception of houses, while the wraps they made for their bodies, as they protected them either with foliage or with plants or even (for they were already killing animals) with skins, gave them the notion of clothes – not yet plaited, but perhaps made by tanning or some such pro-

cess. Then the advance of time **(II)** inspired them or their descendants with the idea of the loom as well.

So no arts, [any more than] these, should be explained by the introduction of Athena or any other deity; for all were the offspring of needs and experiences in conjunction with time.

And with regard to vocal sounds, and I mean the words and phrases of which **(III)** the earth-born human beings produced the first utterances, let us not introduce Hermes as teacher, as some claim he was (for this is palpable drivel), nor let us credit those philosophers who say it was by deliberate invention and teaching that names were assigned to things in order that human beings might have [distinctive designations] **(IV)** for them to facilitate their communication with one another. It is absurd, indeed more absurd than any absurdity, as well as quite impossible, that any one individual should have assembled such vast multitudes **(**after all, at that time there were as yet no kings and indeed, in the absence of any vocal sounds, no writing, and, in the case of these multitudes, **(V)** [it would have been quite impossible, except by means] of a decree, for their assembly to have taken place), and, having assembled them, should [have taken hold of] a rod and proceeded to teach them like an elementary schoolteacher, touching each object and saying "let this be called 'stone', this 'wood', this 'human being' or 'dog' [or] 'ox' or ['donkey'] ..." **(VI)** ...

14

Fr. 13

[The heavenly bodies, when the whirls of air] **(I)** cause [such strong movement], are all [violently] tossed about, but some meet one another, while others do not; and some pursue a straight course up to a certain point, others, like the sun and moon, an oblique one, while others revolve in the same place, like the Bear; moreover, some move in a high orbit, others however in a low one. Yes, and this is a fact of

which most people are ignorant: **(II)** they suppose the sun at any rate to be as low as it appears to be, whereas it is not as low; for if it were so, the earth and everything on it would necessarily be set ablaze. So it is its image that we see low, not the sun itself. However, this is to digress.

Let us now discuss risings and settings and **(III)** related matters after making this preliminary point: if one is investigating things which are not directly perceptible, and if one sees that several explanations are possible, it is reckless to make a dogmatic pronouncement concerning any single one. Such a procedure is characteristic of one who practices divination rather than of a wise man. It is in order, however, to say that, while all explanations are possible, this one is more plausible than that.

It is therefore possible that the sun **(IV)** [is] a disk resembling red-hot charcoal [and] of an extremely fine texture, [lifted up by the] winds and [functioning like] a spring, in that some fire [flows away] from it, while other fire flows [into] it from the [surroundings], on account of their multifarious [mixture], in aggregations of small [parts]. Thus it is [of itself naturally] sufficient for the world ...

15

Fr. 14

... Hail, not unexpectedly, is produced by a fine, loose conglomeration that is due to the [self-moving energy] of what surrounds it and [is formed] either by a wind [that is cold but high in the air or by filmy snow].

16

Fr. 15

(III) ... all ... For if they experience distinct visions and are unable to discover how these are produced, understandably, in my opinion,

they are involved in apprehension; and sometimes [they are] even convinced [that there is a] creator ...

17

Fr. 16

(I) ... and [they vehemently] denounce the [most pious people] as [atheists]. And in fact [it will become evident] that it is not we [who deny] the [gods, but others].

Thus [Diagoras of Melos, with certain others who closely followed his] theory, categorically [asserted that] gods [do not exist and vigorously] attacked [all those who thought otherwise].

(II) Protagoras of Abdera in effect put forward the same view as Diagoras, but expressed it differently to avoid its excessive audacity. For he said that he did not know whether gods exist, which is the same as saying that he knew that they do not exist. If indeed he had balanced the first statement with "However, I do not know **(III)** that they do not exist", [perhaps] he [would] almost have a [circumlocution] to [avoid the appearance of denying] the gods completely. [But he said] "I do not know that they exist", [not] "I do not know that they do not exist", doing [exactly] the same as Diagoras, who indefatigably [did not] stop saying that [he did] not [know] that they exist. [Therefore], as I say, [either Protagoras in that case] in effect put forward [the same view as Diagoras or] ...

18

Fr. 17

(III) ... in [a chariot], making Triptolemus mount one and providing him with most wretched [toils] ... **(IV)** ... For indeed, while hon-

ouring supreme [Zeus] and Demeter as deities, [we regard human beings] not as [their] slaves, [but as their friends].

19

Fr. 18

(II) ... that we may not suppose [*or* let us not suppose], having shared in judging what is still the subject of dispute, ... **(III)** ... [Let us not think that the gods are capable of examining those who are unrighteous] and base and [noble] and righteous. [Otherwise the] greatest disturbances [will be created in our souls].

20

Fr. 19

(I) [Let us then contradict Homer, who] talks [all sorts of nonsense] about them, [representing them sometimes as adulterers, sometimes as] lame, [sometimes as thievish, or even as being struck by mortals with a spear], as well as [inducing the] craftsmen [to produce inappropriate portrayals. Some statues of gods] shoot [arrows and are produced holding] a bow, [represented] like **(II)** Heracles in Homer; others are attended by a bodyguard of wild beasts; others are angry with the prosperous, like Nemesis according to popular opinion. Instead, we ought to make statues of the gods genial and smiling, so that we may smile back at them rather than be afraid of them.

Well then, my readers, let us show the gods [proper] reverence both at festivals **(III)** and on [unhallowed occasions, both] publicly [and privately], and [let us observe] the [traditional] customs [in relation to them; and let not the imperishable beings be falsely accused at all] by us [in our vain fear that they are responsible for all misfortunes], bringing [sufferings to us] and [contriving burdensome

obligations] for themselves. [And let us also call upon] them [by name] ...

21

NF 167 + NF 126-127 + Fr. 20 + NF 182

(I) ... again ... them ... procuring ... [tranquillity] ... against ... [I reply] ... being convinced ... and is ... I say ... [without] difficulty **(II)** I will present ..., initially disposing beforehand of the false accusation that is brought against us. For some say that this doctrine does not benefit our life, for human beings even in the present situation act wrongly so far as they possibly can; that if however they are also released from their fears derived from the gods, they will act completely wrongly, and in consequence **(III)** the whole [of life] will be confounded. However, [people of such behaviour] are even now those who do not fear the gods ([let] this [be] agreed; for if they feared the gods, they would not do wrong). But, as for the others, I declare that those of them who grasp arguments based on nature are not righteous on account of the gods, but on account of their having a correct view of the nature of desires and pains **(IV)** and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the one hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the gods, rather than on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals **(V)** are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrongdoings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, **(VI)** are the most abominable of all peoples.

On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato's and Socrates' judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?

So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine **(VII)** do harm [nor does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not do harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before.

That **(VIII)** our doctrine not only [is] helpful ([as well as] being true), but [even reverent], let us now [show].

Another thing that those who believe in providence claim is that the god both is maker of [the] world and takes providential care of it, providing for all things, including human beings. Well, in the first place, we come to this question: was it, may I ask, for his own sake that the god created the world **(IX)** or for the sake of human beings? (For some claim this too.) If indeed it was for himself, it was from a wish to gain something that he embarked on this undertaking. For how could it have been otherwise, if nothing is produced without a cause and these things are produced by a god? Let us then examine this view and what the Stoics mean.

It was, they claim, from a wish to have a city and fellow-citizens, as though **(X)** he created for himself the world as a city and human beings as fellow-citizens. But that this supposition is a fairy tale and a fable, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher's argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense, is self-evident. Yet even if it was with the intention of doing some good **(XI)** to himself that he created the [world, why was he idle] for the infinite [period of time]

before the [world existed? Why] was he [in need] of this [good] and [no longer perfect]? For god [is perceived to be] a living being, indestructible [and] blessed from [age to] age, having [need of nothing]. Moreover, what [god, if] he had existed for infinite [time] and enjoyed tranquillity [for thousands of years, would have got] this idea **(XII)** that he needed a city and fellow-citizens? Add to this the absurdity that he, being a god, should seek to have human beings as fellow-citizens. And there is this further point too: if he created the world as a residence and city for himself, I seek to know where he was living before the world was created. I do not find an answer, at any rate not one consistent with the doctrine of these people **(XIII)** when they declare that this world is unique. So for that infinite time, apparently, the god of these people was cityless and homeless and, like an unfortunate human being (I do not say "god"), having neither city nor fellow-citizens, was destitute and roaming about at random.

If therefore the divine nature shall be deemed to have created things for its own sake, **(XIV)** (there result) all these absurdities; and if for the sake of human beings, there are yet other more absurd consequences.

Let us divide the discussion into two (the world and humans themselves), and first let us speak about the world and ask whether it has all things well arranged for human beings and whether we have nothing on which to fault them, as they have been prepared by a god.

First let mention be made of the **(XV)** occurrences [involving] celestial phenomena. Let anyone say in what way a thunderbolt benefits life (how does it not actually harm?), in what way flashes of lightning do, in what way claps of thunder, in what way falls of hail, in what way blasts and gusts of violent winds, in what way the irregular orbits of the stars and their differing sizes, in what way eclipses of the sun and the moon and their spiral-shaped and oblique courses, in what way night, **(XVI)** when we can [well rest throughout the] day, in what way the alternating [lengths] of days [and] nights? For of these phenomena some are useless, others actually harmful.

Celestial phenomena have that character. [But of what kind are matters on earth?] How much of Libya is uninhabitable? How much of the land beyond the Scythians? [How much] of the [region] beyond Asia? How much of India? How many other ... ?

(*Short gap*)

22

Fr. 21

(I) ... [The sea] has [excessively large] **(II)** parts [of this earth] as its share, making a peninsula of the inhabited world. It is itself also full of yet other evils and, to cap all, has water that is not even drinkable, but briny and bitter, as if it had been purposely made like this by the god to prevent human beings from drinking.

Moreover, the so-called Dead Sea, which is well and truly dead (for it is never sailed), even deprives the local inhabitants of part **(III)** of the land they occupy; for it drives them away to a very considerable distance with its impetuous attacks and again floods their land as it withdraws, as though being on its guard lest they may do any cleaving of the earth with a plough.

Such then are the things of the world. But the things of human beings themselves – let us now see if they are well arranged by divine providence. Let us begin like this. Fine indeed, my friends, **(IV)** [are these] creatures human beings – creatures that are [rational, gifted with prescience] of the future, and [capable of] leading a blissful [life – if] they possess virtue [for] its own [sake and good dispositions. But] these creatures [do not possess wisdom or indeed virtue, according to] the [Stoics who hold that view]; for the [great folly of all prevents them]. And ... not ...

(*Gap of unknown length*)

23

Fr. 22

... prostrate ourselves [before your images. By making human beings] tyrants, you permit [outrages]. Let us also [mention soldiers] who have inflicted numerous hardships on the whole world; [and] let us remember certain nations and [new acts of violence that have occurred] in our own time.

Who then, [father Zeus], if they hear [any talk of gods who allow] such great evils to afflict [humanity, can believe they have providential care of the world?]

24

Fr. 23

[Enough of this subject, since it is] not necessary [to say anything] in reference to the trap posed by meanings that [remain] concealed, unless you think that we do not appreciate what great misfortunes some people have experienced on account of this ambiguity and intricate obliqueness of oracles, or that this is the right time for us to give a thorough explanation of the kind of disaster suffered by the Spartans [after they had consulted the Delphic oracle concerning Arcadia].

25

NF 143

(I) ... against Cyrus ... the land east of the Halys, while it was fitting to possess the same as each of the others.

Next, why does he (*i.e.* Apollo) give oracles to any who want them against those who have committed no sin, either big or small, against

him? For this is incompatible with the majesty of a god. Moreover, he also takes bribes **(II)** ...; [for Croesus] wanted [to receive] the Delphic Oracle's pronouncements, [spurred on] by which he dedicated to him the tithes of refined gold from the spoils of [the] war. And [straight away he attacked] Cyrus, [going] where [the god] sent him forward. And why [did] the same god ... the [iambic] poet Archilochus, [merciless lampooner ...?]

26

Fr. 24

(I) ... in this case [he disregarded] natural [causes and used arguments] of a dialectician, attempting the art of divination concerning dreams [and] wholly [trusting] them. For ... [Antiphon, he says, predicted, when he was consulted by a runner], **(II)** who was just about to compete for a prize at Olympia, that he would be beaten. For the runner, he says, said, when consulting Antiphon, that he thought an eagle was giving chase in his dreams. And Antiphon at once [told him to remember that an eagle always drives other birds before it and is itself last. However, he says that another interpreter declared, when he was consulted], **(III)** that the god did [not] say at all to the runner "you will be beaten", and that the eagle is no cause for anxiety. If, thanks to Antiphon, he (*i.e.* the runner) had not shown him (*i.e.* the other interpreter) up, so that [he was able to see that the dream could be interpreted in entirely different ways, he would not have suspected that he was receiving unreliable advice]. **(IV)** ... For ... thing ..., as [dreams] testify ...

27

Fr. 25

(II) ... [To the happy the unhappy always seem more turbulent than them, since they are full of disturbance and confusion].

Ethics

28

Fr. 28

Diogenes of Oinoanda's epitome on the feelings [of the soul] and [body].

(*Probably just 1 column missing*)

29

Fr. 29 + NF 207

(I) [There are many who] pursue philosophy for the sake of [wealth and fame,] with the aim of procuring these either from private individuals or from kings, by whom philosophy is deemed to be some great and precious possession.

Well, it is not in order that we too might gain any of the above-mentioned objectives that we have embarked upon the same undertaking, but so that we may enjoy happiness **(II)** through attainment of the goal craved by nature.

The identity of this goal, and that neither wealth can furnish it, nor political fame, nor royal office, nor a life of luxury and sumptuous banquets, nor pleasures of choice love-affairs, nor anything else, but philosophy **(III)** alone, the one which we pursue, secures it, the developing argument will demonstrate.

Moreover, we have set up this inscription not for our own sake, but for your sake, citizens, as a means of salvation for you, as we announced at the opening of the whole discourse. And we do not consider **(IV)** that it (*i.e.* the inscription) will be useful to certain people and not useful to certain people, but that it will be useful to

all. To explain: those of you who are young, still at the beginning of your lives and as it were standing at a crossroads, being apprehensive about what kind of road they will travel, in case it is one that is rough and hard to traverse, we will put on the highway; while those who are not yet **(V)** old, but not indeed young either, we will make lay aside the error of the opinions wrongly held by them before, and live correctly for the rest of their lives, and as for those who are already old we will make them also live well, so long as ever they will still live. For even a day [allows] a good man [to achieve happiness.]

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 1)

[The blessed and imperishable being] neither experiences trouble itself nor causes it to another, so that it is not affected by feelings either of anger or of favour; [for] it is to the weak [that such emotions belong].

(*1 column missing*)

30

NF 191

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 2)

[Death] ...

31

Fr. 30

(I) ... time ..., and we contrived this in order that, even while [sitting] at home, [we might be able to exhibit the] goods of philosophy, not to all people here [indeed], but to those of them who are civil-spoken; and not least we did [this] for those who **(II)** are called foreigners, although they are not really so. For, while the various segments of the earth give different people a different country, the

whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire earth, and a single home, the world.

I am not pressurising any of you into testifying thoughtlessly and unreflectively **(III)** in favour of those who say "[this] is true"; for [I have] not [laid down the law on] anything, [not even on] matters concerning the gods, [unless] with the accompaniment of [argument].

Just [one thing] I ask of you, [as I did also] just now: do not, even if [you should be] somewhat indifferent and listless, be [like] passers-by [in your approach] to the writings, [consulting] each [of them] in a patchy fashion and [omitting to read everything] ...

Lower margin (Epic. *PD 2*)

Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved is without sensation, [and what is without sensation is nothing to us].

(*5 or 6 columns separated* fr. 30 *and* 32.
Fr. 31 *probably supplies the first lines of one of them*)

32

Fr. 31

[Let us, then, immediately begin by discussing pleasures and] moreover [by carefully examining the arguments in detail] ...

33

Fr. 32

...[the latter] **(I)** being as perverse as the former. I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into "what is the means of happiness?" and they wanted to say "the virtues", which would actually be true, it would be unnecessary to take any other step than **(II)** agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not "what is the means of happiness?", but "what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?", I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that the end of the best mode of life is pleasure, **(III)** while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us then declare that this is true and make it our starting-point.

Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, although it is a naïve question, **(IV)** "whom do these virtues benefit?", obviously the answer will be "human beings". The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other living creatures: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist. Each [virtue] therefore **(V)** ... just as if a mother for whatever reasons sees that the possessing nature has been summoned there, it then being necessary to allow the court to be asked what each [virtue] is doing and for whom **(VI)** ... [we must show] both which of the desires are natural and which are not; and in general all things that [are included] in the **(VII)** [former category are easily attained] ...

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 6; *PD* 8 = *VS* 50)

[For the purpose of gaining security from people, government and kingship are a natural good, so long as] this end can be procured [from them].

[No] pleasure is intrinsically bad; [but the] means of achieving some pleasures [involve disturbances] that far, far [outweigh the pleasures].

34

Fr. 34 IV-V (YF 055)

... **(I)** must [use reasoning], since they [will not always achieve immediate success: just as] exertion [often] involves one [gain at the beginning and] certain [others as time passes by], so it is also with [experiencing pleasure]; for sowings of seeds do [not] bring [the same benefit] to the sower, [but we see] some of the seeds [very quickly] germinating [and bearing fruit, **(II)** and others taking longer] ... of pleasures and pains ... [pleasure]. And so the ... [are] ... But if ...

35

NF 192

(II) ... pleasures, and having deceived ... through so many pleasures concerning debauchees the [true name] of happiness. If [we partake] of each pleasure ... [So, when we say that pleasure is a good in accordance with nature], **(III)** it is not those, no, not those, Zeno and Cleanthes and you, Chrysippus, and all who follow the same path as you, not those pleasures of the masses that we advocate as being the end, but only these which we have just mentioned are an end. For if it is your doctrine that the natural good is a kind of condition, and that this is an appropriate end in accordance with the **(IV)** argument that it is in harmony with us, but you hate the name of pleasure, why did you not say to us long ago? – "Your doctrine is true, gentlemen, but you have misused the name of pleasure", so that we might have said to you in opposition to this: "This argument we are now marshalling concerning the previously mentioned

condition is by no means new, but from the beginning [Epicurus proclaimed it] in an address to all Greeks ..."

Lower margin
(*Only two letters are preserved, perhaps from Epic. PD 10*)
(*At least 1 column missing*)

36

Fr. 33, including NF 128 (= fr. 33 IV and part of V)

(I) ... virtues of such a kind ... [pleasure] ... and [the life of complete pleasure is always] inseparable from all [the] virtues, [they deny they] find pleasure, and these [sophists only] admit that often **(II)** ... not ... [Zeno] himself ... [the opinion] ..., just as if he means virtue when he has said "pleasure", and that human beings run to them. And again elsewhere having forgotten this **(III)** ... hunger, for ... not ... of this ... it ... is able, as these people lay it down, like a bait, for all human beings, to draw them, like birds or fish, open-mouthed to the names of the virtues, and sometimes **(IV)** ... the ... itself ... [illusions]. [And you are] not ashamed, [you] wretched people, ... one another ... wit ... pleasure ... cleverly agreeing ... so that you are not [prevented from passing through] ... **(V)** when you venture to climb crags.

Well now, I want to deflect also the error which, along with the feeling of self-love, has you in its grip – an error which, more than any other, further inflates your doctrine as ignorant. The error is this: [not] all causes in things precede their effects, even if the majority do, but **(VI)** some of them precede their effects, others [coincide with] them, and others follow them.

Examples of causes which precede are cautery and surgery saving life: in these cases extreme pain must be endured, and it is after this that pleasure quickly follows.

Examples of coincident causes are [solid] and liquid nourishment and, in addition to these, [sexual acts]: **(VII)** we do not eat [food] and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we drink [wine] and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we ejaculate semen and experience pleasure afterwards; rather the action brings about these pleasures for us immediately, [without awaiting] the future.

[As for causes which follow, an example is expecting to win] praise after death: although people experience pleasure now because there will be a favourable memory of them **(VIII)** after they have gone, nevertheless the cause of the pleasure comes later.

Now you, being unable to mark off these distinctions, and being unaware that the virtues have a place among the causes that coincide with their effects (for they are borne along with [pleasure), go completely astray].

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 10)

[If the things which are productive of pleasures for debauchees dispelled the mind's fears about celestial phenomena and death and pains, and moreover taught the limit of desires] and of pains, we should have no reason to [censure such people], since they would be sated [with pleasures] from every side and [would] not [experience either mental] or physical pain – [pain which is the evil].

37

Fr. 34 I-III

(I) ... of reasoning ... [of happiness] ... [is] ... hope, **(II)** after selection [of these], and cure of erring emotions. So where, I say, the danger is great, so also is the fruit. Here we must turn aside these fallacious arguments on the grounds that they are insidious and insult-

ing and contrived, by means of terminological ambiguity, to [lead] wretched human beings **(III)** [astray] ... pleasure ... many people ...
(*Gap of 3 columns*)

38

Formerly fr. 34 VI-VII, now separate fragment I-II

(I) ... [prudence].

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states and in actions; and let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions that disturb the soul are removed, those that produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

Well, what are the disturbing emotions? **(II)** [They are] fears – of the gods, of death, and of [pains] – and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, unless we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.

[Let us then examine] our fear of the gods ...

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 3)

[The quantitative limit of pleasure is the] removal of all pain. [Whoever experiences pleasure, so long as it continues, cannot ever be troubled] by pain of body or of mind or [of both together].

39

Fr. 36

(I) ... [productive of pleasures] ... **(II)** ... [is] ... of the myth. And ... more ... of the [gods] ... most ...

40

Fr. 35

(II) ... As a matter of fact this fear is sometimes clear, sometimes not clear – clear when we avoid something manifestly harmful like fire, through fear that we shall meet death by it, not clear when, while the mind is occupied with something else, it (*i.e.* fear) has insinuated itself into our nature and [lurks] ...

Lower margin (Epic. *PD 13* = *VS* 72)

There would be [no] advantage [in securing protection against other people so long as phenomena above and below the earth, and in general what happens in the boundless universe, were matters of suspicion].

41

Fr. 37

(I) The soul furnishes nature with [the ultimate] cause [both of life and of] death. It is true that the number of its constituent atoms, both its rational and irrational parts being taken into account, does not equal that of the body; yet it girdles the whole person and, while being itself confined, binds the body in its turn, just as the minutest quantity of acid juice binds a huge quantity of milk.

And this too is a sign, among many others, of the primacy of this cause: **(II)** often, although the body has been beset by a long illness and has come to be so attenuated and emaciated that the withered skin is all but adhering to the bones and the constitution of the internal parts appears to be empty and bloodless, nevertheless, provided that the soul remains, **(III)** it does not allow the creature to die. And this is not the only sign of its supremacy, but it is also the case that amputations of hands and often of whole arms or legs by fire

and iron cannot unfasten life. So powerful is the dominion which the soul-part of us exercises over it. Conversely, there are occasions when, although the body is intact and has suffered no diminution of its bulk, **(IV)** [the faculty of sensation abandons it; for it is of no avail if the soul no longer remains and its union with] the body [is dissolved. But, as long as we see the same part still remaining as guardian, the] person [lives. Thus, as I said, the ultimate] cause [of life] is the soul [being united with] or [separated from the body].

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 5 = *VS* 5, the first sentence occurring also in Epic. *Men.* 132)

[It is impossible to live pleasurably without living prudently] and honourably and righteously, and it is impossible to live prudently and honourably and righteously [without living pleasurably. Whoever lacks these qualities cannot live pleasurably].

42

Fr. 38

[The soul cannot survive separation from the body], since it is [necessary] to understand that it too is a part. By itself [the] soul cannot ever either exist (even though Plato [and the] Stoics talk a great deal of nonsense [on this subject]) or [experience movement], just as [the body does] not [possess sensation when the soul is released from it].

43

Fr. 39

(II) ... in perpetual motion ... But if ..., why then ... we say ... even if only to be ... of this ... [Why then], in the name of [Wisdom, do

you say] it (*i.e.* the soul) [survives] after the body? ... is joined with the body, **(III)** if ... powerful ... when ... How then, Plato, will imperishability [come about] for you? Or how can this [in common language be called] imperishable ...?

The Stoics, **(IV)** wanting to say more singular things than others on this subject, deny that the souls are absolutely imperishable. What they say is that those of fools are destroyed immediately after the parting of the body, while those of the virtuous survive, although they too are destroyed sometime. Well, observe the glaring implausibility of their view: **(V)** they make their assertion as though the wise and the unwise, even if they do differ in intellectual ability, do not have the same mortality. Actually, I marvel more [at their restraint] – how it is that, once [the soul] is to have the power to exist separate from the [body], even if we say for the [briefest moment of time], and ... ?

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 29 = *VS* 20)

[Of the desires, some are natural and necessary; others] natural, but [not necessary]; and others neither natural nor [necessary, but the products of idle fancy].

44

NF 168

... soul ... [being mistaken] about this, but us ... they allow to perish ...

Lower margin (beginning of unknown maxim)

If [you] wish ...

45

Fr. 40

[And let us not say that the soul transmigrated and did not perish, as the Orphics], and [not] only Pythagoras, crazily [suppose]

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 25)

[If you do not at all times] refer each [of your actions to the natural end, but instead, when making a choice or avoidance, turn aside to adopt some other criterion, your actions will not be in conformity with your principles].

46

Fr. 41

... we ... of the (*pl.*) ..., [not] as Empedocles and Pythagoras and their followers [say]. For having ...

47

Fr. 42

(I) ... [Empedocles in regard to these matters borrowed his philosophy from Pythagoras, ... going astray **(II)** he says] that the souls transmigrate from body to body after the first has been destroyed, and that this happens *ad infinitum*, as if someone is not going to say to him: "Empedocles, if the souls are able to survive independently and you have no [need] to drag them into the nature of a living creature and to transfer them for this reason, how is the transmigration of use to you? **(III)** For in [the] intervening time, during [which] their transmigration [is effected, interrupting] the nature of a living creature, they will be thrown into complete confusion.

If on the other hand they are [in no way] able to survive [without] a body, why [exactly] do you give yourself – or rather them – this trouble, dragging [them] about and making them transmigrate from one [creature to] another? And these **(IV)** ... **(V)** ... For [it would be preferable] to make the souls independent and absolutely indestructible and not to cause them to embark on a long, circuitous voyage, so that eventually your theory, although still fallacious, would command more respect. Otherwise we shall disbelieve you, Empedocles, with regard to [these] transmigrations".

Lower margin (unknown maxim)

[Pain], when it is slight, [does not destroy pleasure], while great [pain is not long-lasting].

48

Fr. 43

[Visions are not empty illusions of the mind], **(I)** as the Stoics imagine, going completely astray. In fact they have [the nature] of corporeal images [and] impressions similar in form to all these visible objects that their flux [allows us to apprehend], as I demonstrated also [in the] writing before this one, when I was elucidating the theories about [dreams].

Now, these images do not in any way have [any] sensation, as **(II)** Democritus [supposes], given that they are constructed of [fine] atoms and are [perceptible] only [by the mind. If] they have the form of such things as are congenial to our nature, they make the soul exceedingly glad; but if of such things as are repugnant to our nature, they fill the whole person with a [great] perturbation and fear and [set] the heart pounding.

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 32)

For [all those living creatures that could not make compacts not to harm one another or] be harmed, nothing is either [righteous or indeed unrighteous. And the same is true of all those peoples who could not or would not make compacts not to harm or be harmed].

49

Fr. 44 + fr. 45

[The soul experiences] **(I)** feelings far greater than the cause that generated them, just as [a fire] vast enough to burn down ports and cities is kindled by an exceedingly small spark. But the pre-eminence of these feelings of [the soul] is difficult for ordinary people to gauge: it is [im]possible to make a direct comparison by experiencing simultaneously **(II)** the extremes of both (I mean of the feelings of the soul and of the body), since this seldom ever happens and, when it does happen, life is destroyed. Consequently the criterion for determining the pre-eminence of one of the two is not found. Instead, when people encounter bodily pains, they say these are greater than those of the soul; and when **(III)** [they encounter those of the soul, they say] they [are greater than the others. For] what [is present is] invariably more convincing [than what is absent], and in every case people are [likely], either through [necessity] or through pleasure, to confer pre-eminence on the feeling that has hold of them.

However, this matter, which is difficult for ordinary people to gauge, a wise person calculates on the basis of many factors, **(IV** = fr. 45**)** [including consideration] of the future [no] less [than of the present. Those who have been disturbed] by [feelings] of the soul have struck [themselves and sometimes abstained from daily sustenance. Forgetting what is involved in those actions, they add bodily] pains to their souls ...

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 4 = *VS* 3)

[Pain in the flesh does not last continuously: extreme pain is present for a very short time; pain that only just outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last many days; and chronic illnesses] permit a preponderance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.

50

NF 137

... to have [good] or bad [assumptions about] matters. The additional things that are sent [in this way] from [us] to the illnesses by the part belonging to [the soul] are not of necessity numerous. For indeed [we do] not [believe] that death [is a contributory cause] of irrational [fears] ...

51

Fr. 46

[Wherever pleasure is present, we never] have pain of body and [pain of mind – neither] both together [nor singly]. For ...

52

Fr. 47 (NF 44 + NF 14)

[Nor do we consider terrible the misfortunes **(I)** that provoke] such great pains. For (if it is necessary for anyone to take illustrations of pain) when someone has been struck by a thunderbolt, or has been crushed, with the speed of thought, by a stone four feet across, or has been decapitated [with a sword] with the swiftness [of a dream], how, in the name of Heracles, [is the suffering terrible in such cases, when death occurs instantaneously] **(II)** and time does not even allow a cry of agony, but with great vehemence snatches the soul away from pain?

So, I say, critical occurrences and also those not very far below them, neither of which come [to a living creature introducing long-term pains in the flesh, are in no way to be feared by us. For if the pain takes a turn **(III)** for] the worse, it no longer continues severely, but the crisis comes and passes away in the shortest time; and if it is relieved, it ushers the living creature back to health. What then, in the name of the twelve gods, is terrible about that? Or how can we justly bring a complaint against nature, if those who have lived for so many years and so many months and so many **(IV)** days [come to their last day?

So neither the one eventuality nor] the [other is evil, since the crisis does not last for many days], after which [either death] will possess [someone] and [absolute] unconsciousness [will at once occur], or the person will be [quickly restored to health] and [life is preserved]. And as for the [crises] of diseases, [which indeed] are themselves [bearable in these circumstances], why is it also necessary [to experience pain about them]?

Lower margin (*VS* 33 + Epic. *Men.* 130-131)

[The flesh's cry is freedom from hunger, freedom from thirst, freedom from cold. One who is free from these things and expects to remain so] might rival [even Zeus in happiness].

Plain [flavours afford as much pleasure as a luxurious diet once the pain of want has been removed; and bread and water give the highest pleasure whenever they are consumed by one who needs them].

53

Fr. 48

(I) ... [not] ... **(II)** Therefore three kinds of pains – one coming to us from want, another from sprains and the bones (whether through

blows or insidiously), another from diseases – it is in the power of all to escape, in so far as human nature is able to avoid them.

Well, want has been discussed above. As for wounds and suchlike, this much is sufficient. For some **(III)** ..., [while others] ...

Lower margin (unknown maxim)

[Yearning for] the past ...

54

Fr. 49

(I) ... [For even if I did nothing to reveal] and [point out the nature] of pleasures, still [they themselves reveal] their own nature [to] us. In this way ... well ... no longer. [Through bodily] pleasures [the soul readily] receives also [those that are productive] of this (*i.e.* happiness). For our nature [wants what] is better for [our] soul.

Moreover, **(II)** the soul is manifestly more [powerful] than the body; for it [has] control of the extreme and supremacy over the other [feelings], as indeed we revealed it [above].

[So if], through paying attention to the arguments of Aristippus, we take care of the body, [choosing] all the pleasure derived from drink, food, and [sexual acts] and indeed absolutely all the things that no longer [give enjoyment after the happening, but neglect the soul, we shall deprive ourselves of the greatest pleasures].

Lower margin (Epic. *PD* 16; cf. fr. 71 II)

[It is seldom that chance impedes a wise person: it is] reason [which has controlled the] greatest and most important matters [and which controls and will control them throughout the whole course of life].

55

Fr. 50

[Seeking], by making trial [by themselves], the root [of the good], they light upon [the pleasures of the stomach. But, after being afflicted by other desires, on account of] what they involve those who [have them harm] themselves.

Lower margin (perhaps the first sentence of Epic. *PD* 37)

... [and if not] ...

56

Fr. 51

(I) ... [Neither political fame nor royal office nor wealth is productive of pleasure. The] philosopher [therefore] does [not] want [the] authority [and dominion] of Alexander [or still more] than even he [possessed], since [human beings are] constituted [having no need of what is vain]. ... **(II)** ...

57

Fr. 52

... divination ...

58

Fr. 53

Why then is [the fulfilment of] certain predictions [stronger] evidence [of the soundness of divination than their non]-fulfilment

is evidence [of its unsoundness? It is illogical], in my view. ... [I lay down] ...

59

Fr. 54

(I) ... contradictions ... is [so, as these people say], and [that it is impossible] to escape [necessity], ... the error; while if ... undecided ... and ... For what [other] argument [will he adopt] ...? [Evidently] he will not have one. So, if **(II)** divination [is eliminated], what other evidence for fate is there?

If anyone adopts Democritus' theory and asserts that because of their collisions with one another the atoms have no free movement, and that consequently it appears that all motions are determined by necessity, we shall say to that person: "Do you [not] know, whoever **(III)** you are, that there is actually a free movement in the atoms, which Democritus failed to discover, but Epicurus brought to light – a swerving movement, as he proves from phenomena?" The most important consideration is this: if fate is believed in, all admonition and censure are nullified, and not even the wicked [can be justly punished, since they are not responsible for their wrong-doings].

Lower margin (unknown maxim)

[Eternity], even if it were [productive] of pleasure eternally, [would not increase pleasure] eternally.

60

Fr. 55

[So necessity], as [he says, for this reason is accountable to nobody, while chance is unpredictable].

Lower margin (unknown maxim)

... conceive ...

61

NF 146 + NF 129

[Life offers us for our nutrition, although] **(I)** barley-bread [is sufficient] for our nature, many foods which do not involve unpleasantness when they are taken, and a bed which does not fight against the body because of hardness, and clothes which are not indeed extremely soft, but also not so extremely rough that our nature is repelled, just as if we were clothing our [body with the garment that killed Heracles, putting on something] **(II)** that lacerates our [constitution]. And in fact these items and those much greater than these are easily obtained, so that it (*i.e.* life) becomes one of continual luxury, and to others perhaps a beneficial redeemer in their necessity, and ... [a supporter] of the incapacitated in need, and whatever ... **(III)** to acquire ... and [because of an] abundance of the [correct] arguments, which is a guide especially of those who will gladly share what they have acquired, and because of his other [Epicurean] way of life, which alone is best, let him be a refined man. ... **(IV)** ... what is natural [*or* physics] ... but nevertheless ... why ... I do not know. For see, ... that exceeds the bounds of nature ... would not ... vain ... **(V)** [For indeed, when] we [are dead, we shall certainly not experience continual wailings and groanings or] rivers [of hell and other such miseries, as] the myths [say we shall. So death is nothing] to us, [once sensation is absent], as I have [already] said [before] and [straight away again] shall continue [also to maintain. For] among us [Epicureans] mortality ...

Lower margin (unidentified maxim)

... takes ...

62

Fr. 56

[So we shall not achieve wisdom universally], **(I)** since not all are capable of it, but, if we assume it to be possible, then truly the life of the gods will pass to human beings. For everything will be full of righteousness and mutual love, and there will come to be no need for fortifications or laws or all the things we devise on account of one another. As for the necessaries derived from agriculture, since we shall have no **(II)** [slaves at that time] (for indeed [we ourselves shall plough] and dig and tend [the plants] and [divert] rivers and watch over [the crops), we shall] ... such things as ... not ... time ..., and such activities, [in accordance with what is] needful, will interrupt the continuity of the [shared] study of philosophy; for [the] farming operations [will provide what our] nature wants.

Lower margin (unknown maxim)

Not [every living creature] is able [to make] a compact [not to harm or be harmed]

63

Fr. 57

... [example] ... we must use ...

64

Fr. 58

(II) ... many [*or* much *or* often] ... wicked ...

Fourteen-Line-Column Letters

Letter to Antipater

65

Fr. 62

(I) [Diogen]es to Anti[pater], kind greetings.

[You have often before given] me indications [of goodwill], Antipater, [both] in the letter [you] sent [us] recently [and] earlier [when I was] ardently [calling] you [in person] to philosophy, in which you, [if] anyone, [live] the most pleasant [life through employing] excellent [principles]. Accordingly, I assure you, **(II)** I am most eager to go and meet again both yourself and the other friends in Athens and in Chalcis and Thebes, and I assume that all of you feel the same way.

These words of this letter I am now writing to you from Rhodes, where I have recently moved from [my own country] at the beginning of winter ...

(*Short gap, probably of just one column*)

66

Fr. 63

(I) ... our own land being hit by snow.

So, as I was saying, having had my appetite most keenly whetted by all the advantage of the voyage, I shall try to meet you as soon as winter has ended, sailing first either to Athens or to Chalcis and Boeotia.

But since this is uncertain, **(II)** both on account of the changeability and inconstancy of our fortunes and on account of my old age besides, I am sending you, in accordance with your request, the arguments concerning an infinite number of worlds. And you have enjoyed good fortune in the matter, for, before your letter arrived, Theodoridas of Lindos, a member of our school not unknown to you, who is still a novice in philosophy, **(III)** was dealing with the same doctrine. This doctrine came to be better articulated as a result of being turned over between the two of us face to face, for our agreements and disagreements with one another, and also our questionings, rendered the inquiry into the object of our search more precise. I am therefore sending you that dialogue, Antipater, **(IV)** so that you may be in the same position as if you yourself were present, like Theodoridas, agreeing about some matters and making further inquiries in cases where you had doubts.

The dialogue began something like this: "Diogenes", said Theodoridas, "that the [doctrine laid down] by Epicurus on an infinite number of worlds is true **(V)** [I am confident], ..., as if ... Epicurus ...

67

Fr. 64

... the ... of the matter under investigation ... having assumed all that ...

68

Fr. 65 + fr. 78

I laugh at ... and dismissed the arguments, relayed to us by you, of those who say that the world is a work of some [god], not of nature. So there is no need to be worried about this [breach] and [to

fall] into apprehension, since indeed, [contrary to] your argument, these suppositions [are] wholly [shadows of dreams]. We therefore, so that you may not make the earth gape open and fill it also full [of void, say in opposition] ...

69

Fr. 66

(I) [Let us now ask those who mislead us for the explanation of their theory. So let us say to] the gentlemen: ["What do you] mean, [gentlemen, when you think fit to explain] the [earth in this way as boundless? Do you limit the earth throughout its length from above, circumscribing it] with a vault [of sky, and] from that **(II)** starting-point do you extend [it] indefinitely into the region below, dismissing the unanimous opinion of all, laymen and philosophers alike, that the heavenly bodies pursue their courses around the earth both above and below, and withdrawing the sun sideways outside the cosmos and reintroducing it sideways? Or are you not saying this, but that a single **(III)** earth ...?" ... If ...

70

Fr. 67

(I) ... them [*or* themselves] and ... Therefore if the indivisible entities are assumed by us to be finite in number **(II)** and for the [reasons] we have stated are incapable of coming together (for there are no longer other entities behind them to surround their number and bring them together from the sides), how are they to engender things, when they are isolated from one another? The consequence is that not even this world would exist. For if the number of atoms were finite, they [would] not [be able] to come together.

Letter to Dionysius (and Carus?)

71

Fr. 69

[The current is gradually **(I)** dissolved by the air. As a result of the buffeting, it is depleted]; for on account of the great extent [of space] it cannot preserve the order and [position of the atoms. Now, the] easily-dispersed [currents] of the atoms, [although being carried away] in filmy form, [nevertheless] themselves [both have] reality and are constructed [of matter by nature], just as [these atoms] are composed **(II)** by nature.

[So, since they are awaiting square impressions, people] falsely [accuse the eyes when they convey in non-square form impressions that] in reality [are borne] to us [through the air] in a [roundish] form. [For] in that case [they do not know], probably, [that the images] emanating [from the tower] are abraded [by the air and are] easily damaged.

72

Fr. 68

[So, always including these considerations], Dionysius and [Carus, in an investigation] of [any] kind of thing not evident to sense, [let us await from] phenomena [here on earth] either absence [of non-contradiction or contradiction].

73

Fr. 71

(I) Chance [can] befall [us] and do harm, but rarely; for it does not have matter, like fire, which it may lay hold of. So Epicurus, hav-

ing regard to these matters, refused to remove chance from things entirely (for it would have been rash and incompatible with philosophical respectability to have given a false account of a matter so clear and patently obvious to all), **(II)** but [called] not a few manifestations of it [only] small. As, [then, the] disposition of [the] wise person [can] represent the accidental [happening in this way, so, it seems, it] seldom [operates dominantly], as [the son of Neocles] says: "It is seldom that [chance] impedes a wise person: it is reason that controls [and always controls] the [greatest] and most important matters". ... [most of all] ...

74

NF 214 + fr. 72

(II) ... [encouraged]. For, although the poor souls had slipped about after being rammed by some earthenware jars, the people (on board) remained safe, contrary to expectation, until dawn came. But then they did not continue to be safe even for a short time; for immediately the wind, having become stronger and wilder than it was during the night, carrying the ship [...] with the swell, swept it off to a **(III)** desolate part of the territory of Syme and smashed it on rocks by the sea there.

When it was broken in pieces, as was inevitable, and the people had spilled out and the others suffered a different fate, Niceratus, as he relates, was saved in the following way. After being lifted high up by the swell, he was plunged into a sort of fissure between the rocks from which **(IV)** the sea was no longer able to suck him down and shatter him again. So he was crushed, as one would expect, and swallowed down sea-water; he was lacerated through having fallen upon sea-gnawed rocks. Well, very gradually he swam out of the whirlpool [*or* out of the danger]. Then, during the time when the assaults of the waves were intermittent, he barely came safely to dry land, literally flayed **(V)** all over. So he lay on [the extremity of] the look-

out point, [where he spent] the day [in this state] and the following night and another day until evening, exhausted by hunger and his wounds.

But [we know] now that the accidental does well what is reckoned [appropriate] for you. For this messenger of yours is [not] dead, since he preserved [his life]; for then [by] chance Ni[ceratus] ...

75

Fr. 70

[In these matters pay attention **(I)** to] us; otherwise it is unhappily necessary to have a prolonged discussion about them.

So, [if] you had forgotten the doctrine we have mentioned countless times, that the standard of our actions are the feelings of [both] pleasure and [pain], by reference to which we must determine [both the] avoidance of them [and the] pursuit of something else, do call it to mind.

(II) If you remember it, what got into you, my good friends, that you embarked on an action such as this, that has given rise to feelings painful to Niceratus and painful to us on account of his misfortunes? For if you claim that you have a firm grasp of the doctrine, but that with regard to the decision about sending the person to us or not sending him – whether [you] had to do it **(III)** [in those circumstances] or [you were mistaken ... , ... you were mistaken] ... the [utmost] ... Nic[eratus]

[The difficulty to do with this] matter [has been thoroughly examined] so that, [from now on, all of us may be able to know what we must] do ...

Letter from Archelaus to Dion

76

NF 215

(I – Title) [The words spoken] by [Diogenes after the funeral] of his son.

(II) Archelaus to Dion, greetings!

You are eager to know the words spoken by our Diogenes after the funeral of his son. I most gladly addressed myself to this matter, for I want to oblige you in every way to the best of my ability. The business turned out very fortunately for me, in my wish to give you something better than my own version; for, after some accurate shorthand-writers had made a record of the address, I made this copy for myself and [am sending it to you.]

More FLCL Texts

77

Fr. 73

[I follow you] **(I)** when you make [these] statements about death, and you have persuaded me to laugh at it. For I have no fear on account of the Tityuses and Tantaluses whom some describe in Hades, nor do I shudder [when I reflect upon] the decomposition of the body, [being convinced that we have no feeling, once the] soul [is without sensation], or anything else.

(II) [Therefore] in this matter [I must say now: "I shall be deprived of] life and shall leave behind [the pleasures that belong to it] – pleasures [for which, however], nobody ever [yearns] after [death]".

... strong [hope] ... [longing] ... him ... property ... [manifestly will decompose] ... to the ...

78

Fr. 74

Why then, in the name of Athena, are you (*sing.*) distressed? Surely it is characteristic of the good man to converse with himself and to say this: "I am a human being and it is possible that I was affected, since indeed of the flesh is such and such and such a thing and many other things, of which none cannot occur". So on every occasion he is able to keep in mind those of the affections that are natural, because they are easily defined and marked out as with compasses.

Letter to Unknown Addressees

79

NF 209

(I) ... [It is not possible to restore a life once it] **(II)** has passed [away].

As it is not possible to die twice, so it is not possible to live twice either.

We should be cheerful when we die, for we shall give up not only good things, but also bad ones.

Farewell.

Small-Letter-Fragments of Uncertain Position

80

Fr. 79

The [concept is the assurance] that [is responsible for the testing of related images] ...

81

Fr. 80

... and also ... by one another ... just as ...

82

Fr. 81

(II) ... allows ... [pleasure] ... [reasoning] ...

83

Fr. 82

(II) these ... [those] ... more ... I ...

84

Fr. 83

(I) For [the] ... of its own is ... brings ... **(II)** ... of irrational [fears.] For indeed from ...

85

Fr. 85

... if ... finds ... and [when it has been found] ...

86

Fr. 90

... [constructed] ...

87

Fr. 93

(II) ... in old age ... not even ... abstain ... [soul] ...

88

Fr. 95

... of pains ... [imperishable] ...

89

Fr. 96

(I) ... [let us not speak] for long about what [there is] no [need] ...
(II) ... and ...

90

NF 138

... already ... and ... to us ... to say ... things ...

91

NF 148

... the substances ... and those things which ... exist in them ... by Jove ...

92

NF 149

... [pleasure] ...

93

NF 150

... from necessity ...

94

NF 151

... chance or the [fortuitous] ...

95

NF 152

... prudence ... rational ...

96

NF 194

... the whole ...

97

NF 195

… demonstration … imperishability …

Monolithic Maxims

98

Fr. 97

… human beings … themselves … [being helped] … [dispersal] of misfortunes …

99

Fr. 100

[The elements] of the [universe are] neither [god and] matter ([which] the Stoics [wrongly regard as ultimate principles) nor fire nor air nor water nor earth, as others suppose, but indivisible entities that are absolutely imperishable and unchangeable].

100

NF 155

Although Plato was right to acknowledge that the world had an origin, even if he was not right to introduce a divine craftsman of it, instead of employing nature as its craftsman, he was wrong to say that it is imperishable.

101

NF 171

[It is obvious that the clear view of each thing, which] is apprehensible [by our senses] for the sake of the body, also comes about through the body.

102

NF 156

... [similar in form] ...

103

NF 197

[If providence were suited to the nature of the gods, how] could [not] we too desire its reality? But since it is not so suited, we cannot introduce it.

104

NF 213

It is right that the virtuous person has achieved [renown] and is considered [wholly] deserving of the appellation ["virtuous"]; [for indeed] he is truly good.

[Stormy weather] is often a cause of damage [to] farming, but not [also] of [groundless] feelings of distress and [fears].

105

Fr. 98

A thunderbolt occurs through a violent eruption from the clouds, when both wind and a close mass of fire have burst out together.

An earthquake occurs through entrapment of winds in the earth, and in other ways too.

106

Fr. 99

There is no need to be puzzled how hail is formed in summer-time, for snow exists unobserved even then, although in a filmy form, and can produce hail, as also can a wind that is cold but high in the air.

107

Fr. 101

... the things of the ... [so that] each ... and ... [not happen] ...

108

Fr. 102

... not ... the thing ... is

109

NF 130

Life becomes pleasurable when fear of death is absent. For the fable

[about Tartarus is vain]. Death is to be laughed at, being like a mask that frightens small children; for indeed they believe that that will bite, but it does not bite.

110

Fr. 105

The extremes of pains cannot last long: either they quickly take away life and are themselves also taken away with it, or their acuteness is diminished.

111

Fr. 106

Uttering cries of agony, when one is groaning with pains, is forced on us by nature; but complaining because [we do] not [fully achieve] the condition of the healthy [is contrary to nature].

112

Fr. 107

There are three of the enjoyments not ...

113

Fr. 108

[One] must [regard] wealth [beyond] what is natural [as of no more use than water] to a container that is full [to] overflowing.

We can look at other people's possessions [without envy] and experience [purer] pleasure than they can; for [we are free from craving].

114

Fr. 109

Luxurious foods [and] drinks ... in no way [produce] freedom from harm [and a healthy] condition [in the flesh] ...

115

NF 157

It is unfortunate that those who are sick with the passion of love do not realise that they derive pleasure to the highest degree from looking and not from copulation, while the sexual act itself, whether one's partner has a superior or inferior figure, is the same.

116

NF 131

Vain desires, like those for fame and such things, are not only vain, but, as well as being vain, also difficult to fulfil. It is not unlike drinking much, yet always being thirsty. To be master of Pella, but [to have troubles for company, is vain].

117

Fr. 111

... [for us to show] which of the desires are natural, and which are vain.

It is not nature, which is the same for all, that makes people noble or ignoble, but their actions and dispositions.

118

NF 132

Seldom does the fortuitous, which we term chance, interfere with life, and usually it is we who are in control.

119

Fr. 112

The sum of happiness consists in our disposition, of which we are master. Military service is dangerous and one is subordinate to others. Public speaking is full of agitation and nervousness as to whether one can convince. Why then do we pursue an occupation like this, which is under the control of others?

120

Fr. 113

Nothing is so conducive to contentment as not being occupied with much business, not tackling distasteful matters, and not being forced at all beyond one's own capability. For all these things provoke disturbances in our nature.

121

NF 184

One must make the present perfect, and not live with an orientation

to the future, saying: "Until such and such a thing still happens to me". For [what] will be lacking that needs this [yearning]?

122

Fr. 114

... and [firm] ..., which are [the limit] of a natural [life], ...

123

Fr. 115

Among these ... they say ... of nature ...

124

NF 172

... [ironical reasoning, he was wrong to say] ...

125

Fr. 116

... for the people who will come after you ... inasmuch as [they will be persuaded that it] is only possible to live well by means of feeling and continual exercise of virtues. For the means of salvation is there. It is in case you have not yet [gained] any knowledge of these matters that we turned so many letters to stone for you.

Directions to Family and Friends

126

Fr. 117

I, Diogenes, give these directions to my relatives and family and friends.

I am so sick that I am now at the critical stage that will determine whether I continue to live or not. (A stomach complaint is afflicting me.) If I survive, I shall gladly accept the continuation of life granted to me. But if I do not survive, ...

127

Fr. 118

... these [elements of the system] ...

Ten-Line-Column Writings

128

Fr. 119

(I) ... [address] ... friends ... [I say]. What [*or* Why] in the world ... is [*or* are] ...? The ..., dearest friends, ... to us and ... **(II)** ... I did [this] above all [from a desire to help] ..., in case ... [as well as showing myself] benevolent towards **(III)** those strangers among us. Being perfectly aware that it is through knowledge of the matters, concerning both physics and the emotions, which I explained in the places below, that ...

129

Fr. 120

... about ... [sent] ... [I think] ... [the extreme] ... as ...

130

Fr. 121

(I) ... to be ... [limits] ... writing ... [consistent with] the [firm] foundations of the mental constitution, the reinforcement of the intestines **(II)** coming about as a result of curdled milk until I recover. [For the] curdled milk ... into ... [having] come ...

131

Fr. 122

Letter to Menneas

(I)... written ... and ... woman ... me [*or* us] ... **(II)** I am convinced that I recovered better through having been recommended to her both by you, dearest Menneas, thanks to your goodwill and solicitude towards me, and by the wonderful Carus and our Dionysius, at the time when I was staying at her house in Rhodes.

Goodbye to you too.

132

NF 186

... [I shall try to help them **(I)** in every] way, when I can. As you

know, we do not have better things to offer them (*fem.*) than our own good fare. For indeed they happen already to have done some tasting of the doctrines of Epicurus, but to be sure in not such a way that [the disturbances] that strike **(II)** [them have been removed]. ... For ... they appear ... [I have caught an illness] ...

133

Fr. 123

... fullness ... [if] you (*pl.*) possess ... just as ... in another (*fem.*) ...

134

Fr. 124

[Diogenes] ...

135

Fr. 125

Letter to Mother (1)

(I) ... [you must carry out a careful and] sure [inquiry] into them. [For when images] of people who are far away [from our sight invade our mind, they cause the greatest disturbance. But if you examine the whole matter carefully, you will learn that] **(II)** the images of people who are not present are of precisely the same kind as those of people who are present. For although the images are perceived not by the senses, but by the mind, they have the same power, as far as in them lies, for people who are present (*i.e.* the recipients of the images) as when they existed with those other people (*i.e.* the senders of the images) present also.

Therefore, with regard to these matters, **(III)** mother, [be of good

heart: do not in any way] reckon the visions [of us to be bad]; rather, [when you see them], think of us daily [acquiring] something [good] and advancing [further in happiness]. For not small [*or* ineffectual] **(IV)** are these gains for us which make our disposition godlike and show that not even on account of our mortality are we inferior to the imperishable and blessed nature; for when we are alive, we are as joyful as the gods, **(V)** ...

136

Fr. 126

Letter to Mother (2)

(I) ... [will be] equally [distressed if] they perceive their loss; but if they do not perceive it, how do they suffer loss?

Think of us, then, mother, as always joyful in the midst of such good things and show enthusiasm for what we are doing. **(II)** But, in the name of Zeus, do not be so generous with the contributions you are constantly sending us. I do not want you to go short at all so that I may have more than enough; I should prefer to go short so that you may not do so, whereas in fact I am living in plenty **(III)** in all respects, because of our friends and my father constantly sending us money, and recently also through Cleon sending nine minas. Therefore neither of you should be burdened individually on our account, but you should take advantage of one another ...

137

Fr. 127 + NF 174

Letter to the Son of Mettius Phanias

[At present you reject our philosophy, but later perhaps you will

wish, when your hostility has been banished], **(I)** to open the sympathetic entrances to our community, and you will turn away from the speeches of the rhetoricians in order that you may hear something of our doctrines. Consequently we even hope confidently that you will knock very soon at the doors of philosophy. **(II)** Well, the other friends love you for the reasons which I mentioned, but I love you also because of your father, Mettius Phanias, with his great sympathy for us ... you and ...

138

Fr. 128

Letter to Dositheus

(I) ... [What advantage then], **(II)** Dositheus, is [attached to] this [desire] for your [son, in the name of] Dionysus? [For] in truth ... [to survive] ... [after death] ...

139

Fr. 129

(I) ... For in that case the speaker will be right in saying that one is no different from the other. But it is not possible to say this in the case of poverty and wealth, for we see many things which belong to wealth without belonging to poverty, and which belong to poverty without belonging to wealth. **(II)** [So the Stoics speak in ignorance of the difficulty and the points of difference; for] their [argument does not assume that] wealth [is a superior] and [more highly-valued] thing, [and poverty the opposite, or that poverty is superior to wealth, but] ...

140

Fr. 130

(I)... [blessed] ... now ... [This person **(II)** they do] not help [at all], since, although [genial, they are] regarded with fear. [Consequently, as I said, since] on every [occasion] philosophy [is beneficial], make full use [of our doctrines, no longer standing aloof from] them. And ... [philosophy] so much ...

141

Fr. 131

... through others ... If then ...

142

Fr. 132

... again [to favour whatever] person ... therefore ... what is natural ... and ...

143

Fr. 133

... [you suffer the least pain and] ... procure [the] quickest [pleasure] ...

144

Fr. 134

(I) ... fear ... **(II)** ...

145

Fr. 135

... from there ...

146

NF 158

... we believed that [a child] is originally low-born, but that [the man] becomes high-born [through his virtuous character and behaviour] ...

147

NF 218

(I) [Since the prudent man supports his whole household] wisely, his servants [gladly accept their habitual association] with [him]. ... **(II)** ...

148

NF 159

... and ... as many as ...

149

NF 160

... precise ...

Medium-Sized-Letter Fragment of Uncertain Position

150

Fr. 180

... it is not possible to live

Old Age

151

Fr. 137

Diogenes [of Oinoanda's defence of old age ...]

152

Fr. 138 [A]

(I) Often, young people, by Heracles, I have been really annoyed with those who, although they have not yet grown old, ... [make derogatory pronouncements about the condition] ...

(*Gap of 13 lines*)

There are those who **(II)** have progressed so [far] in culture that they not only praise the poet Hesiod ...

153

Fr. 139 [A]

... them [to die like] Cleobis and [Biton].

Therefore, [my friends], so that you may not be in the same state as most people and ...

154

Fr. 140 [C]

... [to seize] ... [nothing] at any time ... [necessary] ... not to be born ...

155

Fr. 141 [C]

... "to sleep softly; for that is the way of the aged".

Well, I say that, when [the body] has grown old, the ...

156

NF 203 [C]

... For this reason Homer also, [poetically] calling it (*i.e.* anger) "bile", says that it flows sweeter than honey.

157

Fr. 142 [C + A]

(I) ... [although unable to be] **(II)** useful with the body, [is champion] in speech. After [he] had encountered [a recommendation] of [the] best [opinion] ... [as] the same [Homer says, "first seated] a council of great-hearted elders". [And there are others] "through old age having ceased [from war, **(III)** but good] speakers". [To the word of Homer is added that of the] tragic poet [Sophocles?] ...

158

Fr. 143 [C]

(I) ... weapons [by no means adequate] to combat [the passions of the son of Peleus] and the growth of [that famous] wrath **(II)** ... [if it is necessary for one to defend oneself, as the lyric poet [Alcman] says, it is a virtue to use] words [rather than force]. For I ...

159

Fr. 144 [B or C]

... worse.

As for coughing complaints, it is true that they have some involvement in [illness] ...

160

Fr. 145 [B] + NF 133 [C]

(I) ... [Such matters] are [now] the subject of my [investigation], and my very first point is this.

Whoever calls the dimming experienced by the aged blindness is being overhasty ... **(II)**. ... [It is not the fault of old age] if it occasionally happens that, when they [the elderly] want [to see] something clearly, they are not able to do that. [As a matter of fact] this problem is shared with young people. For indeed not uncommonly [these], although [exceedingly] eager [to see something], do not see on account of the impact of certain causes and are not less, or even still more, annoyed than the aged. **(III)** ... [neither the latter group] not the former. For both groups (*i.e.* both young and old) see the light, even if the old do slightly less.

And to the hardness of hearing ...

161

NF 177 [B] + Fr. 146 [A + C]

(I) ...[The aged are not displeased at the comparison of them **(II)** with the] elephant [on account of the very] slow movement of the body, [in my opinion at any rate], even though they are [generally called] wretched when they are slightly or more considerably [slow. For] what harm happens to us if we move more slowly from place [to] place? [We are certainly not entering] the foot race at Olympia ...

(III) And the argument concerning attacks of madness also (for some cite these too) goes like this. In the first place ... [Secondly], let us not be unaware [that] madness is produced [not] by old age, but [by] some other [cause of] natural [origin].

162

Fr. 147 [B + C]

... [For one must admit that many], who have grown old [even in our] own [community] and [eventually attained the age of a hundred], not only [suffered none of the ills] which [I have mentioned], but lived with their senses unimpaired [until] the last [day] of their lives. And I, so that I may wheel about and oppose those who ...

163

Fr. 148 [B]

(I) ... not this ... affairs ... and fame ... these ... the same... **(II)** ... so that ... neither are ... pains ... of the [body] ...

164

Fr. 149 [C + A]

(I) ... For ... all **(II)** ... [Deprivation of desires] is [by no means] an argument [against] the aged. For in general, where there are no cravings for things, there are no feelings of distress concerning them either, **(III)** unless people are truly out of their minds, being disposed to be distressed about this very circumstance – that [they have been deprived] of the [feeling of desire] ...

165

Fr. 150 [C]

(I) ... Taste ... is ... **(II)** ... [pleasure makes life blessed and is suitable for our] nature. ...

166

NF 211 [C] + fr. 151 [C]

... [If the old are no longer able to eat solid foods, they are not upset, knowing] that gaps in their teeth, although immediately conspicuous, do no harm to their nature. For [they derive pleasure from taking] liquid foods ...

167

NF 212 [A]

... [the one attitude undisciplined and likely to involve a person] in troubles, the other philosophical and derived from doctrines.

Now, [intercourse] with courtesans and boys ...

168

Fr. 152 [B]

(I) ... is ... not ... **(II)** ... [neither], as they grope about, do they find a single one of these things which they wish to find, nor ... **(III)** ... [Expecting] that they will find the pleasant life [above all] in wealth, they embark on a frenzied quest for it. Then, if they become wealthy, they are indignant at not finding what they expected. Often therefore ...

169

Fr. 153 [B]

(I) ... is convincingly proved. Of the desires some are vain, others natural. Now, those that are natural seek after such things as are [necessary] for our nature's enjoyment, [while those that are vain] ... **(II)** ... What [need is there for one to mention the] fabulous treasuries of Croesus and his gold ingots or the rivers running with gold for him? What [benefit], father Zeus, [did he derive] from these [riches]? ...

170

Fr. 154 [A]

(I) ... is ... If you yourself say "If then, Diogenes, not even in wealth is happiness ever found [by people, how is life made pleasant for us?", I shall answer] ... **(II)** wise person [*or* philosopher] ... and ...

171

Fr. 155 [C]

..., while what is vain [is difficult to obtain]. And, apart from this, young people, great, yes great, is [the] advantage in [adopting great] poverty ...

172

Fr. 156 [B]

(I) ... [thinks]... [philosophy] ... righteous ... **(II)** ... For some people, [having shown dim understanding], at the time [cast] what is pleasing [in the teeth of] those who want [to choose pleasures]. But later they bring [a complaint against] ...

173

Fr. 157 [B]

(I) ... [If ever some exhibit, in their dealings with him, haughtiness and arrogance, it is for the most part] in the power of the elderly person [to take no notice of] such people ...

(II) ... [When we die, our souls are dissolved instantly], even [if] we have still been living up to this moment for a long time, being able to exist no longer. For the generation of human beings quickly perishes on account of its inherent [mortal nature] ...

174

Fr. 158 [A]

(I) ... uncivilised ... to be and ... near ... to be considered deserving of [the] ..., which also ... **(II)** ...

175

NF 136 [B] + Fr. 161 [B]

(I) [Occupy a modest dwelling, not] an elaborate house with fretted and gold-spangled ceilings. Moreover, [wear] clothing that is simple

and [unostentatious]. Cabbage gives [us as much pleasure as luxurious foods] ... **(II)** ... , and ... they take what ...

But [some people ... bring] the [most serious accusations against] nature, [when they belittle the] body ... **(III)** ... [For being born is impossible without] the body, as is [experiencing sensation], and thinking of [anything, and uttering] words. [So, as I say, our] bodies ought [to be treated with respect]. And ...

176

NF 140 [A]

... about the grave ... it is useful ...

177

Fr. 162 [B]

(I) ... to think ... [of sensation] ... [precedence] ... [to be] ... **(II)** ... self [*or* selves] ... these ...

178

Fr. 163 [B]

(I) ... [these arguments] about ... **(II)** ... [not rightly] ...

179

Fr. 164 [B]

... to lead someone ... in this respect ... not ... these ...

180

Fr. 165 [A or B]

... not of the [old person] ... this ... and no longer ... [of pleasure].

For this reason ...

181

Fr. 166 [A or, more probably, B]

... such as this ... dance ...

182

Fr. 167 [A or B]

Well, however that may be, [if someone celebrates an all-night festival] ...

183

Fr. 168 [C]

(I) ... [desire] **(II)** ... to snatch away ... after seeing which, [you will not be able] promptly to liberate [life] from [your] fears, unless you are on your guard ...

184

Fr. 169 [C]

(I) ... lest ... [time] ... have **(II)** ... For we do not live ... such as this ...

185

Fr. 170 [C]

... [us] ... Homer ...

186

Fr. 171 [C]

... will employ [force] ... power ...

187

Fr. 172 [C]

... the [wise have fullness of pleasures], whether ... or ...

188

Fr. 173 [C]

(I) ... [Well, Epicurus] agrees about [this. He does] not then [say that the] happy person **(II)** ... [but Democritus of Abdera] ...

189

Fr. 176 [C]

(II) ... and [a wise man] easily judges [everything in accordance with] feelings [and sensations], in order that ...

190

NF 163 [B or C]

… to live

Title Fragment of Uncertain Position

191

NF 206

No translatable text

Notes

Physics

Although Epicurus was first and foremost a moral philosopher, he taught that the moral end, freedom from disturbance of the mind (*ataraxia*), can only be achieved through the study of natural science (physics). The chief obstacles to *ataraxia* are our unnecessary fears, especially of the gods and death, and unnecessary desires. The universe, of infinite extent and containing an infinite number of worlds, is composed of just two ultimate realities, matter and void. Matter consists of an infinite number of indivisible particles, i.e. atoms. Gods exist, composed of the finest atoms and living lives of perfect tranquillity in the spaces between the worlds, but they do not intervene in the affairs of our world, which they did not create. Therefore they are not to be feared, although they are to be worshipped (fr. 19) because worship of such perfect beings is of benefit to the worshipper. As for fear of death, it is dispelled by the knowledge that the human mind and soul are, like the body, material and do not survive death for a moment. So stories of punishment after death are not to be believed.

Closely connected to Epicurus' physics is his canonic or theory of knowledge. Three criteria of truth are recognised: sensation (*aisthēsis*), preconceptions (*prolēpseis*), and feelings (*pathē*). Sensation is the primary standard of truth. Preconceptions are generated by the repeated experience of sensation and allow memory and the creation of scientific knowledge. Feelings of pleasure and pain determine choice

and avoidance and are the supreme test in matters of morality and conduct. Universal experience is that pain is bad and pleasure good, although not every pain is to be avoided, and not every pleasure taken, because sometimes pain is outweighed by subsequent pleasure, and pleasure outweighed by subsequent pain. Physical pains, including chronic ones, often still permit a preponderance of pleasure over pain, and they can always, or almost always, be mitigated by mental pleasure. The ability of the mind to look back and forward is used by the wise to their advantage, while it ruins the lives of those whose attitude to the future is dominated by unnecessary fears and by unnecessary and insatiable desires, especially those for wealth and power.

1

Fr. 1

NF 52 / YF 138

Although this fragment carries only four letters, there is no doubt that it is part of a title, and comparison of its lettering with that of the title of D's second main writing, the *Ethics* (fr. 28), points to the likelihood of it belonging to the *Physics*. The full title, at least the gist of it, can be plausibly reconstructed on the analogy of the *Ethics* title, but is likely to have been longer than that in my translation. One possibility is that it mentioned "the gods" as well as "nature".

NF 206, found in 2012, carries only one letter, but can be identified as a title-block because the text was carved inside a *tabula ansata* – a panel with dovetail "handles", the lefthand one of which is preserved. See HS (2014) 180-182. It is possible that this too is part of the *Physics* title.

2 and 3

Fr. 3 and 2

HK fr. 57 + 58 / YF 028 + 053 and HK fr. 59 / YF 013

D explains his reasons for setting up his inscription on the wall of a stoa. Since the *Physics* was meant to be read first, the passage introduces not only that treatise, but also the entire inscription.

Traditionally, fr. 2 has been placed before fr. 3, but, as I argue in Smith 2000(a), D's own words show that this order is wrong. In fr. 2 he repeats, and says he is repeating, points made in similar language found in fr. 3. It is to be noted too that fr. 2, with its talk of unnecessary desires, follows on entirely naturally after the closing lines of fr. 3, in which Diogenes mentions unnecessary fears and pains. When he lists in fr. 34 the four disturbances which prevent human beings from gaining peace of mind, the order is: fears (of the gods and death), pains, unnecessary desires. This is also the order in Epic. *PD* 1-4, setting out the fourfold remedy or *tetrapharmakos*; and, with fr. 2 placed after fr. 3, it is the order in the present passage as well. I am surprised that several scholars, including Alberto Grilli and JH, have continued to favour the "old" order. I am equally surprised that some do not consider the preface partly preserved in fr. 3 and 2 to be part of the *Physics*. A recent case is Corsi (2022), who devotes the bulk of his 282-page book to the *Physics*, but ignores fr. 3 and 2, arguably the most important passages of it, and makes the briefest of mentions of my reversal of their order in a footnote (29, n4). So far as he is concerned, the first surviving passage of the treatise is fr. 4. The *Physics* preface is closely paralleled by the preface to the *Ethics* (fr. 29 + NF 207; fr. 30), which, as well as introducing that treatise, is a second introduction to the whole inscription, repeating some of the points made in the first one.

We learn from fr. 3 I that the second of D's two reasons for the inscription is to show that what is good for our nature, *ataraxia*, is the same for one and all. This statement is echoed in fr. 29 + NF 207 I-II, where he asserts that he has set up the inscription to create happiness "through attainment of the goal craved by nature". The best indication of what his first reason was is his statement in fr. 3 IV: "But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague".

As in the preface to the *Ethics*, so in the present passage D makes clear that he has no political ambitions or intentions.

Somewhere in the *Physics* preface he may have urged his readers to give his writings their full attention. When he does this in the

Ethics preface (fr. 30 III), he says that he made the same appeal earlier.

For leaving life "with a fine anthem" (paean), cf. *VS* 47.

The idea that the unenlightened are "diseased" and require the "medicine" of Epicureanism is paralleled in other Epicurean sources. Epicurus himself declares:

> Vain is the word of a philosopher by whom no human suffering is cured; for just as medicine is of no use if it fails to banish the diseases of the body, so philosophy is of no use if it fails to banish the diseases of the mind (Us fr. 221).

As mentioned above, the four maxims in which he summarises the basic principles of his moral system were known to his followers as the *tetrapharmakos*. According to the Epicurean spokesman in Cic. *Fin.* 1.59, diseases of the mind are more destructive of happiness than diseases of the body. Such diseases include unlimited and empty desires for wealth, fame, power, and sensual pleasures. Lucretius closes his poem *On the Nature of Things* with a detailed account of the plague which took hold in Athens in 430 BC (6.1138-1286), for the most part closely following Thucydides (2.47-52), but representing people, living at a time when Epicurus' teachings were not yet available, morally as well as medically ill-equipped to deal with the calamity. Although he does not say so explicitly, there are persuasive indications that he saw the physical condition of the plague's victims as symbolic of the moral condition of unenlightened humanity. See especially Commager (1957) and Smith (1966). Elsewhere he compares himself to a doctor (1.935-950; 4.10-25) and points out that someone who suffers from ennui is a sick person who does not understand the cause of the illness, which can only be cured by a study of the nature of things, that is to say Epicureanism (3.1070-1075).

For the comparison of the plague-stricken to sheep, cf. Thuc. 2.51.4; Lucr. 6.1237. For people's folly in competing with one another for power and fame, see e.g. Lucr. 5.1120-1135.

The need to help future generations, emphasised in Cic. *Fin.* 3.64, is probably stated again by D in fr. 116. Other passages in which he expresses his philanthropic feelings for foreigners are fr. 30 I-II and fr. 119 II-III. For his Epicurean philosophy being the means of "salvation", cf. fr. 29 + NF 207 III; fr. 116.

Fr. 2, as noted above, follows on naturally after the end of fr. 3. The idea that it is the soul rather than the body which causes the pains inflicted by unnecessary desires goes back to Democritus (DK fr. 159) as well as to Epicurus (Us fr. 445). D, who follows Democritus in speaking of the body bringing a law suit against the soul, is partial to legal terminology: see, for example, fr. 6 III; fr. 9 I; fr. 47 III; fr. 156 II; fr. 161 I; NF 136 + fr. 94 II.

For the simplicity of the body's needs, and how our natural and necessary desires are easily satisfied, cf. Epic. *Men.*130-131; *PD* 15, 18; *VS* 33; Us fr. 456, 469; Lucr. 20-36; NF 146 I-II; fr. 155.

"So, to reiterate what I was saying, …". The words D is reiterating are those he wrote in fr. 3 III-IV. See Smith (2000a) 241.

Between fr. 2 and 4 Diogenes will have asserted that it is impossible to dispel one's fears of death and the gods without study of nature (*physiologia*). On the indispensability of such study, cf. e.g. *PD* 11, 12.

4

Fr. 4

HK fr. 40 / YF 103

It was the frequent practice of Epicurean writers to seek to demolish rival views before setting out their own. For example, this is what D does when he discusses the elements of matter (fr. 6-8), and there should be no surprise that, in emphasising the importance of *physiologia*, he targets Socrates and his followers, who attached no importance to it at all, although, if one can believe what he is made to say in Plato's *Phaedo* (96a-99d), he took great interest in it as a young man – an interest which probably helps to explain the representation of him in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Among the followers of Socrates whom D has in mind are probably the Cynics and

Cyrenaics, the latter being pupils of Aristippus of Cyrene, who, as a hedonist philosopher whose view of pleasure differed from that of Epicurus, was criticised by D (fr. 49).

5

Fr. 5

HK fr. 41 / YF 012

From Socrates and his followers D turns to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who, he claims, believe that nothing is scientifically knowable because everything is in flux, which means that they are as hostile to physics as the Socratics are. His attribution of the doctrine to Aristotle used to be treated with disbelief. Surely he was mistaken? The debate has continued for over 130 years, and this is not the place to describe it. I summarise it in Sm 128-130. Suffice it to say here that, since the 1930s, when Ettore Bignone published several discussions of the passage, it has been generally accepted that D's representation of the Peripatetic position, even if to some extent a misrepresentation, was derived from earlier Epicurean sources, especially from Epicurus' pupil Colotes, who vigorously defended his master's doctrines and with equal vigour attacked those of other philosophers. For a recent discussion of the sources and import of fr. 5, see Verde (2019) 375-384.

On the matter of flux, it is be noted that, while, according to D's opponents, it prevents scientific knowledge, his Epicurean view is that it is precisely what makes perception possible. See fr. 9; fr. 43.

"Ephectic philosophers" are ones who suspend judgement, sceptics. Lacydes of Cyrene succeeded Arcesilaus as head of the sceptical Academy about 241 BC.

6

Fr. 6

HK fr. 42 / YF 19A+B

The programmatic information in the opening lines is illuminating: D is only going to expound the Epicurean atomic theory after he has refuted rival views of matter. Doxographical elements were con-

tained in book 14 of Epicurus' *On Nature*, although the text, edited by Leone (1984), is too fragmentary to be of great use. However, Lucretius' refutation of Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras occupies a big chunk of book 1 (635-920), the first opponent being a monist, the second a limited pluralist, the third an extreme pluralist. D also mentions three other monists (Thales, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Anaximenes), but, like Lucretius, begins with Heraclitus, who considered fire the controlling form of matter. Both Epicurean writers probably put him at the head of their lists on account of his influence on Plato and the Stoics.

For the Stoic identification of the elements as matter and god, cf. fr. 100, where mention of the four-element theory may also have been made.

The commendation which D gives Democritus for identifying the elements as atoms is very like the one he gives Plato for believing that our world was created (NF 155). The problem is that both of them also made big mistakes.

It is characteristic of D to address philosophical opponents by name. He does the same in fr. 7 II (Democritus), 39 III (Plato), 42 II and V (Empedocles), NF 192 III (Zeno [of Citium], Cleanthes, Chrysippus).

7
NF 142
YF 215

The visible text reveals that D has finished with Heraclitus and is now refuting the elemental theory of a pluralist. It is frustrating that the stone, located in 2008, is deeply embedded in the ground upside down, covered by smaller stones, and it has not yet been possible to expose and record the remainder of the text. What we can see are lines 7-12 of what will have been a 14-line column running to the right edge of the stone. Until more text is exposed, it is uncertain whether D is dealing with fire, air, water, and earth, the four elements of Empedocles, or with the homoeomeries of Anaxagoras.

8

Fr. 7

HK fr. 43

It is likely that in the incompletely preserved col. I the argument is against the Stoic views about void – that there is none inside the world, but an infinite extent of it outside the world. Democritus believed in the ultimate reality of void as well as atoms, but was criticised by the Epicureans, including D here (II), for regarding sensible qualities such as taste, smell, colour, and temperature as subjective, existing only by convention. In describing Democritus' views, D says that only the atoms have reality, ignoring Democritus' belief in void. The omission is inaccurate, but not unnatural in a discussion dominated by material elements.

9

Fr. 8

NF 53 / YF 145

A small bit of text, but an informative one: evidently D has completed his review of rival elemental theories and is now setting out the Epicurean theory, making the point that the elements of matter must be atoms – entities which are indivisible and indestructible.

10 and 11

Fr. 9 and 10

NF 5 / YF 086 + NF 6 / YF 072 and HK fr. 52 + NF 1 / YF 022

D expounds the Epicurean theory that vision, thought, and dreams are caused by the "images" (*eidōla*) constantly emitted from objects. When they impinge on our eyes and minds, they produce, respectively, vision and thought and dreams. The passage is to be compared with Epic. *Hdt.* 46-52, Lucr. 4.26-822, and the fragmentary remains of book 34 of Epic. *Nat.* in Leone (2002). D criticises the theories of dreams held by the Stoics and Democritus – the former for attaching too little importance to them, the later for attaching too much.

There is some uncertainty about the order of fr. 9 and 10. It is possible that it should be reversed, but our understanding of the passages is hardly affected.

Other associated passages of D are fr. 43, part of the *Ethics*, in which the Stoic and Democritean theories are again mentioned; fr. 125, about the dreams the mother had had of her son; and fr. 24 in the discussion of divination.

By a curious chance, my 16 earliest discoveries at Oinoanda in 1969 and 1970 included no fewer than five substantial fragments on the subject of *eidōla*, vision, thought, and dreams: NF 1, 5, 6, 12, 13, carrying 10½ of the 13 columns making up fr. 9-10 and 43. Four of the five were found in a close cluster, the fifth a long way distant.

12

Fr. 11

HK fr. (47)

Restoration and interpretation are not helped by the circumstance that the fragment has not been seen since its discovery in 1885. There is no drawing, photograph, or squeeze. But enough is preserved to indicate that the subject is the origin of living creatures, including human beings, from the earth. Cf. Lucr. 5.790-836, especially 805-820, and, much more briefly, Us fr. 333.

13

Fr. 12

HK fr. 48 + 49 / YF 018 + YF 036

By far the most detailed Epicurean account of the life of primitive human beings, the development of civilisation, and the origin of language is that of Lucr. 5.925-1457. He discusses language in 5.1028-1090. There is a brief statement in Epic. *Hdt*. 75-76. A passage which has much in common with the accounts of Lucr. and D is Diodorus Siculus 1.8. D's argument against language being an artificial invention is well discussed by Verlinsky (1998). He points out that there are similarities between the arguments of the two Epicureans and

that of Sextus Empiricus *Math*. 9.30-33, in his refutation of the theory that belief in the gods was implanted in others by lawgivers.

"Tanning" (col. I) translates *kasōtōn*, in accordance with the interpretation of Settecase (2017b).

14

Fr. 13

HK fr. 45 / YF 031

On the movements of the heavenly bodies, cf. especially Epic. *Pyth*. 92-93, 111-115; Lucr. 5.509-533, 614-649. Lucr.'s treatment of astronomical phenomena (5.509-770) before the beginnings of life on earth (5.772-1010) makes one wonder if D's order was the same, but Epic. *Hdt*. deals with celestial phenomena (76-80) *after* mentioning the beginnings of civilisation and the origin of language (75-76).

The doctrine of recognising plural causes of objects of which it is impossible to obtain a near, clear view (III) is stated also by Epic. *Hdt.* 79-80, *Pyth*. 86-87; Lucr. 5.526-533, 6.703-711. For discussion of D's attitude, see Bakker (2016) 37-42; Verde (2018) 530-531, 543.

The comparison of the sun to a spring (IV) is made also by Lucr. 5.597-603.

15

Fr. 14

NF 41 / YF 101

On the formation of hail, see *Pyth*. 106-107; also one of D's *Monolithic Maxims*, fr. 99, in which he addresses the question of why hail, although ice, occurs in the summer.

16

Fr. 15

HK fr. 53 / YF 035

The eight lines preserved in col. II were first presented in Smith (1972) 161-162. Up to that time only one line, the last, had been deciphered. It is a good example of what can be achieved through patient examination of a good squeeze.

The references to "distinct visions" causing apprehension and possible belief in "a creator" leave no doubt that D is talking about visions of the gods, which are caused, like other visions, by the impingement of *eidōla* on the mind – *eidōla* of surpassingly fine composition emanating from the gods in their intercosmic abodes. Epic. is thinking of this process when he writes: "Gods exist, for the knowledge of them is derived from distinct vision" (*Men*. 123). For the divine being as (supposed) "creator" (*dēmiourgos*), cf. fr. 19 I; NF 155; Theol. VIII, XI, XII, XIII.

17

Fr. 16

HK fr. 50 / YF 167

The charge of atheism was frequently levelled at the Epicureans in antiquity. There is justification for D's claim that they were "most pious". Certainly Epicurus himself was that. He wrote a treatise *On Piety* and piously performed the traditional acts of worship and recommended his followers to do the same. See fr. 19.

The present passage has attracted much criticism for its equation of Protagoras' agnosticism with the atheism of his contemporary Diagoras of Melos. Logicians have expressed outrage, but D cared more about ethics than about logic, and in any case he seems to have been taking the orthodox Epicurean line. For example, Phld. *On Piety*, distinguishes three kinds of atheists, one of which is those who do not know whether there are gods or not. See Henrichs (1974) 25. I have previously suggested that the Epicureans "would have considered the moral consequences of doubting the existence of the gods no less damaging than those of denying it" (Sm 131).

18

Fr. 17

HK fr. 54

The large block which carried this text has not been rediscovered, but the squeezes of it made by Cousin and Diehl in 1885 and Heberdey and Kalinka in 1895 survive. The first two of the four col-

umns are obliterated, and III and IV are poorly preserved and often illegible.

Enough is preserved to show that D is discussing right and wrong attitudes to the gods. The restoration of the name of Triptolemus ties up well with the mention of Demeter. He was a son of King Celeus of Eleusis, near Athens, and it was to him that Demeter gave the gift of corn, with instructions to spread it round the world. He was often depicted sitting on a chariot. The mention of humans being not the gods' slaves, but their friends, is in line with Philodemus' statement that the wise are friends of the gods, and the gods friends of the wise (*De Dis* III col. I.17-18 p. 16 Diels).

19

Fr. 18

NF 32 / YF 026

The parallels from Epic. *Hdt.* (77, 81) and Phld. *De Dis* (I col. XVI.19 p. 28 Diels) quoted in Sm 459 indicate that D too is mentioning disturbance resulting from an incorrect conception of the gods.

20

Fr. 19

NF 115 / YF 174

A very interesting and valuable text, criticising Homer for misrepresenting the gods and spawning the misrepresentations of them by sculptors and others, who depict them carrying weapons, being guarded by wild animals (as Cybele by lions), and being angry. Much earlier, Xenophanes had criticised Homer and Hesiod for misrepresenting the gods (DK fr. 11-12), and there is a parallel Epicurean passage in Cicero (*DND* 1.16.42). Phld. *On Piety* 1307-1311 Obbink (1996) refers to the way poets misrepresent the gods as angry.

Seemingly unparalled in the extant sources is D's statement that statues of the gods should be made smiling, so that humans can smile back at them instead of being afraid.

Epicurus' observance of traditional religious ceremonies has been mentioned above on fr. 16. See especially Us fr. 387: "Let us

sacrifice to the gods piously and rightly, where it is customary, and let us do everything rightly in accordance with the laws". But the worshipper must avoid the misconceptions of the gods held by the masses (*Men*. 123-124).

21

NF 167 + NF 126 + 127 + fr. 20 + NF 182

YF 240 + 193 + 190 + 093 + 252

This text, consisting of five substantial and well preserved fragments, is the longest continuous passage of the inscription yet found, consisting of 16 complete or half-complete columns. One of the five fragments, NF 126, is 1.65 m wide. That makes it the widest block of the inscription yet found, and it is the only one carrying part or all of six columns.

The subject of the first part of the passage, down to the beginning of VIII, is, in three words, morality and religion. Fear of the gods does not prevent people from doing wrong, as is proved by the cases of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of peoples, are the worst behaved. What prevents wrongdoing by most people is not fear of the gods, but fear of the laws. The Epicureans are right to oppose fear of the gods and give people peace of mind.

The second part of the passage, starting in VIII, refutes the view, attributed to the Stoics, that a god providentially created the world as a city for his own benefit or for the sake of the human beings whom he created as his fellow-citizens. D finds both explanations of the god's motives equally absurd. He goes on (XIV) to show that the world is far too faulty to have been a divine creation to benefit humans. In the same place he helpfully says that, after he has completed that demonstration, he will refute the view that human beings are products of divine providence. The transition from the world to humans occurs in the middle of our next passage, fr. 21.

D's arguments about the imperfections of the world are to be compared with those of Lucr. 5.156-234. The celestial phenomena mentioned in XV-XVI are among those explained by Epic. *Pyth*. D

seems to be the only Epicurean writer to suggest that night is unnecessary because we can easily rest in daylight.

JH and I call the five-fragment text the "Theological *Physics*-Sequence", abbreviation Theol. The whole Greek text (followed by a translation) is presented by us in HS 263-270.

In XI 6 the translation is of *o[uketi telei]/os*, conjectured by Settecase (2017a). Or read *o[udamōs telei]/os*.

22

Fr. 21

NF 40 / YF 097

This text follows on closely after the 16-column sequence, without quite joining up with it. The mention of uninhabitable areas of the earth (XVI) is followed by the example of the sea. It is mentioned also by Lucr. (5.203) during his demonstration of the faultiness of the world, but D goes into more detail, using spoudaiogeloion to point out that the seawater created by god is not even drinkable. He then mentions the so-called Dead Sea, which is not, as I originally thought, the lake in Palestine, but part of the northern ocean. Kappeler (1990) was the first to make the correct identification. For a summary, see Sm 462.

Turning to the nature and character of human beings, D mocks the views of the Stoics, whose ideal, the possession of virtue (*aretē*) for its own sake, is by their own account unattainable.

23

Fr. 22

NF 54 / YF 134

D is probably refuting the Stoic contention that human beings are divine creations, but, instead of addressing them, he addresses a god whom he pictures as having the power the Stoics attribute to him. He accuses him of creating tyrants and powerful military leaders and allowing violence in the contemporary world. How can such behaviour be squared with providential care of humanity?

The nations involved in "new acts of violence" are likely to have included those of the Jews and Egyptians, whom D condemned in Theol. V. There were Jewish revolts in 115-118 and 132-135, both of which involved Egypt among other places.

24

Fr. 23

NF 19 / YF 074

Like Velleius, the Epicurean spokesman in Cic. *DND*, at the end of his exposition of the school's theology (1.20.55), D turns his attention to divination. That he should have been so concerned to refute beliefs in it and god-sent dreams is understandable, for such beliefs were held not only by rival philosophers, but also by non-philosophical contemporaries. Oracles in Asia Minor, like that at Claros, prospered, and, probably a few decades later than D, the second century AD produced Aelius Aristides, author of *Sacred Tales*, and Alexander "The False Prophet".

In fr. 23 D highlights the ambiguity of oracles and illustrates the point by mentioning the story, told by Herodotus 1.66, of how the Spartans were deceived by the Delphic Oracle when they consulted it about their invasion of Arcadia. Cicero refers to the same incident in his discussion of oracles (*Div.* 1.19.37).

25

NF 143

YF 221

This fragment is closely linked to fr. 23, but may have preceded rather than followed it. Here the discussion is about Croesus' crossing of the River Halys to invade the Persian Empire, encouraged by the Delphic Oracle's pronouncement that, if he proceeded, he would destroy a mighty empire. D criticises the Oracle's immorality for encouraging Croesus' aggression and taking bribes from him in the form of the lavish dedications it received (Herodotus 1.50-51). The text breaks off without identifying the oracle about Archilochus with which D is concerned, but there can be little doubt that it was

to the issuer's moral discredit. A point of special interest is the whole passage's frequent parallelism with the treatment of the topic by the second-century Cynic Oenomaus of Gadara. See Hammerstaedt (1988) and HS 40-42.

26

Fr. 24

NF 122 / YF 182

The passage is to be compared with Cic. *Div.* 2.144, where the same dream is described. Like Cicero, D is engaging in an anti-Stoic polemic. The person who reports the conversation between the sophist Antiphon and the dreamer is probably either Chrysippus or Antipater of Tarsus, as indicated by Cic. *Div.* 1.39, 2.144. It is to be noted that the text and interpretation in Sm were corrected in S 86-88 in the light of Pendrick (2002) 427-428.

27

Fr. 25

NF 55 / YF 113

This brief text is heavily restored. If its reconstruction is on the right lines, it is to be compared with Epic. *PD* 17: "The righteous person is most free from disturbance, the unrighteous most full of it".

Ethics

The *Ethics*, carved like the *Physics* in 14-line columns of "small" letters, occupied the lowest course of the inscription. Its blocks are significantly taller than those of the *Physics* and have a spacious lower margin through which runs a continuous line of Epicurean maxims inscribed in "medium-sized" letters. Many of the maxims are Epicurus' *Principal Doctrines*, and their quotation, sometimes closely related to the subject matter of the columns above, can be a valuable indicator of the order of the fragments and of the extent of gaps in the text of the treatise. To calculate how many columns of the treatise there

were above an already-known maxim, all one needs to do is add up the letters in the maxim and divide the total by 16, which is the average number of letters in the lower margin between the beginning of one column and the beginning of another. There is the further point that the band of maxims, right at the bottom of the whole inscription, symbolises their basis for the understanding of Epicurean doctrine.

28

Fr. 28

HK fr. 55 / YF 009

The left half of the 4-line title of the treatise is preserved. The translation is of its restoration by Hammerstaedt (2006) 6. The title was carved in "large" letters inside a *tabula ansata*, a frame with triangular "handles" on the left and right sides. Part of the frame for the *Ethics* title and the left "handle" are dimly visible.

29

Fr. 29 + NF 207

HK fr. 60 + NF 207 / YF 016 + YF 271

The preface to the *Ethics*, of which we have two substantial passages (fr. 29 + NF 207 and fr. 30), has much in common with the preface to the *Physics* (fr. 3, 2). In both D says that he has set up the inscription for the moral salvation of others, and that he wants to show that what benefits our nature is the same for all, regardless of status. The only road to salvation is philosophy, meaning Epicurean philosophy of course.

A point D makes forcefully in the *Ethics* preface (Fr. 29 + NF 207 III-V) is that his message and mission are directed at people of all ages. Epicurus said the same (*Men.* 122). Echoing thoughts in the *Physics* preface, D says that he is addressing foreigners as well as his fellow citizens (fr. 30 I) and those who are "civil-spoken" (fr. 30 I) – presumably the same people whom in the *Physics* passages he calls "those of suitable make-up" (fr. 3 III, 2 II).

Whether just one column of the treatise is missing at the beginning, or whether two columns are missing, depends on whether the

continuous line of maxims in the lower margin was preceded by a title, such as "Sayings of Epicurus".

30

NF 191

This tiny piece carries three wholly or partly preserved "medium-sized" letters of a lower-margin maxim. It is the lower righthand corner of the missing block which separated fr. 29 + NF 207 and fr. 30, and its letters belong to the beginning of *PD* 2.

31

Fr. 30

HK fr. 61 / YF 015

See also on fr. 29 + NF 207.

D's statement of his cosmopolitanism (II) is notable and noble. Cynic and Stoic influence has been suspected, but the concept was by no means the exclusive property of those schools. See Sm 139-140.

We learn from III that D's request to his readers to read the whole of his work and to do so attentively is not his first time of asking. That was probably in a missing part of the *Physics* preface. It is a fair guess that only a small minority of his readers had the stamina to do what he asked.

32

Fr. 31

NF 59 / YF 152

Pleasure is the Epicureans' moral end, and it is pleasure which D discusses after the *Ethics* preface.

33

Fr. 32

HK fr. 66 + HK fr. 67 + NF 42 / YF 043 + 049 + 091

It should be no surprise to find D engaged in polemics, and no surprise either to see that he is directing them against the Stoics. His

argument is that virtue (*aretē*) is the necessary means to the end, which is pleasure, not, as his opponents believe, the end itself.

34

Fr. 34 IV-V

HK fr. 82 / YF 055

Previously, I placed this text between YF 046 (fr. 34 I-III) and YF 038 (fr. 34 VI-VII), making it fr. 34 IV-V. Hammerstaedt/Hinzer-Al-Hasan (2013) show that it does not belong there. To their arguments to do with measurements one must add the decisive evidence of the quotations of *PD* 3 in the lower margins of YF 046 and YF 038. As I should have noticed long ago, the number of letters of the maxim missing between the end of the first quotation and beginning of the second is 45, indicating a space of three columns of text above instead of the two in my fr. 34 III-IV.

Despite the passage's brevity and rather poor state of preservation, it looks as though D is saying that people need to employ a hedonistic calculus, to work out which course of action will bring most pleasure. Sometimes it will be necessary to be patient about the emergence of the benefits, which may take some time.

35

NF 192

YF 256

The text on the left half of the block (YF 256) is either obliterated or in a very poor condition, but the mention of the pleasures of debauchees (II) seems secure. Then (III-IV) D shows his earnestness by addressing the three founders of Stoicism by name and employing a triple anaphora to deny that those are the sorts of pleasures Epicureanism recommends (III). He is echoing Epicurus: "So, when we say that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of debauchees and those that depend on sensual enjoyment, ... but freedom from pain in the body and freedom from disturbance in the mind" (*Men*. 131).

A further textual loss in NF 192 is the obliteration of all but two

letters of the maxim in its lower margin, depriving us of a likely clue as to its exact position in the treatise.

36

Fr. 33

HK fr. (68) + NF 128 + HK fr. 69 + HK fr. 70 / YF 002 + 188 + 090 + 045

Discussion of pleasure and virtues continues, but the text of I-III, where not obliterated, is difficult to read, which makes interpretation difficult. The most serious problem is one which David Sedley and I have been unable to agree on – the identity of Diogenes' opponents. He says the Cyrenaics, I say the Stoics. Our arguments are set out in Smith (1998) 148-152; Smith (2003) 90-97; Sedley (2002). Tsouna (2017) discusses the problem and sides with Sedley, but I am not persuaded by their arguments. For example, "the feeling of self-love" (V) as a motivating force is attested as a Stoic doctrine by Cicero, Seneca, and Aulus Gellius, and the Cyrenaics, who recommended the pursuit of immediate pleasure, are the last people in the world to have believed only in antecedent causes of pleasure. Aristippus is mentioned, critically, in fr. 49, but there is no mention of his name or his school in the present section of the treatise.

37

Fr. 34 I-III

HK fr. 62 / YF 046

The "fallacious arguments" are, again, likely to have been deployed by the Stoics, but the text is too short to allow precision.

38

Fr. 34 VI-VII

HK fr. 63 / YF 038

This text is programmatically valuable. Having completed the argument that pleasure is the end, D announces the next topic, an investigation about how our life is to be made pleasant in states

and actions. States are to be discussed first, including the way the removal of disturbing emotions allows their replacement by feelings of pleasure. He identifies four disturbing emotions, which he describes as "the roots of all evils": fear of the gods; fear of death; fear of pains; and excessive desires. The passage repeats the list given in the *Physics* preface. Fear of the gods is to be examined first, but very little of this subsection has been found. That may be a matter of chance, but, since fear of the gods received extensive treatment in the *Physics*, D (despite his penchant for repeating arguments!) may have felt it unnecessary to give it extensive treatment in the *Ethics* as well. Indeed, he may actually have included a statement to that effect.

39

Fr. 36

NF 43 / YF 106

The apparent mentions of pleasures, myth, and gods suggest that this small fragment may belong to the fear of the gods subsection, but there can be no certainty.

40

Fr. 35

HK fr. 71 / YF 229

Despite its better state of preservation, there is doubt about this fragment too, but the likelihood is that D is dealing with fear of death rather than fear of the gods.

41

Fr. 37

HK fr. 65 / YF 052

This substantial text discusses the relationship between soul and body, and it is natural to suppose that D, like Lucretius (3.323-416), dealt with this matter before he considered the fate of the soul after death. The soul is part of the body, composed of extremely fine atoms. It has rational and irrational parts, the former (the mind) hav-

ing a fixed place in the breast, the latter (the spirit) being scattered all through the body. As D says, it reigns supreme in the body, which depends on it for its life.

42

Fr. 38

NF 61 / YF 133

A short but informative text, which probably closely followed fr. 37. It underlines the point that the soul cannot exist without the body, and the swipe at Plato and the Stoics looks forward to the arguments in fr. 39.

43

Fr. 39

HK fr. 83 / YF 037

Col. I is obliterated and II and III are poorly preserved. In the lost passage D refuted Plato's belief in the immortality of the soul, completing his argument in III. In IV-V he turns to the Stoics. Different Stoics had different ideas on the fate of the soul after death. Cleanthes believed in its survival until the next cosmic conflagration, Posidonius in a celestial immortality, Panaetius in no survival at all. The view which D criticises, that only the souls of the wise survive, was held by Chrysippus (Diogenes Laertius 7.157). The matter about which D expresses surprise at the end of the passage is presumably that the Stoics do not make the souls completely indestructible.

44

NF 168

YF 237

What survives of the last four lines of a column suggests discussion of the fate of the soul, and if my tentative restoration in HS 84 is correct, there was an address to Plato by name.

45

Fr. 40

HK fr. 72 / YF 286

This brief text, recorded by both Cousin and HK, was rediscovered not by the British and international teams who explored Oinoanda in 1968-2017, but by four Turkish visitors to the site in 2022 – Bora Bilgin and three of his relatives. They took a photograph and posted it online, where it was seen by JH in 2025. It was clever of the visitors to find the fragment, and their behaviour was perfectly responsible: they placed the piece by the door of the depot and informed the watchman, Sedat Atçı. Their photograph shows that HK were correct to show that part of the text was carved in an unusually small and cramped fashion.

"Pythagoras" is certain, but who else was mentioned? I have suggested the Orphics. In any case, D is probably discussing metempsychosis, the transmigration of souls.

46

Fr. 41

NF 62 / YF 119

The bracketing of followers of Empedocles and Pythagoras leaves no doubt that the subject is metempsychosis.

47

Fr. 42

NF 2 / YF 023 + HK fr. (76) + HK fr. 77

This passage occupies three blocks. The first (I-II) was found in 1969, the second and third (II-V) in 1885. The second block has never been rediscovered, and the third has not been seen since 1895, but the French squeezes of both survive and have been examined.

For Empedocles' belief in metempsychosis, see DK Emped. fr. 117, 127, 129, 136-137, 146-147.

48

Fr. 43

NF 13 / YF 088 + NF 12 / YF 087

In the *Physics*, "the writing before this one", as D describes it (I), he refuted the Stoic and Democritean theories of dreams (fr. 10), arguing that the former attached too little importance to them, the latter too much. It is rather remarkable, at least from the point of view of not being much concerned about economy of words even when they are carved on a wall, that he returns to the same theories and refutations here. The exact context in which he does so is not entirely clear. He may have wanted to show, like Lucr. 1.131-135 and 4.33-41, that visions of the dead are not proof of an after-life, in which case the passage will have been part of the subsection on fear of death. Or he may be arguing against divination, as in fr. 52-54.

49

Fr. 44 + 45

HK fr. 64 / YF 014 + NF 64 / YF 137

D considers the pains of the soul and those of the body and asks whether mental or physical pain is worse. Most people's answer is, predictably, whichever they happen to be experiencing at the time. Those best able to judge the matter are the wise, who can do so on the basis of the future as well as the present. They will understand that, whereas the body is pained only by the present, the mind experiences pain with regard to the past and future as well. In all this the Epicureans disagreed with the Cyrenaics (Diogenes Laertius 10.137).

50

NF 137

YF 199

This text is too brief to reveal whether it belongs to the section on fear of pain or to that on fear of death.

51

Fr. 46

NF 63 / YF 160

This tiny fragment very likely contained wording similar to that of the second sentence of Epic. *PD* 3: "Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither physical nor mental pain nor both together". If so, it may belong either to the discussion of pleasure or to that of pain. A version of the maxim is quoted in the lower margin of fr. 34.

52

Fr. 47

NF 44 / YF 096 + NF 14 / YF 085

Hammerstaedt/Hinzer-AlHasan (2013) 63-65 contend, mainly on the basis of the stones' measurements and physical features seen in the digital scans, that I am mistaken in making NF 14 / YF 085 (fr. 47 III-IV) an immediate continuation of NF 44 / YF 096 (fr. 47 I-II). Given that damage to NF 44 has removed both the last lines of its second column and the letters of the maxim which would have run through its lower margin, the correctness of my join cannot be proved. For the same reasons I am not entirely convinced that it can be disproved either. My critics produce a veritable blizzard of detailed measurements and statistics, which I must confess that, being a poor mathematician, I find difficult to understand. Moreover, I am in no position to check the accuracy of their figures independently. Something which makes me sceptical about their conclusions is that they want (p. 65) to place YF 096 immediately before NF 17 / YF 089 (fr. 48). But this seems impossible, as the line endings preserved in YF 089 col. I show. On the other hand, if one considers the content of YF 096 and YF 085, the latter seems to follow on naturally after the former, despite the brief lacuna between them, and for this reason I continue to keep them together. In any case, they are unlikely to have been far separated in the treatise.

The Epicurean view was that severe physical pain is short lived,

being quickly relieved by either recovery or death, while chronic illness still allows a preponderance of physical pleasure (*PD* 4).

D uses legal language here (III) and in fr. 156 in his mention of nature. Lucretius does the same (3.951-952, 963) except that he makes nature the prosecutor rather than the defendant.

53

Fr. 48

NF 17 / YF 089

Although this short text is certainly part of the discussion of pain, its place within the subsection is uncertain.

54

Fr. 49

NF 20 / YF 082

D criticises Aristippus of Cyrene's brand of hedonism, which differed from Epicurus' in giving most attention to immediate pleasure and prioritising pleasure of the body over pleasure of the mind. Those who detect criticism of Cyrenaic hedonism in fr. 33 are, as I argued there, mistaken. The present passage is likely to be part of the discussion of excessive desires. A helpful indication of its position fairly well on in the treatise is the reference (II) to the demonstration of which fr. 44 is part.

55

Fr. 50

NF 60 / YF 121

A mere scrap, probably part of the discussion of excessive desires.

56

Fr. 51

NF 34 + YF 024

D discusses the unnatural and unnecessary desire for power, and, if the restorations are correct, for wealth as well. On the vanity of

power as exemplified by the case of Alexander the Great, see also NF 131.

57 and 58
Fr. 52 and 53
HK fr. (79) and HK fr. 78
The two fragments were found together by Cousin in 1889. Only fr. 53 was rediscovered by HK, and neither of them has been seen in later investigations. It is likely that they are part of the same column. Both mention divination (*mantikē*), which recurs in fr. 54 I. It is probable that the treatment of divination here is part of the discussion of "actions" promised in fr. 34 VI (= passage **38** I), and that the polemic, like the passage about divination in the *Physics* (fr. 24), is anti-Stoic.

59
Fr. 54
HK fr. 80 / YF 041 + HK fr. 81 / YF 042
The discussion is about "fate" or "necessity". D points out that there is no evidence for it, once divination has been disproved (I). He goes on to criticise Democritus for supposing that necessity controls the movement of atoms, whereas Epicurus, who rejected determinism and believed in free will, postulated the existence of an atomic swerve (II-III). He makes clear that Epicurus' belief in the moral independence of the individual is the crucial consideration: the fact of free will is proof that atoms do not always move predictably in accordance with fixed natural law. The doctrine is expounded in detail by Lucr. 2.216-293.

60
Fr. 55
HK fr. 84
Perhaps part of the discussion of necessity and free will to which fr. 54 belongs. "He" is Epicurus.

61

NF 146 + NF 129

YF 216 + YF 185

This substantial but damaged passage is to be assigned to D's demonstration of how life is made pleasant "in actions". He recommends a simple diet, as in NF 136 + fr. 161, although there the food is cabbage, here barley bread. He recommends also a bed and clothes which, although not luxurious, do not cause the body discomfort. He does not encourage asceticism such as was practised by the young Marcus Aurelius. His view is evidently like that of *VS* 63: "There is also a limit in simple living. Anyone who disregards this limit is as mistaken as the person who indulges in extravagance". With regard to clothing to be avoided, I have tentatively suggested a reference to the garment which brought Heracles an agonising death, according to Sophocles' *Women of Trachis*. The needs for the sort of life D favours are "easily obtained" and bring "continual luxury". Compare Us fr. 202: "For with regard to what is sufficient for nature, every possession is riches". Also *VS* 25.

The last lines of I-III are buried, and so is the lower margin with a maxim running through it, so the block (NF 146) awaits further attention. The right half of IV and the left half of V are carried by NF 129, but little survives of IV. My revised text of V, presented as II in Smith (2003) 102, is heavily restored, but without doubt D is denying that the horrors of hell await us after death before reiterating the Epicurean view that death is nothing to us.

62

Fr. 56

NF 21 / YF 073

The discovery of this text in 1972 aroused considerable excitement, and it quickly became known as the "Golden Age" passage. Although nothing in it conflicts with Epicurean orthodoxy, there is no parallel in the school's surviving literature for the utopian vision described by D. He begins with an admission that not everyone is capable of wisdom, but says that, if we assume

it (wisdom) to be possible, people will live like gods. Righteousness and mutual love (*philallēlia*) will prevail, and there will be no need of fortifications, because there will be no fighting, and no need of laws, since they exist not to prevent the wise from doing wrong, but to prevent them from being wronged (Us fr. 530). People will obtain the necessities of life by engaging in co-operative farming, without (if the restored text is right) using slave labour. At other times they will study philosophy together. Epicurus believed that individual human beings can attain godlike happiness on earth (see fr. 125 III-IV and notes there), and he attached the greatest importance to friendship (*philia*), but, so far as we know, he did not recommend co-operative farming. The same is true of Philodemus, who recommends farming, but with the farmwork being done by others (*Oec.* XXIII 7-11 Jensen). It is also true of the Stoic Musonius, even though he advocated farming as a suitable occupation for a philosopher, and it is to be noted that D only advocates farming as something necessary for the production of food and as an activity that interrupts the study of philosophy. The nearest parallels to the Golden Age fragment are passages in a pseudo-Aristotelian *Letter to Alexander* (Stern [1968] 3-8) and of the *Historia Augusta* life of Probus 23. Both are of Roman Imperial date, and in Smith (1993) 141 I quote David Sedley's opinion that D is "adapting traditional Epicureanism to the language and spirit of his times".

Fourteen-Line-Column Letters

These letters, carved on blocks taller than those of the *Physics* and a little less tall than those of the *Ethics*, and differing from the *Ethics* in having no band of maxims in their lower margin, occupied the third lowest course of the inscription, or at least a significant part of it. There were at least three of them. The title of one of them is preserved (NF 215), and it is likely that the others had titles too.

Letter to Antipater

65 and 66
Fr. 62 and 63
HK fr. 56 / YF 056 and NF 107 /YF 166 + HK fr. 37 /YF 064 + HK fr. 38 / YF 065
D is writing from Rhodes to an Epicurean friend named Antipater, who is in Greece, very likely Athens, for D tells him that, when winter is over, he hopes to sail to meet him again and also the other Epicureans in Athens, Chalcis, and Thebes. Antipater wants to hear the arguments for the Epicurean theory that the number of worlds in the universe is infinite. D says that he has just been discussing this very subject with a new recruit to the Epicurean school in Rhodes, Theodoridas of Lindos, and so he is sending Antipater their discussion in its original form, that is to say in dialogue. On the analogy of title block NF 215, the title of the *Letter to Antipater* is likely to have been worded something like this: "The matters discussed by Diogenes concerning an infinite number of worlds".

Although Antipater and Theodoridas may have been real people known to D, it is unlikely that the *Letter to Antipater* is the text of a letter he wrote to his friend incorporating an accurate report of his dialogue with Theodoridas. We should be wiser to think of him adopting the epistolary form as an effective way of varying and enlivening his exposition of philosophy, in this case supplementing his *Physics*, and at the same time imitating his master Epicurus' practice of addressing a wider audience through the medium of letters addressed to individual disciples or small groups of them.

In fact, there are close similarities between the *Letter to Antipater* and the *Letter to Pythocles* attributed to Epicurus. Each writer has received a letter from a well-disposed pupil, who has asked him to explain physical matters: Pythocles has asked about celestial phenomena (84), Antipater about the innumerability of worlds, a topic addressed early in the *Letter to Pythocles* (89).

Not much is preserved of D's argument about the innumerability of worlds, but his preface to the letter is valuable testimony to the dif-

fusion of Epicureanism in the Mediterranean world early in the second century and to the links between Epicurean communities at that time, including those between Rhodes and mainland Greece. Rhodes was an important centre of higher education, better known for its Stoics than for its Epicureans: Panaetius was born there and Posidonius settled there. But we know from Philodemus (*Rhet*. 1.89 Sudhaus) that in the first century BC it had an Epicurean school with close links to the school in Athens, and those links seem to have been very much alive two centuries later. That was one attraction of the island for D. Another was the mildness of its winter climate compared with that of Oinoanda, 1,400 m up in the mountains of northern Lycia.

What D says about his longing to see his Epicurean friends and his hope to make the journey reminds one of St Paul's remarks in his *Epistle to the Romans* 1.10-11, the only major difference being that D makes no mention of the will of God, instead referring to two uncertainties which might prevent his plans – the inconstancy of human fortunes and his old age.

67

Fr. 64

HK fr. 85

The physical features of this fragment indicate the *FLCL*, and the "matter under investigation" may be the one mentioned in fr. 63 III.

68

Fr. 65 + fr. 78

HK fr. 39 / YF 011 + NF 22 / YF 017

The stone, carrying just one column, is heavily damaged and broken into two parts. The larger piece was found in June 1895, the smaller one in May 1972. The join was made in May 2022 by Nikolaus Koch, using the three-dimensional digital models created during the international survey of Oinoanda in 2007-2017, and the combined text was edited by Smith/Hammerstaedt (2022 [2024]).

Although much assisted by the uniting of the two fragments, JH and I were not able to agree about the restoration and interpretation

of the lower half of the column, and we recorded our separate suggestions. Noting the unnecessary concern about a "breach" and, at the end, the mention of not making the earth "gape open" and filling it full of [void], I believe that D, like Lucr. 1.1052-1113, is attacking the Stoic view that our finite world is surrounded by an infinite void into which it (the world) will be dispersed if its "walls" are breached. Lucr. calls any such breach a "a gate of death". D makes his point with a characteristic touch of ironical humour.

In line 4 JH and I adopt Michael McOsker's suggestion τό γε.

69

Fr. 66

HK fr. 46 / YF 044

That this passage is polemical is obvious. What is not obvious is against whom, and against what doctrine, the argument is directed. The most popular suggestion is Xenophanes and his belief that the earth has an upper limit, but extends downwards indefinitely. Another proposal is the Stoics and their view that the earth is spherical.

70

Fr. 67

HK fr. (44)

Like Epic. *Hdt.* 42 and Lucr. 1.1008-1051, D argues that the number of atoms, like the extent of the void, is infinite.

Letter to Dionysius (and Carus?)

Dionysius is mentioned in D's *Ten-Line-Column Writings* (*TLCW*) at the end of fr. 122, which expresses gratitude to three individuals who recommended that he stay with an unnamed woman in Rhodes while he was recovering fron an illness. The three are: "dearest Menneas", the addressee of the letter; "the wonderful Carus"; and "our Dionysius".

The Dionysius of fr. 122 is naturally to be identified with the Dionysius whom D addresses in fr. 68, a small fragment of the *FLCL*, which was probably addressed also to a second person, a person with a short name. Carus is the obvious candidate. The letter seems to have discussed quite a mixed bag of topics, and it is possible that the passages assigned to it are actually the remains of two letters.

71

Fr. 69

NF 9 / YF 084

The subject here is epistemological. D explains why square objects viewed from the distance appear to be round, as part of an argument that such optical illusions do not conflict with the infallibility of sensation. Compare the explanations given by Epic. *Hdt.* 48-52; Lucr. 4.353-363, 462-468.

For the text and translation of the last sentence, see Smith (2003) 111-112.

72

Fr. 68

NF 58 / YF 120

The address to Dionysius (and probably Carus). The fragment is heavily restored, but D seems to be explaining how "things not evident to sense", such as celestial phenomena of which a clear near view is impossible, are to be investigated.

73

Fr. 71

NF 8 / YF 083

This passage and the next two, whether from the same letter as fr. 69 and 68 or not, certainly belong together. The main topic is chance (*tychē*), which Epicurus recognised as an issue, but one which seldom impedes the wise. In II D quotes *PD* 16, where this point is made. It is also made very briefly in NF 132, one of the *Monolithic*

Maxims: "Seldom does the fortuitous, which we term chance, interfere with life, and usually it is we who are in control". *PD* 16 is quoted also in the lower margin of the *Ethics* (fr. 49).

74

NF 214 + fr. 72

YF 282 + NF 7 / YF 070

The second part of this text (fr. 72 = IV-V) was found in 1970 and provoked much discussion and puzzlement for nearly half a century. Why was epic language being used to describe a shipwrecked man's struggles to reach dry land, where eventually he chanced to be rescued, perhaps by a passing fisherman or shepherd? And who was the shipwrecked man? Hoffman (1976) I 93-96, II 280-286 proposed Niceratus, who is mentioned in fr. 70 as having had a distressing experience. He did not have many, if any, followers, most scholars, myself included, preferring Clay's more glamorous suggestion that D was closely following Epicurus' account of being shipwrecked. The controversy was settled in Hoffman's favour between 2 and 6 October 2017, when JH, visiting Oinoanda with several colleagues in order to settle certain problems in preparation for a multi-authored book about recent work on the site, unexpectedly found himself needing to record in a very short time six new fragments of D's inscription, including NF 214 and 215, both substantial blocks and very important. See Hammerstaedt/Smith (2018). NF 214 was exceptionally difficult to record, being wedged top down between other stones on Martin's Hill and immovable. Only a partial squeeze and partial photographs were possible, but JH heroically and skilfully recorded the hidden parts of the text by lying down and wielding a torch and a mirror.

The text, a partial glimpse of which had been obtained two years earlier, graphically describes the series of events which culminated in Niceratus suffering shipwreck and being its sole survivor. It also mentions the location, the rugged coast of the island of Syme, situated between Rhodes and Cnidus. But the identification of Niceratus as the shipwrecked man does not satisfactorily explain the

language of epic poetry, which was one reason for thinking that D's account closely follows one of Epicurus, who sometimes used exuberant language, especially in his letters. My suspicion is that he is indeed closely following his master, but has changed the name of the shipwrecked man and changed the location of the incident. I do not believe in the factual accuracy of D's account any more than I believe in the factual accuracy of the *Letter to Antipater*.

When publishing NF 214 + fr. 72, JH and I also re-edited fr. 71 and 70, and our revised Greek texts of those passages together with our commentaries can be consulted in Hammerstaedt/Smith (2018). There is, for example, an important new reading in fr. 72 II 6 (p. 57).

75

Fr. 70

NF 10 / YF 071

The mention of pleasure and pain, the criteria of truth in Epicurean ethics, suggests that the Niceratus episode could have been in the same letter as the passages concerned with the validity of sensation as a criterion of truth (fr. 69, 68).

"Countless times", reading in I 6 ἀπει/[ράκις]. See Hammerstaedt/Smith (2018) 59.

Letter from Archelaus to Dion

76

NF 215

YF 284

The second major discovery in 2017 is as sensational as the first. It is a block bearing the title and opening column of what purports to be a letter written not by D, but by a certain Archelaus to a certain Dion. The latter has asked the former to tell him what D said after the funeral of his son. It was not previously known that D had a son, let alone one who predeceased him. In reply, Archelaus claims that he can do better than just give Dion his own recollections of what D said, because he has copied the version of the speech made by reliable shorthand-writers.

Given that Archelaus' *Letter to Dion* is part of D's inscription, one is bound to question whether it was actually written by Archelaus and sent to Dion, and whether a copy of D's speech needed to be obtained from shorthand writers. I believe that, in this case which would have been very close to him emotionally, D decided to put across his views on death and bereavement in a way that would make it easier for him to "speak" and at the same time vary and dramatise the narrative. He was well versed in the art of rhetoric, and here we have a striking example of the sophisticated use he was able to make of his skill. The mention of shorthand writers, interesting in itself, serves the double purpose of making Archelaus and his version more credible to readers, and of showing them that the views attributed to D in the letter are genuinely his.

We are not told where the funeral took place, or in what places Archelaus and Dion resided. Neither name has yet been recorded at Oinoanda.

Although NF 215 has all the other physical and epigraphical features of the *Fourteen-Line-Column Letters*, it is remarkable that, uniquely, it begins with a column of 17 lines. The likely explanation for this was the wish to accommodate the whole of the preface on one stone, so as to be able to commence the speech attributed to D on a new block.

More FLCL Texts

77
Fr. 73
HK fr. (51)
The discovery of NF 215 raises the question of whether any previously known texts can be assigned to the same writing. The answer is "none with certainty", but a possible candidate is this one in which the writer, presumably D (and it could be D reported by Archelaus), declares that he laughs at death and has no fear of punishment after death. The punishments of Tantalus and Tityus are among those discussed and allegorised by Lucr. 3.978-994. In Homer, Tantalus' punishment was to stand up to his chin in water and be unable to drink, but Lucr.

follows the Greek lyric and tragic poets in making him fear the fall of a great rock suspended over him. As for Tityus, his agreed punishment for trying to rape Leto was to have two vultures feeding on his liver.

For laughing at death, cf. NF 130.

The text is inscribed on a stone which has not been seen since its discovery in 1885. The French squeeze survives, but does not cover the complete surface. The possibility that it is a case of an *Ethics* fragment whose lower margin was broken off or overlooked cannot be ruled out.

78

Fr. 74

NF 108 / YÇ 1062

A possible but improbable candidate for attribution to the *Letter to Dion* is this meditative piece, carved in a 15-line column, perhaps because it closed an argument and it was thought undesirable to have a brief overflow onto the next stone.

In the last sentence D echoes words in the preface to Epic. *Pyth.* 84, where the writer tells his pupil that he is sending him a brief account of celestial phenomena, "marked out as with compasses, to help you to remember".

The fragment was placed by Alan Hall in the wrong (non-Diogenes) inventory, hence the YÇ number.

Letter to Unknown Addressees

79

NF 209

YF 274

The subject matter is ethical, but the text cannot be confidently assigned to any of the known parts of the inscription. But the combination of its "small" lettering and its height (61 cm) suggests that it stood in the same course as the *Ethics*. All but a few letters of col. I have been broken off or obliterated, but the 13 lines of II are legible

and are the last of a letter. The subject, on which there are two gnomic pronouncements, is death: one cannot die twice and therefore cannot live twice; and death should be met cheerfully, since we shall lose not only good things, but also bad ones. "Be cheerful" has a Pauline ring to it (*Acts* 27.22, 25). It is also an expression which Xenophon makes Socrates use with regard to any troubles from which he may be released at the end of his life (*Apol.* 27).

Small-Letter Fragments of Uncertain Position

Few of the small pieces assembled here carry any significant text, and fewer still require any comment.

80
Fr. 79
NF 33 / YF 039
The text is heavily restored, but seems to be epistemological, *noēsis*, "concept", being synonymous with *prolēpsis*, "preconception" (cf. Epic. *Men.* 123), which is one of the Epicurean criteria of truth (Epic. *Hdt.* 72). For further explanation, see Sm 526.

84
Fr. 83
NF 70 / YF 109
The word after "For indeed from" began with the letter theta, so was probably "death" or "god(s)".

89
Fr. 96
NF 120 / YF 178
The text translated is that suggested by Smith (2003) 117, comparing fr. 70 I.

Monolithic Maxims

The *Monolithic Maxims* constitute a separate section of the inscription, unlike the maxims which run through the lower margin of the *Ethics* and are sometimes related to the subject matter of the columns above them. These separate maxims are monolithic in the sense that each one occupies one column of a single stone, without an overflow onto a neighbouring stone or stones. Sometimes, the single column contains two maxims (fr. 98, 108, 111; NF 213). The height of the blocks is similar to that of the *FLCL*, but the lettering is different – "medium-sized" rather than "small", and the number of lines in a column is different too, averaging ten but varying from nine to eleven. So it is doubtful if they were in the same course as the *FLCL*, and it is difficult to see where else they might be placed. Their monolithic status is unparalleled in the inscription, and one has to ask why this is so. One possible answer is that they were not part of the wall of the stoa, but displayed separately, either inside the building or outside it.

The *MM* were almost certainly compositions of D. Most of them are ethical, but some are about epistemology and physics. Their order is very uncertain. Epigraphically, they are less homogeneous than other sections of the inscription, not only in the varying number of lines in a column, but also in the style of lettering. The distinctive hands of at least three stonemasons can be detected.

Elsewhere, I have written:

> I suspect the maxims were carefully selected and arranged in order to give D's readers, in a brief and easily digestible form, material that summarises and/or supplements information presented elsewhere in the inscription. Because of their brevity and predominantly non-technical and ethical content, they are likely to have been one of the most popular sections of the inscription. Those who visited D's stoa and spent only a few minutes there, either because they had to attend to other business or because their attention span was short, would be more

> likely to read a few ten-line maxims than to plunge into the *Physics* or *Ethics*, and it is difficult to believe D would not have realised this.
>
> Smith (2003) 117-118

99

Fr. 100

HK fr. 33 / YF 051

For detailed discussion of this text and its proposed restoration, see Smith (2000b). Even if not every word is correct, especially in the lower half of the column, the rejection of the Stoic and Presocratic theories of the elements followed by a statement of the Epicurean theory seems highly plausible. D presented his arguments in the *Physics*.

100

NF 155

YF 200

In his *Timaeus* Plato describes how the world was made by a divine craftsman (*dēmiourgos*), and how it will last for ever. For the Epicureans the world was created by a natural process, and eventually it will be dissolved into its constituent atoms, just like any other compound body.

101

NF 171

YF 226

The loss of the upper half of the column makes interpretation difficult, and JH and I are not agreed about it in HS 86-88. He thinks the subject is pleasure. I favour epistemology: the point that sensation and thought cannot take place without the body is made also in NF 136 + NF 94 (fr. 161) III.

102

NF 156

YF 213

Part of a likely statement of how vision is caused by the impact of filmy images similar in form to the objects from which they emanate. Cf. fr. 9.

103

NF 197

YF 261

In the *Physics* D argued that divine providence is impossible. Our world and its human inhabitants are far too faulty to have been created by the gods either for their sake or for ours. See the extensive arguments in Theol. and fr. 21. The point here is that, if there *were* divine providence, the Epicureans would acknowledge it.

104

NF 213

YF 279

The stone is broken on the right, with a loss of at least six letters in each line. There are two maxims here. The first asserts the true goodness of the virtuous person. The statement seems obvious, even tautologous, but the reason may be that D is having a dig at his favourite opponents, the Stoics. The second maxim is on a very different subject, farming. To my restoration "stormy weather is often a cause of damage to farming", JH prefers "farming is often a cause of damage to the body". For full discussion of the whole fragment, see Hammerstaedt/Smith (2016).

105

Fr. 98

NF 45 / YF 092

The Epicureans offered multiple explanations of thunderbolts and earthquakes. On thunderbolts see Epic. *Pyth.* 103-104 and Lucr. 6.246-284; on earthquakes *Pyth.* 105-106, Lucr. 6.535-607. Epic. concludes his discussion of each phenomenon by saying that they may have other causes too (*Pyth.* 104, 106), like D does with respect to earthquakes.

106
Fr. 99
NF 82 / YF 124
Hail is discussed in fr. 14, Epic. *Pyth.* 106. The problem of why it occurs in summer is addressed by Aristotle *Mete.* 347b-349a and Seneca *Natural Questions* 4.4.1; 4.5.4.

109
NF 130
YF 191
When this piece was found in 1997, only the upper part of its column was visible, the lower part being hidden under a stylobate. It was fully exposed in 2011. The previously buried lines are particularly interesting, with D joining the ranks of those Greek and Latin authors who compare fear of death to the irrational fear of children. They include Plato, Lucretius, and Seneca. Lucr. compares the fear of death to children's fear of the dark (2.55-61 = 3.87-93, 6.35-41). Plato (*Phaedo* 77e) and Sen. (*Moral Letters* 24.13) are among the writers who compare death to a mask which frightens children. As for death deserving "to be laughed at", cf. fr. 73 I.

110
Fr. 105
HK fr. 29 / YF 006
Cf. fr. 47 II-III.

112
Fr. 107
NF 83 / YF 108
No doubt the three enjoyments are of food, drink, and sex, all of which give pleasure at the time they are taken. Cf. fr. 33 VII, fr. 49 II.

113
Fr. 108
HK fr. 31 / YF 063

The first maxim, on the vanity of wealth, is in line with, for example, Epic. *PD* 15 and D's *Old Age*, fr. 152-155. The image of the container full to overflowing puts one in mind of Lucr.'s references and allusions to the Danaids, representing those who are never satisfied with the good things of life, punished in the underworld with the futile task of pouring water into leaky containers (3.936-937, 1003-1010; 6.17-23).

The idea in the second maxim is found in Democritus DK fr. 191.

115

NF 157

YF 217

When this text was discovered in 2008, the upper half of the column was buried under other stones. Only when it was fully exposed in 2009 was it seen that it is about sexual passion. It is a welcome addition to our sources of information concerning the Epicurean attitude to it. The surviving Greek sources, mainly Epic. and Philodemus, are scanty. Far more detailed is the account of Lucr. in the closing section of book 4 (1030-1287). Epic. considered sexual desire natural, but not necessary (Us fr. 456 p. 295.12-17), which meant that it should be either suppressed or satisfied in the least disturbing way. According to *VS* 51, one is never benefited by sexual love, and one is lucky if one is not harmed by it. Prominent in Lucr. are the ideas that lovers are wounded and sick or even mentally unhinged. Philodemus agrees that they are sick (*On Music* IV col. CXIX 42-43 Delattre). D is of the same opinion, and, although he recognises, like Epic., that the sight of a beautiful figure gives pleasure (Us fr. 67), neither of them thinks that it is desirable, only that it is preferable to having sexual intercourse. D's observation that, if one has sex, it makes no difference what one's partner looks like, reflects his view that the pleasure of copulation is limited to the ejaculation of semen. He treats the whole matter from a male point of view. So for the most part does Lucr., although he does acknowledge that sexual pleasure is often shared by the woman (4.1192-1208).

116
NF 131
YF 189
The master of Pella is Alexander the Great, whose vain desire for power and fame is mentioned also in fr. 51.

117
Fr. 111
HK fr. 30 / YF 168
The beginning of the first maxim is missing. For the division of desires into natural and vain or unnecessary, cf. fr. 153 and see note there. The second maxim is echoed in NF 158, assigned to the *TLCW*. The idea that nobility is not inborn, but something gained through virtuous behaviour, goes back at least as far as Democritus (DK 68 B 57).

118
NF 132
YF 186
Cf. Epic. *PD* 16; fr. 71. The stone carrying D's maxim is the narrowest complete piece of the inscription yet found (22.5 cm). The Greek text, despite occupying an 11-line column, is unprecedently brief (16 words), and unique also in containing a word whose letters are distributed between three lines.

119
Fr. 112
HK fr. 28 / YF 005
Epic. was hostile to rhetoric. Cf. fr. 127. D's comment on public speaking is like that of Tacitus *Dialogus* 13: "The troubled and anxious life of orators" (*inquieta et anxia oratorum vita*).

120
Fr. 113
HK fr. (27)

"Contentment" translates *euthymia*. That was the moral ideal of Democritus, and the whole maxim has been influenced, directly or indirectly, by him (DK Democritus fr. 3).

121

NF 184

YF 245

The text, significantly affected by cracks, fractures, and other damage, is difficult to read and restore, especially but not only in the last lines of the column. But there can be no doubt that the main message is ethical, stressing the importance of making full use of the present, not living for an uncertain future.

122

Fr. 114

NF 123 / YF 181

Elsewhere I have attempted a full restoration of the passage: ["Death is nothing to us; for our soul, as soon as we reach the immovable] and [firm boundaries], which are [the limit] of natural [life, is dissolved]". The conjectural reconstruction needs to be treated with caution.

124

NF 172

YF 235

Perhaps part of a polemical statement directed at Socrates.

125

Fr. 116

NF 81 / YF 105

This damaged fragment, undoubtedly a continuation of text inscribed on at least one neighbouring stone, is not a maxim, but part of a statement, or rather restatement, of D's mission. As in fr. 3 and 29 + NF 207, he holds out the promise of "salvation". It is likely that he meant the passage to be read after the *Monolithic Maxims*. Any-

how, it seems to close a section of the inscription, possibly even the whole of it. The last sentence, explaining why "we turned so many letters to stone for you" is

> a humorous acknowledgement, as well as a serious defence, of the epigraphic colossus which his missionary zeal has created.
>
> Sm 143

Poking gentle fun at one's own verbal prodigality was something of a tradition among Epicurean teachers. Lucr. did it (1.410-417), and so did Epicurus at the end of *On Nature* book 28: see Sedley (1973) 56.

Directions to Family and Friends

126

Fr. 117

HK fr. 2 / YF 269

D starts as if he were quoting his will. Perhaps he is, but the brief surviving passage does not have the ring of a legal document, in contrast with the wording of Epicurus' will quoted by Diogenes Laertius 10.16-21. D seems most concerned to convey the message that death is not to be either sought or feared, as argued by Epic. *Men.* 125-126.

kardiakon pathos, translated "stomach complaint", could mean "heart complaint", but fr. 121 suggests a gastric problem.

127

Fr. 118

NF 38 / YF 040

A severely weathered and worn block, mostly illegible, assigned to the same writing as fr. 117 on the basis of its physical and epigraphical features.

Ten-Line-Column Writings

These writings occupied the fourth course of the inscription – the fourth from the bottom and also the fourth from the top. Their position above the texts carved in "small" characters and below *Old Age* carved in "large ones" explains why, being somewhat above eye level but not at the highest level, they display "medium-sized" characters. Whether they occupied the whole of the middle course is uncertain. The total width of the known *TLCW* fragments is much less than that of the known fragments of the *Physics* and the *Ethics*, but the same is true both of the *FLCL* and the *MM*.

Most, if not all, of the passages are of letters. With the exception of fr. 119, their order is uncertain.

128

Fr. 119

NF 18 / YF 030 + HK fr. 3 / YF 027

Despite the textual losses in I and II, the prefatory nature of this passage, addressed to unnamed friends, is plain. As in other such passages, D states that he wants his work to benefit others, including strangers, through his expositions of Epicurean physics and ethics which he has provided "in the places below", thus helpfully confirming that the *Physics* and *Ethics* were at a lower level, but also implying that the *Physics* preceded the *Ethics* – the order confirmed in fr. 43 I.

129

Fr. 120

NF 36 / YF 025

The best clue to the subject of this very small text is the likely mention of the "extreme", probably of pain, like in fr. 44 II and fr. 105.

130

Fr. 121

NF 23 / YF 80

A damaged fragment, in which D talks about his damaged health, specifically the gastric problems (cf. fr. 117) which he hopes will be eased by a diet of curdled milk – presumably, if the fermentation was controlled, yoghurt.

131
Fr. 122
HK fr. 26 / YF 004

Letter to Menneas

The closing passage of the letter. Since D refers to his recovery from illness in Rhodes, fr. 121 could be part of the same letter. Dionysius and (probably) Carus are the addressees of one of the *FLCL* (fr. 69, 68, 71; NF 214 + fr. 72; fr. 70). Luciano Canfora's belief that Carus (Karos) is T. Lucretius Carus is refuted in Smith (1993b).

132
NF 186
YF 247
The unidentified addressee appears to be an Epicurean. The point of greatest interest is that the people D is trying to help are female, as the Greek for "them" shows. Epicurus had admitted women to his circle, and their presence in Epicurean circles in D's time should not be a matter of great surprise. On the likely influence of Pompeia Plotina, see Introduction **2**. The identity of the women is not revealed, and we do not know if they are Oinoandans or not. They may have been Rhodians. One would like to know if D is writing to a woman.

134
Fr. 124
NF 88 / YF 141
Probably the beginning of a letter and of D's greeting to its addressee(s).

135 and 136
Fr. 125 and 126
HK fr. 21 / YF 048 + HK fr. 22 / YF 236 and HK fr. 23 / YF 159 + HK fr. 24 / YF 047.

Letter to Mother

The authorship of this letter is one of the most discussed questions in Diogenic studies. Two passages of it have been found, each occupying two stones whose texts join up. They are by far the most substantial presence in this section of the inscription. Many have believed that the letter was written to his mother, Chaerestrate, by the youthful Epicurus. One of their arguments is that "minas" (fr. 126 III) indicates a time earlier than that of D. Another is that the person who sent the money is Cleon, perhaps the same man who brought Epicurus a letter from Pythocles (Epic. *Pyth.* 84). And it is questioned whether the young Diogenes, clearly a member of a very wealthy family, would have needed the kind of support described in the letter. I used to accept these and other arguments in favour of Epicurus' authorship, but I now have an open mind and tend more to the view that it was written by D, perhaps in imitation of a letter of Epicurus. My scepticism about the majority view was increased by two discoveries made during recent work at Oinoanda. One is NF 174, which showed that the linking fr. 127, which urges the addressee to turn from rhetoric to philosophy, is not, as had been suggested, the work of Epicurus, but of D. The other is the revelation in NF 214 that the shipwrecked man, part of whose ordeal is described in fr. 72, is not Epicurus, but a contemporary of D called Niceratus.

In more than one way, the letter is untypical of a young man's letter to his mother. In fr. 125 he explains how her visions are caused by the impingement of "images" on the mind and are no cause for alarm. In fact, his happiness is godlike. In fr. 126 he begs her not to be so generous to him with her money.

137
Fr. 127 + NF 174
NF 24 / YF 081 + YF 239

Letter to the son of Mettius Phanias

This passage has been mentioned just above in connection with fr. 125 and 126. My attribution of fr. 127 to Epicurus, after its discovery in 1972, was generally accepted until 2009, when NF 174, the immediate continuation of it, revealed that the addressee is not Epicurus' mother, not one of his brothers, not Pythocles, and not Hermarchus. All had been suggested. Hermarchus seemed to me the strongest candidate because he had turned from rhetoric to philosophy. The extension to the text tells us that the writer, undoubtedly D, is addressing the son of Mettius Phanias, a contemporary of his and probably a Lycian, who might have been granted Roman citizenship by Mettius Modestus, governor of Lycia-Pamphylia in AD 99-102. The possibility that D is imitating a letter of Epicurus cannot be ruled out.

138
Fr. 128
NF 110 / YF 163

Letter to Dositheus

I used to believe that this brief text, too, is part of a letter written by Epicurus. We know from Plutarch (1101a-b) that he wrote a letter of consolation, on the death of Hegesianax, to Dositheus and Pyrson, the deceased's father and brother respectively. I now prefer to attribute the extract to D, who may perhaps be using his master's letter as a model and taking the name of the addressee from him.

139
Fr. 129
NF 124 / YF 180

The stone which carries this text was found built into the surrounds of a fountain in the village of Kınık, several kilometres from Oinoanda, in 1983. At that time part of it was buried in cement, but the whole surface was temporarily exposed in July 1994. It is believed to have been brought to Kınık from Kemerarası, an ancient site close to the foot of the hill of Oinoanda which in the 1960s and later was being quarried by local people for building stone. It will have been removed to Kemerarası from Oinoanda in late antiquity.

The text is polemical and probably directed at the Stoics, who regarded wealth and poverty as "indifferent", but the exact context of the argument is not clear.

140

Fr. 130

NF 3 / YF 001

If the restoration of this small fragment is approximately correct, its content may have been similar to that of fr. 127 + NF 174.

146

NF 158

YF 219

Cf. the second maxim in fr. 111: "It is not nature ... that makes people noble or ignoble, but their actions". See note there.

147

NF 218

YF 281

The most extensive relevant discussion by an Epicurean writer is Philodemus *On Property Management*. It is not fully preserved, and in the surviving text Philodemus does not make the exact point D seems to be making, but he discusses the treatment of servants, which (he recommends) should be neither too generous nor harsh. See Tsouna (2013) IX 15-21, X 15-28.

Medium-Sized-Letter Fragment of Uncertain Position

150
Fr. 180
HK fr. (12) / YF 277
Probably belongs to the *MM*.

Old Age

This writing, carved in large letters because it was displayed above eye level, occupied the top three courses of the inscription. Its 18-line columns ran down all three courses, which I call A, B, and C. Group A blocks carry the first 5 lines of the columns, Group B blocks the middle 7-8 lines, and Group C the last 4-6 lines, below which there is a spacious lower margin, much of it occupied by a scored band, which would have been inelegant as a decorative feature, but may have supported a moulding. Anyhow, the prominent scoring is a useful indicator of a stone's identity, even if none of the text above has survived. Before the translation of each fragment, I show which course it belongs to, placing the letter in square brackets after the fragment number.

The treatise's spread across the three courses, combined with the large size of its lettering, means that its surviving text, clearly only a fraction of the complete writing, is even more bitty than usual. Although it has been possible to join up a small number of fragments, not enough of the treatise has been found to enable us to be sure exactly how it was arranged, but comparison with discussions of old age by other writers, especially those of Cicero *Sen.* and Iuncus (preserved in Stobaeus), can be helpful, and, *faute de mieux,* I continue to place what survives in a roughly Ciceronian order, so that after the introductory pieces, D answers the following complaints against old age: (1) that it prevents active participation in affairs; (2) that it involves physical and mental weaknesses; (3) that it lacks pleasures; and (4) that it is near to death. Help from other Epicurean sources, including Epicurus himself, although sometimes available,

is limited because D is the only Epicurean known to have produced a writing on the subject. What *is* apparent is that his treatment of the subject faithfully represents the Epicurean viewpoint. Another feature of it is that, as is usual in the inscription and in accordance with usual Epicurean practice, he engages in robust polemics, demolishing opposition views before setting out his own. It should be further noted that there is likely to have been much overlapping in his answers to the four complaints listed above.

Having reached old age, D was well qualified to write about the subject, and one may conjecture that his treatise was one of the most-read sections of the inscription, being devoid of the somewhat abstruse passages found in the *Physics* and *Ethics*.

151

Fr. 137

HK fr. 1 / YF 020

Line 1 and some letter-tops of line 2 survive of the title, which undoubtedly continued on a block or blocks to the right of this one as well as on a block or blocks below.

152

Fr. 138

HK fr. 9 / YF 058

The preserved lines of col. I will have been the opening ones of the treatise, and fr. 138 is the only piece of it whose exact position is certain. In mentioning Hesiod, D may be thinking of *Works and Days* 331, "the evil threshold of old age", or of *Theogony* 225, "accursed old age". Anyhow, "culture" is ironical. Incidentally, the learned poet's old age, whether real or not, became proverbial: see Powell (1988) 152.

153

Fr. 139

NF 93 / YF 122

According to Herodotus 1.31, Solon related to Croesus how the brothers Cleobis and Biton of Argos drew their priestess mother's

chariot to the temple of Hera, where their reward was to die inside it, revealing that "it was better for a person to die than to live". Solon was illustrating his opinion that people's blessedness can only be judged when they are dead. Exactly what point D made here is not clear. But, when he goes on to tell his readers not to behave as the many do, he may be referring, as Epic. *Men.* 125 does, to the variable attitude of the many towards death, considering it sometimes a curse, sometimes a blessing.

154

Fr. 140

NF 101 / YF 114

The very fragmentary text does not permit sure interpretation, but it is possible that D, like Epic *Men.* 126, is criticising the view, expressed by Theognis among others, that "not to be born is best".

155

Fr. 141

HK fr. 15 / YF 057

This is one of several fragments which cite Homer and other authors who mention the elderly. Here D quotes Homer *Od.* 24.255, where Odysseus, in disguise on his return to Ithaca, is speaking to his father, Laertes. Whatever it was that D went on to say is likely to have been critical.

156

NF 203

YF 253

The relevant passage of Homer here is *Il.* 18.107-110. JH's and my differing restorations and interpretations were much improved by suggestions of David Armstrong and Michael Gronewald. See Hammerstaedt (2015).

157

Fr. 142

HK fr. 5 / YF 059 + HK fr. 6 / YF 060
D's Homeric quotations are of *Il.* 2.53 and 3.150, making the point that the elderly, although no longer able to fight, are good speakers. The "tragic poet" is most likely to be Sophocles, partly because mention of Aeschylus or Euripides would involve hiatus.

158
Fr. 143
HK fr. 17 / YF 003
The points that weapons were not sufficient to deal with the wrath of Achilles, and that words are preferable to violence, follow on naturally after fr. 142. The importance of the advice Nestor gave Agamemnon about Achilles (*Il.* 1.254 ff, 9.96 ff) is stressed by Iuncus (Stob. p. 1064 ff W-H). The lyric poet, whose name (the space indicates) must have been quite short, is likely to have been Alcman, as M.L. West suggests, citing fr. 41 Page (Sm 575).

159
Fr. 144
HK fr. (20) / YF 276
This fragment, missing since its discovery by Cousin in 1889, was rediscovered in 2012. It is likely that D pointed out that coughing complaints are not experienced only by the elderly. He may have mentioned too that, if they are chronic, they still allow a preponderance of pleasure over pain.

160
Fr. 145 + NF 133
HK fr. 4 / YF 135 + YF 19
The assembly of the existing text happened in three stages. First, in 1895 Heberdey and Kalinka recorded a block bearing seven lines in two columns (HK fr. 4 / YF 135). Secondly, in 1997 I recorded NF 133 (YF 192) and realised that its argument is a continuation of that of HK fr. 4. Thirdly, in 2011, when NF 133, previously partly hidden under a stylobate, was completely exposed in preparation for its re-

moval to the storehouse, JH and I were able to see that it actually joins up with HK fr. 4.

After dealing with deficient sight, D moved on to deficient hearing, no doubt contending that the old are not the only ones affected.

The identity of the light which is not always clearly visible to the young as well as to the old is obscure. Just possibly there is a link with fr. 167, where there may have been mention of an all-night festival.

161

NF 177 + fr. 146

YF 241 + HK fr. 7 / YF 061 + HK f. 19

This text too has quite a complicated history. Two of its pieces, HK fr. 7 / YF 061 and HK fr. 19, were discovered in 1889 and rediscovered in 1895, but were first correctly brought together by Casanova (1984). Then in 2009 the text was extended by the discovery of NF 177. At least it is JH's and my belief (HS 101) that NF 177 is to be joined to fr. 146. If we are mistaken, the two pieces must have been very close together.

JH and I are not completely agreed about the restoration of the opening lines. In particular I do not accept his introduction of camels (HS 102-104).

For ancient writers' favourable opinions of elephants, including their intelligence, gentleness, and longevity, see Sm 578.

When D says that it does not matter if the old move slowly, because they are not going to run in the Olympic Games, he makes a serious point with memorable force and humour. (In I 11 I now conjecture ο[ὐ μήν] for ο[ὐ γάρ]).

After slowness, D starts to deal with attacks of madness. His first point was probably that only a minority of elderly people develop dementia. His second point is that madness is not caused by old age, and (one may conjecture) that it can strike persons of any age.

162

Fr. 147

HK fr. 10 / YF 169 + HK fr. 18 / YF 010
The two pieces were first brought together by Casanova. He assigned the fragment to the refutation of the allegation that old age does not permit active participation in affairs, but I believe D is answering the charge that old age brings all sorts of physical weaknesses, including the problems discussed in fr. 144-146.

163
Fr. 148
HK fr. 25 / YF 123
D is apparently defending old age against the charge that it brings pains.

164
Fr. 149
HK fr. 8 / YF 054 + NF 121 / YF 175
D's contention that the loss of sensual desires and pleasures is no disadvantage of old age, but, by implication, an advantage, matches Cic. *Sen*. 39-42, as does his belief, evident from following fragments, that there are still pleasures which the elderly can enjoy.

165
Fr. 150
NF 28 / YF 079
The mention of "taste" suggests that D may be discussing pleasures retained in old age.

166
NF 211 + fr. 151
YF 270 + NF 97 / YF 156
Although JH and I are not entirely agreed about the restoration and interpretation of the text, part of which was found in 1975, part in 2012, the main point, that the elderly can enjoy their meals even if there are gaps between their teeth, is not in doubt. They can still get pleasure from liquid foods.

167

NF 212

YF 275

With the text being so brief, and there being a change of subject in line 4, it has not been possible to decide where it belongs. My best guess is that D made the point that the pleasure derived from philosophy is wholesome, lasting, and available to everyone, young or old, and went on to contrast pleasure from sex, which is fleeting and unsatisfactory. He may also have said that the old are much less likely than the young to want sex and therefore are spared the pain it can bring.

168

Fr. 152

NF 25 / YF 078 + NF 26 / YF 067 + NF 15 / YF 068

Here and in the following passages (fr. 153-155) D turns his attention to the search for happiness in wealth. The search is always vain because the desire for wealth, like that for power, is unnatural and unnecessary and can never be satisfied, in contrast to the natural and necessary desires for essential food, drink, and shelter. In the preserved text there is no specific mention of old age, but what applies to all human beings naturally includes the elderly, who may well have saved money and acquired property in the hope of gaining security. Moreover, the mention of Croesus' wealth (fr. 153) is a reminder that Solon refused to assess his blessed happiness without knowing how he ended his life, which suggests a possible link to the subject of old age.

169

Fr. 153

NF 27 / YF 066

As in fr. 111, D distinguishes just two sorts of desires, natural and unnecessary. Sometimes the Epicureans identified three: natural and necessary; natural but not necessary; and neither natural nor necessary. See e.g. Epic. *Men.* 127.

170
Fr. 154
NF 49 / YF 102
D puts a question, addressed to himself, into the mouth of the reader. We do not need to guess his answer, because he gives it himself in fr. 34.

171
Fr. 155
HK fr. 16 / YF 062
Regarding wealth as poverty, and poverty as wealth, is orthodox Epicureanism. Cf. e.g. *VS* 25; Lucr. 5.1117-1119. It is also part of Solon's lecture to Croesus (Hdt. 1.32).

172
Fr. 156
NF 16 / YF 069
Restoration and interpretation of the surviving text are not easy, but D seems to be discussing people who censure those who choose pleasure, but who then, like the old person reprimanded by Nature in Lucr. 3.955-963, complain that their lives have slipped away from them unenjoyed.

173
Fr. 157
NF 4 / YF 029
For recent discussion and restoration, see Smith (2019). The translation offered in this book is taken from that article. The remains of II, much less scanty than those of I, show that D is there pointing to the inevitability of death and the shortness of human life. In I he may have been saying that, if the elderly are on the receiving end of bad behaviour, they can ignore it, and there is no excuse for them to behave badly themselves.

174

Fr. 158

NF 112 / YF 164

Too little is preserved to allow any certainty, but "uncivilised" makes one wonder if D is considering the charge that the elderly have a disagreeable nature. If so, his reply may have been similar to that given in Cic. *Sen.* 65, that bad behaviour is the fault not of old age, but of character: *haec morum vitia sunt, non senectutis.*

175

NF 136 + Fr. 161

YF 194 + NF 94 / YF 162

NF 136 was found in the theatre, where it had evidently been used in its restoration or extension. It is of particular interest for its parallel with Lucr. 2.20-36, who contrasts the simple requirements of the body with luxuriously ornamented houses, specifically mentioning gold-fretted ceilings (28). As for cabbage, Juvenal (1.134; 5.87) mentions it as eaten by humble clients in contrast with the luxurious diet of the great man. D's recommendation of simple living, eating, and clothing is to be compared with what he says in NF 146 I.

After emphasising the desirability of simple shelter, clothing, and food, D goes on to defend the body against those who consider it unimportant compared with the soul. Without the body, we would have no sensation and would be unable to think or speak. Prominent among Greek philosophers who disparaged the body were Plato and the Stoics, and these are the most obvious targets of D's argument.

176

NF 140

YF 196

I place this brief fragment here because D's likely point that the grave should not be elaborate and costly, but simple and ordinary, chimes in well with the remarks he has made about houses. In this context, it may be worth mentioning that it was frequent practice

in Lycia for the wealthy to ensure that their graves, their homes for eternity, were impressive monuments of stone, the durable material. The tombs sometimes imitated architectural features found in the wooden homes they occupied in life. Incidentally, it is remarkable that some of those features are still preserved in traditional buildings, such as barns, in parts of Lycia, including the territory of Oinoanda.

177-190

Fr. 162-173, 176, NF 163

These fragments are too brief and scrappy to allow much if any plausible speculation about their content and context. Fr. 162 contains likely or possible mention of "sensation", fr. 165 of "pleasure", fr. 166 of "dance", fr. 167 of an "all-night festival", fr. 168, fr. 172 and 175 of "pleasure(s)", fr. 176 of "feelings and sensations". Fr. 168, of which I published a revision in Smith (2003) 137, actually includes three almost complete lines of text, warning against the danger of being unable to rid oneself of fears, but the context is not clear. Fr. 170 names Homer and so should perhaps be placed with fr. 141, NF 203, fr. 142, and fr. 143. Fr. 171 may be part of D's argument (fr. 142, 143) that words are better than weapons (Smith [2003] 138). Fr. 173 contains probable mention of Epicurus and Democritus, but the context is not revealed.

Title Fragment of Uncertain Position

191

NF 206

YF 273

See Notes on fr. 1.

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