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Storia Militare Antica e Bizantina (6)

a cura di
Marco Bettalli, Elena Franchi e Gioacchino Strano

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Direzione, Via Bosco degli Arvali 24, 00148 Roma
Contatti: direzione@nam-sigm.org ; virgilio.ilari@gmail.com

Grafica: Nadir Media Srl - Via Giuseppe Veronese, 22 - 00146 Roma
info@nadirmedia.it

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Bronze statue (2nd/3rd century AD) of the genius of a legion.
Enns (Upper Austria). Museum Lauriacum.
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The *Enseignements* of Theodore Palaiologos

A *Speculum* in the Style of a Byzantine Military Treatise[1]

by Jürg Gassmann

Abstract. The *Enseignements* of Theodore Palaiologos, Marquis of Monferrat, are an example of an original, military-related text from the first half of the fourteenth century. The *Enseignements* have not had a lucky publication history; both originals were lost, they survive only in one French translation. They are currently accessible only in a transcription of 1983, long out of print. The tract has received attention from Italian and Byzantinist historians, but anglophone academic treatments are not evident. Unusually for a military treatise of the time, it does not rely on Vegetius, but integrates the author's personal experience of warfare in Italy and (presumably) the military literary tradition of his native Byzantine Empire. The result is a handbook combining integrated strategic thinking to produce a manual on leadership. The purpose of this brief article is to provide an introduction to this exceptional text and especially its military-related content, and thereby make it and the secondary literature related to it more generally accessible.

Keyword. Medieval warfare; Military history; Medieval Italy; Enseignements; Byzantine military history; Vegetius

The Author

Theodore Palaiologos (1291-1338) was born in the purple to the Byzantine Emperor Andronicus II (1259-1328, emperor since 1282), the second son from his second marriage. Theodore's mother was Yolanda of Monferrat (c.1274-1317), who assumed the name Irene on becoming Empress. Of special interest here is his mother's family; Irene's brother John I the Just, Marquis of Monferrat (1277-1305, marquis since 1292), died suddenly and un-

1 The subtitle is taken from Marco Merlo, « Le armi del marchese. Gli armamenti negli *enseignements* di Teodoro Paleologo tra teoria e pratica della Guerra », *Bollettino storico bibliografico subalpino* 110.2 (2012), pp. 499-568, at pp. 515-16.

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expectedly without issue. John had been the last of the Aleramic line, which had ruled the marquisate since it was established in about 950 by Berengar II to protect the western boundaries of the Kingdom of Italy.

Monferrat gained in prominence in the twelfth century; Conrad I was King of Jerusalem in 1192, his brother Boniface led the Fourth Crusade, which resulted in the Latin capture of Constantinople in 1204. The Aleramic involvement with Byzantine politics remained strong and explains Andronicus' choice of Yolanda of Monferrat for his second marriage. John had appointed his sister and her sons as his heirs,[2] so on his death in 1305, a delegation of Monferrat worthies travelled to Constantinople, seeking their future prince.

Theodore, then fourteen, was tapped to assume the marquisate.[3] His mother had intended a dynastic marriage for Theodore in furtherance of her own schemes in the complicated politics of the Byzantine court, but on his designation as the future marquis, that plan was scrapped in favour of a match with Argentina, the daughter of Opizzino Spinola, then one of the two *capitani del popolo* of Genoa.[4]

The Genoese connection – with its geographical proximity to Monferrat –

2 On the complexity of John's will Riccardo Rao, « La continuità aleramica: il governo del marchesato e i poteri locali durante la successione paleologa (1305-1310) », in Aldo Settia (ed.), *"Quando venit marchio Grecus in terra Montisferrati" L'avvento di Teodoro I Paleologo nel VII Centenario (1306-2006)*, Casale Monferrato, n.pub., 2008, pp. 23-44, on pp. 23-4; Gian Savino Pene Vidari, « Teodoro I e il parlamento del Monferrato », in Aldo Settia (ed.), *"Quando venit marchio Grecus in terra Montisferrati" L'avvento di Teodoro I Paleologo nel VII Centenario (1306-2006)*, Casale Monferrato, n.pub., 2008, pp. 119-29, on pp. 120-21.

3 Not without complications: Angeliki E. Laiou, « A Byzantine Prince Latinized: Theodore Palaeologus, Marquis of Montferrat », *Byzantion* 38 (1968), pp. 386-410, at pp. 394-96; Walter Haberstumpf, « Teodoro I Paleologo e il Monferrato fra Oriente e Occidente », in Aldo Settia (ed.), *"Quando venit marchio Grecus in terra Montisferrati" L'avvento di Teodoro I Paleologo nel VII Centenario (1306-2006)*, Casale Monferrato, n.pub., 2008, pp. 15-22, at pp. 15-17.

4 On the early personal history of Theodore see Lutz Rickelt, « Im Westen Grieche, im Osten Lateiner: Theodoros Palaiologos von Monferrat », in Falko Daim, Dominik Heher, Christian Gastgeber, Claudia Rapp (eds.), *Menschen, Bilder, Sprache, Dinge: Wege der Kommunikation zwischen Byzanz und dem Westen*, Vol. 2, Heidelberg, Propylaeum, 2019, pp. 269-76, at pp. 269-71; Christine Knowles, *Les Enseignements de Théodore Paléologue*, London, Modern Humanities Research Association, 1983, pp. 1-3, 26-39; Nikolaos Kanellopoulos, « The Byzantine Influence on the Military Writings of Theodore I Palaiologos, Marquis of Monferrat », in Georgios Theotokis and Aysel Yildiz (eds.), *A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea*, Leiden / Boston MA, Brill, 2018, pp. 287-98, at pp. 287-88.

would be valuable to Theodore, but it was also of direct relevance to the Empire. Byzantium at the time was wholly dependent on mercenaries and had engaged the Catalan Company. When the Empire was unable to pay them, the Company took Imperial towns and began to carve out a fiefdom for itself. Andronicus had to scramble to find an alternative mercenary force to bring the Catalans under control. Only the Genoese were willing to take on the job, mainly because the Catalans were jeopardising Genoa's lucrative grain trading monopoly.[5]

Once in Monferrat in August 1306, Theodore's first task was to ward off other pretenders to the title.[6] It cannot have been easy for him, being parachuted into an alien environment at a young age and lacking the personal network a locally grown heir would have been able to forge. But he was successful, thanks to nobility and councillors loyal to his uncle and the military and financial support provided by his father-in-law.[7] About half the marquisate pledged allegiance to him and he was able to muster the levies of his loyal fiefs, but he had to reverse encroachments by neighbouring Provence, under Angevin control. What exactly this entailed is unfortunately not elaborated in the sources. He made rapid progress in the months following his arrival, and by early 1307 had recaptured several towns. The re-assertion of control can be considered accomplished by 1310, when Theodore was confirmed in his marquisate by Holy Roman Emperor Henry VII.[8]

Theodore returned to Constantinople twice, once 1317-1319, and a second and last time 1326-1328. The first trip was probably motivated by a further scheme

5 A thumbnail sketch of a convoluted story: Laiou, pp. 397-401; also Haberstumpf, pp. 16-17; Fabio Bargigia, « Gli aspetti militari della "riconquista" del marchesato: Teodoro I di Monferrato nel biennio 1306-1307 », in Aldo Settia (ed.), *"Quando venit marchio Grecus in terra Montisferrati" L'avvento di Teodoro I Paleologo nel VII Centenario (1306-2006)*, Casale Monferrato, n.pub., 2008, pp. 195-209, on p. 197.

6 On the arrangements and developments between John's death and Theodore's arrival in Monferrato Rao. The Ghibelline-Guelf controversy affected but did not dominate alignments; having said that, Haberstumpf complains that while Theodore's Byzantium-related diplomacy has received much academic attention, his diplomacy targeted at the Holy See, Savoy, the HRE, or his other neighbours, remains little examined: *ibid.*, p. 17.

7 Bargigia, pp. 198-99.

8 Bargigia, pp. 195-6; Rao, pp. 35-37; Paolo Grillo, « Il governo del marchesato », in Aldo Settia (ed.), *"Quando venit marchio Grecus in terra Montisferrati" L'avvento di Teodoro I Paleologo nel VII Centenario (1306-2006)*, Casale Monferrato, n.pub., 2008, pp. 103-18, on pp. 104-07; in the process, Theodore had to make some concessions to nobles and to towns that stayed loyal to him: Rao, p. 41.

of his mother's, but the prospect she had in mind for him – the throne of Serbia – on inspection proved unattractive, and his mother's death put an end to the plans anyway. Theodore loitered in Constantinople in the hopes of being able to make himself relevant in Imperial politics, but he failed to gain traction. His internal and external enemies in Monferrat were exploiting his absence, so Theodore returned to his marquisate and again re-established his authority.

The second trip was precipitated by the possibility of contesting the succession to the Byzantine throne; Andronicus II's son from his first marriage and heir-designate, Michael IX, had died in 1320, and Theodore's elder brother had in the meantime died as well. Heir-designate was now Michael's young son Andronicus III, much to the disgust of a large faction at the Byzantine court. Theodore tried to win backing for his own candidature, but again found no support. Hoping to make himself useful in other respects, Theodore penned his *Enseignements* during this sojourn.

Renewed trouble in Monferrat and the pointlessness of his continued stay in Constantinople again moved Theodore to return to Italy. Again he had to fight militarily and diplomatically to secure his marquisate, this time with easier success. Though he kept track of the political developments in Constantinople and in his will reiterated some hereditary though unrealistic dynastic claims, his focus for the rest of his life remained on Italy.

For most of his contemporaries, Theodore was it seems a man not of two worlds, but between worlds; to the conservative Byzantine courtiers, he was irretrievably westernised, from marrying a commoner and a Catholic to following the western fashion and shaving his beard.[9] But for his western contemporaries, he was the *marchio Graecus*, in itself an insult as the Byzantines saw themselves as *'Ρωμαῖοι*, Romans. How he saw himself is hard to tell; a passage in his *Enseignements* affirms his enduring loyalty to Byzantium and its Emperor his father,[10] but since he wrote the text during his stay in Constantinople while he was hoping to be accepted by the court's inimical officials, the sincerity of the statement can be questioned.

9 For the Byzantine view of Theodore Laiou; Haberstumpf, pp. 17-20, 22. Theodore's mother had of course been raised Catholic.

10 Knowles, p. 110.

The History of the Text

Theodore originally wrote his work in Greek, during his second stay in Constantinople 1326-28. According to the postscript, he soon commissioned and personally supervised a translation into Latin. Both of the originals are lost, only a part of the Latin introduction was preserved in a quotation by another medieval author.[11] The sole integral version that survives is a translation into French made by Jean de Vignay in the late fourteenth century, which is why the title is commonly given in French (this applies to the quotations in this article as well). De Vignay has an unfortunate reputation for taking liberties with his material, a factor that needs to be borne in mind throughout.[12]

De Vignay's translation itself has been transmitted to us in only two exemplars, both kept in the Royal Library of Belgium. The texts do not differ much, and it is likely that the younger one is a copy of the older one.[13] A transcription of this manuscript was edited by Christine Knowles and published in 1983; it is currently out of print, and there is no prospect of a re-print.

The Royal Library holds a further, short work by Theodore, also translated by Jean de Vignay, containing personal reflections of the marquis.[14]

The Enseignements *as a Military Text*

The *Enseignements* are predominantly a military text – the typical *speculum* as a rule includes guidelines to general conduct.[15] These elements are to a limited

11 Knowles, p. 4; we do not even know the original titles of the work.

12 Knowles, pp. 10-12.

13 Knowles, pp. 17-19.

14 Recently published as an *editio princeps* with an Italian translation: Marco Di Branco and Angelo Izzo (eds.), *L'elogio della sconfitta*, Rome, Viella, 2015 (not reviewed for this article).

15 See e.g. the wide-ranging subject-matters of Giles of Rome's *speculum*: Aegidius Romanus, *De regimine principum – Über die Fürstenherrschaft*, Volker Hartmann (ed. and trans.), Heidelberg, heiBOOKS, 2019; Aldo Settia, « L'esperienza e il « senno accidentale » negli « Insegnamenti » di Teodoro di Monferrato », *Bollettino storico bibliografico subalpino* 110.2 (2012), pp. 479-98, on p. 485, 494-5.On the Byzantine *speculum* tradition Günter Prinzing, « Byzantine Mirrors for Princes: An Overview », in Noëlle-Laetitia Perret and Stéphane Péquinot (eds.), *A Critical Companion to the 'Mirrors for Princes' Literature,* Leiden/Boston MA, Brill, 2023, pp. 108-35; Id., « Beobachtungen zu „integrierten" Fürstenspiegeln der Byzantiner », *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik* 38 (1988), pp. 1-31, where he includes the *Enseignements* as an untypical Byzantine *speculum* (p. 5).

extent present in the *Enseignements* as well, but where they are, they nearly always have an express link to the matter's relevance to military affairs.

Though he does not expressly say so, Theodore's strategic aim appears to have been to preserve the independence and core – not necessarily territorial – integrity of the marquisate. Expansion of the domains was in principle desirable, but was confined to opportunistic situations, it was not a strategic goal.[16]

One can classify Theodore's recommendations for achieving this strategic objective into three general categories: Firstly, readiness, i.e. measures to shape the strategic environment. This category encompasses a wide range of measures, both domestic and external. Domestically (or politically), it includes bolstering the ruler's legitimacy, ensuring the loyalty of his feudatories, and fostering a sense of national identity, as it were. External measures might include diplomacy and the judicious employment of spies. Secondly, organisation: military organisation, mobilisation procedures, training, equipment, supplies, etc. Finally, tactics, i.e. the organisation of troops for action and the conduct of campaigns and battles. This article will be structured around these categories, and within a category follow a logical timeline, even though this will entail jumping around in the source.

Theodore's text is not well organised – quite unlike the very methodical structure of *De regimine principum* by Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus, Aegidius Colonna). For example, one of the longest chapters, with 10 pages, is the twelfth, titled "Comment le prince doit oïr sa messe" [how the prince should hear mass].[17] The chapter begins with the remark that the prince must in his conduct follow four principles, the first of which is to faithfully observe mass. The next four and a half pages then deal with advice on a situation where one of the ladies in the prince's entourage is unjustly accused.[18] Theodore then reverts to the remaining four principles, and states that curiosity is the second, and gets side-tracked into recommending that the prince should always take care to maintain a good table for himself and his entourage, with ample but simple food.[19]

16 Knowles, p. 88 – there also the remark that a prince must be prepared to lose territory if necessary, just as one would let go of merchandise by its sell-by date, rather than futilely want to hang on to everything.

17 Knowles, pp. 64-74.

18 In fairness, it is very likely that this story was inserted by Vignay – Knowles, p. 123 fn. 150 and p. 65.

19 Theodore picks up the subject of food again in a later chapter, where he recommends a close guard on the supplies of meat, bread, and wine, to forestall treachery – Knowles, p. 87.

He then resumes his four principles disquisition with the third one, one paragraph long, that the prince should be "debonair" in public and in private. As the fourth principle – and by now we are at the seventh page of the chapter – Theodore stresses that the prince should not announce a project unless he can and will follow through vigorously and forcefully. Expanding on this principle, the remaining three pages contain an explanation of two battle stratagems.

Where appropriate, comparisons will be made to roughly contemporary military texts dealing with warfare in Europe which Theodore could have known. Giles' *de regimine principum* was already mentioned; it is *a*, maybe *the* type for the *speculum* genre, highly popular and recopied throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. Another is the anonymous Italian tract *Pulcher tractatus de materia belli*. Like the military passages in the *De regimine principum*, but unlike the *Enseignements*, it is based on Vegetius; on the other hand, it is the work of a practitioner, like the *Enseignements* – and unlike Giles' contribution.[20] A further one is the Templar Rule, one of the few cavalry-centred texts from the Central Middle Ages.[21]

Another source to be considered for comparison and for possible influences on Theodore are the *Siete Partidas*, a law code commissioned by the Castilian king Alfonso X (*el Sabio*) and completed in around 1265.[22] Theodore's mother Yolanda was a daughter Beatrice of Castile, in turn a daughter of King Alfonso X and married to Marquis William VII the Great (1240-1292, marquis from 1253). Yolanda evidently inculcated much feudal law and tradition in her son.[23] Theodore's text reveals several parallels with the *Siete Partidas*; he could have had a copy, but that is not the only possible avenue of transmission. A Castilian courtier might have joined Theodore's entourage, or the content was part of the family lore.

The question of Byzantine influences on Theodore have preoccupied scholars.

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20 Settia, « Esperienza », pp. 495-96; *Der* pulcher tractatus de materia belli*: Ein Beitrag zur Kriegs- und Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*, Alfred Pichler (ed.), Graz-Vienna-Leipzig, Leuschner und Lubensky, 1927; Jürg Gassmann, « The *Pulcher tractatus de materia belli*: A Military Practitioner's Manual from c. 1300 », *Nuova Antologia Militare* 5.17 (2024), pp. 105-138.

21 Settia, « Esperienza », pp. 497-98.

22 Settia, « Esperienza », pp. 496-97; Jürg Gassmann, «The *Siete Partidas*: A Repository of Medieval Military and Tactical Instruction», *Acta Periodica Duellatorum* 9.1 (2021), pp. 1-27, at pp. 2-3.

23 Haberstumpf, pp. 19-20; Rao, p. 23.

Based on his personal background and given the wealth of Byzantine military literature, it would be surprising if Theodore had not been familiar with e.g. Leo's *Tactica*, the *Strategikon* of Maurice or Kekaumenos, or the anonymous *De velitatione bellica*. He would at the same time have had access to the Byzantine *specula*.[24] Also, the first version of his treatise was written in Greek. But apart from the Bible, Theodore does not explicitly cite any works, Byzantine or Western, Greek or Latin. Some of his precepts echo passages found in Byzantine literature, but researchers are divided whether the knowledge is specifically Byzantine or represents a military commonplace – or may even be derived from the High Antiquity Roman canon, e.g. Vegetius or Frontinus.[25]

Theodore's Fighting Experience

Pretty much from the moment he left Constantinople for Monferrat in July 1306 in the company of his future father-in-law, Theodore was personally involved in warfare and fighting.[26] Arrived in his marquisate, he first had to win back fiefs that had taken advantage of the turmoil to reject allegiance to the marquisate. He was frequently at war with Charles II of Anjou, King of Naples and Count of Provence, and his allegiance to Holy Roman Emperor Henry VII involved him in Holy Roman Empire campaigns and campaigns in alliance with the Milanese Visconti in northern Italy. In the process, he experienced sieges and field battles, as well as victory and (it seems mostly) defeat.[27]

The judgement on his military capabilities too was mixed; there was no dearth of critics who thought him weak and ineffectual. Given his interloper status, the criticism may be more politically motivated than based in fact. Contemporaries who fought with him, such as Werner von Homberg, the *vicarius* in Lombardy of

24 Regarding the Byzantine *specula* Prinzing, « Byzantine Mirrors », and Id., « Beobachtungen »; the *Enseignements* expressly intend to provide recommendations to the Byzantine Emperors (Knowles, pp. 4-5), and the title "enseignements" (if it reflects the original title) evokes παραίνεσις, occurring in some Byzantine titles.

25 Settia, « Esperienza »; Merlo, pp. 515-16; Kanellopoulos, pp. 291-4; Knowles, pp. 7-8.

26 Kanellopoulos, pp. 288-9.

27 Bargigia, pp. 206-08; Aldo Settia, De re militari. *Pratica e teoria nella guerra medievale*, Rome, Viella, 2008, pp. 104-07. For Visconti military activities 1329-1339 see Paolo Grillo, « Azzone Visconti e la guerra. 1329-1339 », in Paolo Grillo (ed.), *Connestabili. Eserciti e guerra nell'Italia del primo Trecento*, Soveria Manelli, Rubbettino, 2018, pp. 119-34; Milan hired a high number of German mounted mercenaries.

Fig. 1 – Count Werner of Homberg in Italy, early fourteenth century
Cod. Pal. Germ. 848 (Codex Manesse), fol. 043^{v} (cropped)
Courtesy UB Heidelberg, CC-BY-SA 4.0

Holy Roman Emperor Henry VII, praised his courage and fighting spirit.[28] Either way, there can be no doubt that he was personally involved in both the military and diplomatic issues that feature in his work, that he speaks from hard-won personal experience.

Theodore Comparing the Monferrine and Byzantine Military Constitutions

In the final pages of his *Enseignements*, Theodore compares the Byzantine military constitution unfavourably with the feudal constitution of his own marquisate.[29] The Byzantine military constitution at the time relied on a largely demilitarised population generating tax income, and the central government using the revenue to hire mercenaries. The effect was that an attacker would find a completely unresistant population and could murder, pillage and plunder unhindered until the army arrived. It also offered opportunities for corruption in the process of collecting and spending the taxes, by profiteering parasites who had no interest in the wellbeing of the Empire. As Byzantium's experience with the Catalan Company showed, Byzantium's reliance on mercenaries was so great that the Empire had no means to confront the Company when it went rogue and turned to self-help for its delayed pay.[30] Theodore particularly marked out one individual who, so Theodore, gained the trust of his father and proceeded to abuse it to the benefit of himself and his family, and to the detriment of the Empire's defence.[31]

His description of the marquisate's feudal military constitution can therefore be seen as a study in contrast, comparing it favourably to the Byzantine situation[32]

28 Aldo Settia, « Premessa. Teodoro I: un "Greco" in Monferrato » in Aldo Settia (ed.), *"Quando venit marchio Grecus in terra Montisferrati" L'avvento di Teodoro I Paleologo nel VII Centenario (1306-2006)*, Casale Monferrato, n.pub., 2008, pp. 11-15, at p. 13.

29 The term "feudal" has become controversial in modern, especially anglophone historiography, but there is no better term available. As used here, the term implies that a vassal (whether a collective like a town or borough, or an individual) is bound to a lord by virtue of a contractual arrangement with reciprocal rights and obligations, and that a vassal has a legally protected autonomy of organisation and agency.

30 Merlo, pp. 509-10.

31 It is not clear whether Theodore's vitriol against Theodore Metochites was justified – Knowles, p. 108 and fn. 261 p. 127.

32 Speculatively also Bargigia, p. 209. This would also explain why Theodore does not engage with the Byzantine military literature, though he must have been familiar with it; on the inability to clearly identify Byzantine sources in the *Enseignements*; Settia, « Esperienza », p. 485. In narrating his personal history, Theodore emphasises his maternal lineage and her

– which incidentally leads one to query whether Theodore might have deliberately applied a rosy gloss to his descriptions. Unlike the Empire, which was a state with an army, Monferrat was a society organised for war. The entire population was involved in defence and bore responsibility for arming themselves and being ready to fight. The prince's job was not primarily to motivate his feudatories to fight, that they were largely prepared to do anyway; his challenge was to motivate them to fight *for him*.

Theodore may have learnt about feudal organisation before he assumed the marquisate; his mother was manoeuvring to secure for her sons essentially fiefdoms within the Byzantine Empire, a feature that was alien to the Byzantine Empire's constitution and brought her into conflict with courtiers.[33] It was on these schemes, ineffective and of dubious legality though they were, that Theodore in his will asserted his "hereditary claims" to Byzantine lands.[34]

Fortunately, Theodore's *Enseignements* are not the only text available to us to describe the military constitution of the marquisate; records of the parliaments of Monferrat, though incomplete, elucidate the picture.[35]

The term "parliament" here requires some cautionary and explanatory remarks, especially that the references are to "a parliament" in the indefinite and "parliaments" in the plural. At this point in time, the assemblies described by that term were *ad hoc* affairs, convoked by the marquis or those acting in his name for a specific purpose. Though they typically united representatives of the nobility, the towns and boroughs, and the crown, their membership was not fixed, nor was their scope of authority, nor any frequency of their meeting. Nevertheless, as will be shown, they played a key role in the Monferrine commonwealth.[36] Already

descent from the King of Spain: Knowles, pp. 26-8; Settia, « Esperienza », p. 486.

33 Haberstumpf, pp. 19-20.

34 Theodore's successor John II based claims on the Byzantine throne on these constructs: Laiou, pp. 402-03.

35 Referenced in Aldo Settia (ed.), *"Quando venit marchio Grecus in terra Montisferrati" L'avvento di Teodoro I Paleologo nel VII Centenario (1306-2006)*, Casale Monferrato, n.pub., 2008.

36 Pene Vidari; Grillo, « Governo », p. 116; Settia, *De re militari*, p. 115. Only temporal estates attended the parliaments, no spiritual ones: Pene Vidari, p. 126; Theodore (Knowles, p. 51) defines a *parlement* as a council with only secular participants, one with church functionaries would be a *concille*. On different types of parliaments in the Holy Roman Empire generally Duncan Hardy, « Vom Schiedstag zum Reichstag », in Angela Huang and Christina Link (eds.), *Kollektive Willensbildung in der Vormoderne*, Wismar,

Theodore being called to the throne testifies to the institution; though John's will was unambiguous in designating his sister Yolanda (i.e. Empress Irene) as heir, a parliament was involved in forming and instructing the delegation to Constantinople.[37] Theodore himself refers to parliaments, and defines them as his council of barons.[38]

Settia writes that according to the *Enseignements*, the prince was obliged to secure the authorisation of parliament to declare war.[39] To the modern constitutional scholar, this evokes the principle enshrined in modern democratic constitutions that the power to declare war is a prerogative of the legislature, not the executive. I do not believe that is either the intent or the import of Theodore's remark. Rather, I believe Theodore is seeking to buttress the prince's decision on a practical, an ethical, and a legal level. At the practical level, a decision calmly debated over time by a number of individuals who are both expert in the subject and stakeholders in the commonwealth is more likely to end in success than a decision made on the whim of the monarch. At an ethical level, God favours humility; He disapproves of decisions made in the heat of pride or passion and with hidden motivations, so a decision debated openly dispels these concerns. And on a legal level, a vassal's obligation to follow his lord to war was always premised on the war being just; involving the leading vassals in the decision binds them into the venture.[40] We see Theodore implicitly or explicitly apply this triad in many of his recommendations.

The Prince, His Nobility, His People, and God

Theodore stressed the need for the prince to conduct himself worthy of the loyalty of his noble vassals, of the respect of his people, and of the grace of God.

Callidus, 2024, pp. 3-37.

37 Pene Vidari, pp. 120-21; Rao, pp. 28-29; Grillo, « Governo », p. 106.

38 Knowles, pp. 50-53, reference to *parlement* on p. 51; references to councils also e.g. on pp. 89, 99.

39 "[Gli] *Insegnamenti* … insistentemente ritornano sul dovere del principe di agire dopo aver ottenuto l'autorizzazione del proprio 'parlamento'." Settia, *De re militari*, pp, 95-96, pointing to the witnesses referenced in the previous footnote.

40 Theodore generally does not confront feudal law limitations on the prince's decision-making – like his contemporary rulers, he was probably actively engaged in subverting them in favour of more absolutist rule. However, they occasionally shine through.

To that end, he set out guidelines for the prince's personal conduct in the initial chapters of the *Enseignements*, which will not be discussed here in any detail.[41] These early chapters are closest to the subject-matter of the *speculum* literature; Giles of Rome's *de regimine principum* was mentioned, and the first half of Book II of the *Siete Partidas* includes provisions to this effect as well.[42]

The *Enseignements* harp on the importance of maintaining good personal relations with the nobility, the marquis' direct vassals. They have the greatest personal interest in preserving the independence of the marquisate (and so ensuring the continuing preservation of their own fiefs).[43]

His precepts incidentally highlight one of the limitations, so far as the lord is concerned, of a feudal military constitution. The enfeoffment is after all a contract; the vassal has obligations toward the lord, but the lord also has obligations toward the vassal. One of the vassal's key concerns is to be assured of the lord fulfilling his obligations toward the vassal, first and foremost to confirm the vassal in the possession and quiet enjoyment of his fief. For that reason, Theodore strongly advises to keep the frontier fortresses well stocked and supplied, so that the vassal to whom the castle is enfeoffed does not have any excuse for surrendering his castle to a foreign prince threatening a siege (and transfer his allegiance to the foreign prince). The vassal should not be able to argue that his lord had failed in his obligation to put the vassal into a position to withstand a siege, at least for long enough for Theodore to assemble a relief force.[44]

41 Knowles, pp. 42-74, though the text here contains references of military import.

42 E.g., Theodore urges the prince to practice seven virtues, i.e. compassion, faith, charity, fortitude (or determination), wisdom of God (by which all matters are judged pursuant to law and science), legality (*droiture*), and chastity; as an afterthought, he adds on truth (Knowles, pp. 59-64). The *Siete Partidas* in 2:2-2:5 cover injunctions on royal conduct, but both content and structure are different (*Las Siete Partidas*, Gregorio López (ed.), Salamanca, Domingo de Portonaris y Ursino, 1576, pp. 8^{r}-16^{v}; *Siete Partidas: Volume Two: Medieval Government: The World of Kings and Warriors*, Robert I. Burns (ed.) and Samuel Parsons Scott (trans.), Philadelphia PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, pp. 277-97). Giles of Rome dedicates the second part of Book I to a discussion of royal virtues, but again very different in content and structure (Aegidius Romanus, pp. 83-288).

43 Knowles, p. 87.

44 Knowles, pp. 87-88; a castellan had enormous power and nuisance value, obliging a prince to negotiate a narrow path between trust and verification: Manuel Rojas, « Some Problems in the Study of the Conduct of Warfare in the Eleventh Century », in Susan B. Edgington and Luis García-Guijarro (eds.), *Jerusalem the Golden: The Origins and Impact of the First Crusade*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2014, pp. 51–74, at p. 69. The *Siete Partidas* devote Tit-

Theodore was no doubt very pious. He refers again and again to Christian and Biblical injunctions, and after a passage exhorting his reader to act boldly or to use a clever ruse or stratagem, he hastens to add that success is ultimately the work of God. His piety is also practical – his references to Scripture are often in a context where Theodore emphasises that the Biblical advice has relevant and tactically appropriate application in the specific situation.

In a curious passage toward the end of his text (justifying his aversion to fighting by night), Theodore contends that Aristotle had provided his pupil, the eventual Alexander the Great of Macedon, with a scrap of parchment on which was written (in Latin) "*ordo*." This simple word encapsulated all the wisdom of rulership. The word itself obviously has meaning, but it is also an acronym for the foundations of wise rule. Of these there are four, as there are four humours, four seasons, and the four corners of a building. The initial "O" stood for "honourably", the "R" for "reasonably", and the "D" for "devoutly". The final "O" then represented the invocation of the Father of Light, the omnipotent Father, on whose grace all depends.[45]

While God and Jesus are invoked repeatedly, there is no reference to the Church. Theodore of course was a Ghibelline and fought in the Holy Roman Emperor's campaigns. Still, one might have expected at least a reference to the marquis' relationship to bishops and abbots in the area.[46]

Advice focused on these aspects of the prince's conduct is designed to shape the domestic strategic environment in his favour – his subjects and feudatories are rewarded in their loyalty, their personal sacrifices for the benefit of the marquisate appreciated. There is also an effort to cast the marquisate as a commonwealth, and tone down the notion that it is the personal property of the prince

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le 2:18 with 32 Laws to castles and castellans (*Siete Partidas*, pp. 54^{r}-64^{v}, trans. Scott, pp. 379-401). In a similar vein, the town of Lu – traditionally Monferrine, but in June 1307 still held by Charles II of Anjou – agreed with Theodore that if his besieging forces could not be dislodged by Charles within fifteen days, then the town would surrender to Theodore: Bargigia, p. 202.

45 Knowles, p. 97 – though the story, which is otherwise not associated with Alexander, was probably interpolated by Jean de Vignay, *ibid*., fn. 229 / p. 126.

46 Settia, *De re militari*, p. 122 points out that Theodore had a contretemps about non-compliance with feudatories who also had feudal obligations to the Bishop of Vercelli; the bishop was of course Guelph, though the reason for their refusal could also have been that the feudatories' forces were tired out from repeated call-ups.

– though Theodore can be somewhat cynical about the notion, as when he says that the prince must be able to write off territorial losses with the equanimity of a merchant writing off goods past their sell-by date.[47]

Mercenaries v. Own Troops

Theodore does not favour mercenaries – they are expensive and unreliable. If you do hire mercenaries, he says, make sure they are from different places and speak different languages.[48] It seems Theodore himself employed mercenaries only once, during the siege of Pontestura shortly after assuming the marquisate in late 1306, though in this case, the mercenaries were provided by Genoa, through the connections with Theodore's father-in-law.[49]

But Theodore shows an appreciation for mercenaries' strengths and utility. As professionals, mercenaries typically equip themselves with the lightest arms and armour, which makes them highly mobile. They are the ideal units to deploy along the borders as flying columns and rapid reaction force, to act as tripwires as far ahead as possible to give early warning of an approaching enemy, and to prevent enemy raids aimed at kidnapping labourers in the fields. Once an enemy has attacked and is returning to his base laden with spoils, these fast units are well placed to chase down the enemy's columns and relieve them of their ill-gotten gains.

He is also not above exploiting mercenaries' lack of "flag". One stratagem he elaborates on is to use a force of mercenaries without banners or insignia to attack an enemy. If the *coup de main* is successful, it can be exploited and consolidated with own troops. The objective is to use plausible deniability regarding the guiding hand behind the attack while the outcome is still undecided – using the mercenaries as privateers, so to say.[50]

47 Knowles, p. 88; see here fn. 16.

48 Knowles, pp. 54-55; Settia, « Esperienza », pp. 487-8; Id., *De re militari*, pp. 106-07, 113-14; the advice on different languages is likely again based on Byzantium's experience with the Catalan Company.

49 Bargigia, p. 198-200; Merlo, p. 517; Haberstumpf, p. 16.

50 Knowles, pp. 84-85.

Three Types of Enemies and of Disputes

Theodore places a high value on diplomacy – pursuing a strategy of economy of enemies is essential to being able to secure the marquisate, and it is in conformity with the verse in the Sermon on the Mount "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called the sons of God".[51] If you have three neighbours, he advises, make peace with one, secure a truce with the other, and pursue war with the third.[52]

How you proceed with whom depends on the type of the dispute:

> If the dispute is with your traditional enemy, then on no account compromise with them or trust them – they will invariably take advantage of you.[53]
>
> If it is one that has arisen from a specific issue with a party who is otherwise a longstanding friend, then focus on resolving the matter diplomatically, using the good offices of trusted mediators. If the other party proves intransigent, ensure that you are seen to be the reasonable one, show a willingness to compromise. Allowing such a situation to escalate into war is folly, an unnecessary risk. It is also a sin and contrary to Scripture since it cannot justify the destruction, misery and loss of life caused by a war.[54]
>
> If the dispute is with a neighbour who covets part of your territory, especially if the neighbour is stronger than you, true peace is unrealistic. Conclude a truce and use the time to prepare for war. Visit your border regions, reassure your nobles there, make your presence felt, and ensure the fortresses are prepared and well stocked. Send good, courageous and reliable commanders to the region. Deal swiftly and harshly with traitors.[55]
>
> In general, make an effort during times of peace to ready yourself. Ordered and deliberate preparation is more productive and less stressful. Procure good horses and different kinds of tack, for any eventuality, and also many different types of good and light weapons. Confer with your men, so they understand your intentions, and cultivate friends and allies.[56]

51 Knowles, p. 81; Matthew 5:9.

52 This statement is made out of context, in its own one-paragraph chapter: Knowles, p. 98. On the possible historical precedent Settia, *De re militari*, p. 104-05.

53 Knowles, p. 81.

54 Knowles, pp. 81-82; i.e. it risks not being a just war.

55 Knowles, pp. 82-84; when in 1310 Vignale, beholden to Theodore, refused to accept him, Theodore unhesitatingly punished the town – Bargigia, p. 204.

56 Knowles, pp. 79-84; Bargigia, p. 203; Settia, Aldo, *Rapine, assedi, battaglie: La guerra*

> In your border regions, ensure intensive defensive preparations. Mercenaries are typically professional and highly mobile units, and useful for interdicting enemy raids and acting as forward observation. Spies too can provide information and forewarning. If an enemy does attack, and captures spoils, by all means try to pursue him and relieve him of his booty. But be circumspect; if your enemy is much stronger than you, any pursuit motivated by revenge or a false sense of honour will only fail and will compound your losses. It is better to absorb the loss, and carefully plan a retaliatory action.[57]

Theodore emphasises the importance of keeping well informed about the enemy's preparations and intentions; a key tool in this context is the use of spies. Having good information on the enemy will allow preparation, and to ambush an enemy attack. Of necessity, spies may not be the most ethical people, so he advises retaining several spies, but to ensure that they do not know of each other. If they did, they are liable to collude and deliver sexed-up but dodgy dossiers. However, he goes on to say, be aware that just as you will seek to keep informed about your enemy, so the enemy will do in respect of your actions, so do not expect that your own attack preparations would remain hidden. The clever surreptitious raid you may be planning could well end up a fiasco.[58]

Three Types of War

Theodore divides the types of war into three: Firstly, war by rapine, destruction, and the kidnapping of labourers in the fields; it is directed at weakening the enemy economically. Secondly war by treachery, bribery, and deceit, seeking to take without fighting.[59] And finally, all-out war entailing a supreme effort by infantry and cavalry, directed at the total destruction of the enemy and his environment. It means field battles with heavy casualties, and costly sieges with all manner of engines.[60]

Theodore elaborates on this third type of war again in a later chapter. While he acknowledges the dictum that war favours the bold attacker, he cautions that

nel Medioevo, Rome, Laterza, 2003, p. 221.

57 Knowles, pp. 84-86.

58 Knowles, pp. 84-85; Settia, « Esperienza », pp. 479-80.

59 Treachery and guarding against it is again mentioned later, Knowles, pp. 86-87.

60 Knowles, p. 80.

a prince must have just cause on his side to win divine favour.[61] People generally prefer peace and the ability to go about one's business, and do not view haughty troublemakers kindly. Nobles who may now benefit from being on the winning side with such an avaricious and lawless prince will soon realise that their leader's caprice might soon have *them* in his cross-hairs – a sentiment that can be exploited.[62]

Organisation: Arms and the Marquisate's Military Constitution

Unlike the Byzantine Empire, Monferrat did not have a system of Imperial arms factories and arsenals that would equip the troops with a standardised complement of arms and kit. In the feudal military constitution, the equipment was the responsibility of the estate called up; high command, as it were, technically had no direct influence on which arms, defensive or offensive, the individuals brought along, or their quality. In reality, by the later Middle Ages, authorities in all polities worked hard to gain a level of influence over equipment.[63]

Whether or not the cavalry was centred around the nobility is hard to say; the text refers to *hommes d'armes a cheval*.[64] The *Enseignements* enjoin those mounted on destriers to have heavy and sufficient arms.[65] The requirements for those mounted on lighter horses are more specific: They must have cuirass,[66]

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61 And, incidentally, to ensure that vassals are bound by their obligation of *sequela*.

62 Knowles, pp. 88-89.

63 On arms generally Merlo, where he discusses the mentioned arms and compares them to arms listed in records from neighbouring polities, to iconography, and to museum artefacts from the time.

64 Knowles, p. 58; further down in the same paragraph, Theodore refers to "vassals," "honourable men," and "barons," but only regarding how many horses each should have, not what type of horse or what kinds of arms. Cortese found that the feudal categories of mounted service had mostly vanished by the mid-thirteenth century but continued for some time into the fourteenth century in the domains of reigning nobility, though the matter is not well documented or explored: Maria Elena Cortese, « Le frange inferiori della cavalleria nelle campagne toscane: scutiferi e masnadieri tra inquadramento signorile e mobilità sociale (secc. XII-XIII) », *Archivio Storico Italiano* 667.1 (2021), pp. 3-41, esp. pp. 34-38. Under Azzo Visconti in the 1330s, awarding knighthoods for military prowess and valour was still common: Grillo, « Azzo Visconti », pp. 123-24 and *passim*.

65 Knowles, p. 58; Merlo, p. 537.

66 The text here says "*cuiriee*" – Knowles (glossary, p. 130) reads this as "*cuirasse*", which in modern terminology refers to a steel plate upper torso armour. Etymologically it is derived

Fig. 2 – Fresco of riders from Vezzolano Abbey, late twelfth century
Courtesy Wikimedia Commons / Misasar CC-BY-SA 4.0

gambeson, hauberk, gorget, cuisses, poleyns, greaves, helmet and shield. Over his armour, the horseman was to wear a surcoat displaying his heraldic devices.[67]

The offensive arms of the cavalry are sword and lance.[68] In the section on horsemen's arms, Theodore does not mention maces, though his cavalry formation section includes riders relying on the mace.[69] Unlike Byzantine cavalry,

from *cuir [bouilli]*, i.e. boiled leather. Full steel plate armour was not yet common in Theodore's or even Jean de Vignay's days, so Theodore may here be referring to a leather armour; so Merlo, pp. 537-38.

67 Knowles, p. 58; Merlo, p. 542.

68 Knowles, p. 58; Merlo, p. 546-48. Theodore's text (via Jean de Vignay) says *espee ou glaive*, worn at the side; Knowles (fn. 116, p. 121) speculates that *glaive*, commonly meaning a short sword in the style of a Roman *gladius*, may refer to a poignard or dagger.

69 Knowles, p. 93; Merlo, pp. 550-53, finds maces rarely mentioned in contemporary records for the region, though there is good evidence for their existence. One such mention, along with other arms, is in the 1326 city of Gubbio contract for mercenary cavalry, see Alberto Luongo, « Nobilità cittadina e *stipendiarii*: l'organizzazione militare eugubina nella prima metà del XIV secolo », in Paolo Grillo (ed.), *Connestabili. Eserciti e guerra nell'Italia del primo Trecento*, Soveria Manelli, Rubbettino, 2018, pp. 135-58, at p. 145.

where the bow was an important weapon, there is no reference to horse archers.[70] Theodore makes particular point of calling on the cavalry to ensure that the arms and accoutrements are resplendent, to impress the enemy.[71]

Unusually, Theodore elaborates on horses as well. For the lighter cavalry, he says to have two small horses in the manner of the Greeks, or geldings or mares. If the rider wants a heavier horse in the manner of the Latins, he should have a (and here unfortunately there is a lacuna in the text) as well as a rouncey. Vassals and honourable men (*les vassaulz et les honnorables hommes*) should have three horses, i.e. a destrier, a large palfrey, and a good and strong rouncey capable of carrying loads. A baron or lord then should have five horses, with one for a squire.[72]

Theodore repeats in several places the importance of light arms. By this he evidently means arms and armour that are not unnecessarily heavy, but are fit-for-purpose and of good quality. Such arms allow for rapid movement, and they will not tire out the wearer.[73]

The infantry was organised differently than the cavalry. Each town and borough was obliged to provide a certain number of men and was responsible for their kitting out; the *Enseignements* consequently speak to the local lord or governor to ensure that his men have the proper equipment. At the simplest level, those liable for military service, the *hommes de deffense* (males between 15 and 70 years of age), should have a helmet, a gambeson, and a shield. For offensive arms, Theodore calls for a sword, a spear or lance, a self bow, or a similar common arm. Those who could and were adept in it should bring a crossbow, an arm that impressed Theodore.[74]

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70 Merlo, p. 549.

71 Knowles, p. 58; Merlo, p. 550; the *Pulcher tractatus* pp. 55-56 has the same provision; Gassmann, « Pulcher tractatus », p. 126.

72 Knowles, p. 58-59; Settia, *De re militari*, p. 118; Merlo, pp. 564-67 (though Merlo's remarks about the "limited manoeuvrability" of the destrier is not born out by the current state of research). The *Templar Rule* allocates to the top charges four horses as well as squires and lieutenants with their own horse allocations, for lesser officers three and two, and for regular brothers and sergeants a destrier – *Règle du Temple*, Henri de Curzon (ed.), Paris, Renouard, 1886, *passim*. The *Siete Partidas* emphasise that the knight not only needs a good horse, he must also be expert in understanding horses: *Siete Partidas*, 2:21:10 / pp. 72^{r-v}; trans. Scott pp. 421-22.

73 Knowles, pp. 84 and 87; similarly in the *Siete Partidas*, 2:21:10 / p. 72^{v}, trans. Scott p. 422.

74 Knowles, p. 57; Merlo, pp. 529-37, 553-61; Settia, *De re militari*, pp. 97-98, 102-03, 166. Crossbow training is recorded, see e.g. Luongo, pp. 147-48. The mid-to-late thirteenth



Fig. 3 – Mounted Crossbowman Confronting Lancer, 1467
Hans Talhoffer, Cod. icon. 394a, Fol. 136r (Codex Württemberg)
Courtesy Bayerische Staatsbibliothek / Münchner Digitalisierungszentrum and Wiktenauer, CC-PDM 1.0

But if for defence all effectives were required, everybody should turn out with what agricultural implements could serve as weapons. There were some exceptions, notably clerics, but Theodore does not explain in more detail who fell into the category outside the *hommes de deffense* but were included in those subject to a general levy. Theodore recognises that this general levy could not remain in the field for much longer than a day, so if their service should be required for longer,

century bye-laws of the Bolognese *societates armatae* required their members to have a helmet, a shield, and a form of upper body protection, but did not specify offensive arms: Jürg Gassmann, « The Bolognese *Societates Armatae* of the Late 13th Century », *Acta Periodica Duellatorum* 2 (2014), pp. 195-231, at pp. 212-13. The *Siete Partidas* do not mandate specific arms, but encourage a soldier to bring better equipment by granting greater participation in the spoils distribution: *Sieta Partidas*, 2:26:28 / p. 102r, trans. Scott, p. 493 (though Scott's translation is questionable); Gassmann, « Siete Partidas », pp. 13-18. The practice of allocating a greater share of booty to the better equipped is also attested to early thirteen century Monferrat: Settia, *Rapine*, p. 70.

the lord should restrict the levy to half the number.[75] For this general levy, Theodore says that a population of 1,000 *hommes* should for static defence be able to muster and support 100 to 150 good (*nobles*) and well-equipped men for a month; for a mobile force, 50 would be appropriate.[76]

With the parliament Theodore called in 1319, after his return from Constantinople, Theodore sought to leverage the institution by moving the infantry service obligation away from the historically grown one-on-one feudal arrangements, and in the process standardising the terms. The result was a better coordinated, more efficient organisation for raising infantry, and a stronger feeling of shared responsibility for the protection of the commonwealth. The greater publicity of the various towns' and boroughs' obligations also promoted a greater fairness in the spread of the burden, and hence a better acceptance. Enforcement of the obligations buttressed the fairness of the system and manifested public buy-in to the punishment of the recalcitrant.[77]

The passage bears reflection. Certainly, there was no Byzantine tradition of the Emperor obtaining buy-in from anyone. In Western Europe, there was no – or not yet a – well-established parliamentary tradition that Theodore would have seen necessary to defer to. Following his arrival in Monferrat in 1307, Theodore built on the parliament of 1305 that had authorised his being called in order to declare a general levy in preparation for the reconquest of the fiefs that had fallen away. But Theodore himself did not convoke any further parliaments until his return from Constantinople twelve years later.[78] Then, he faced the necessity of raising troops and cash urgently, and to that purpose called two parliaments, in late 1319 and early 1320. They did not have the quite the salutary effect Theodore

75 Knowles, pp. 57-58; Merlo, pp. 562-64. Theodore frames this as a practical consideration, not a limitation imposed by feudal law; generally in feudal law, the service obligation of the general levy was limited to defensive war, and in extent by time or distance.

76 Knowles, p. 59. For calculations of Monferrat's mobilisation potential Settia, *De re militari*, pp. 115-41.

77 Grillo, « Governo », pp. 106-07; Pene Vidari, pp. 127-28; Merlo, pp. 519-20; Settia, *De re militari*, p. 118-19. In this, Theodore was part of a trend observable also in the neighbouring, much larger principalities like Savoy, where more intrusive crown control over the infantry was implemented via parliaments, and over the cavalry via the creation of orders of chivalry and prince-sponsored tournaments – Merlo, p. 517-19. Tournaments as training for the cavalry in *Pulcher tractatus*, p. 42; Gassmann, « Pulcher tractatus », pp. 119-21.

78 Merlo, p. 519.

hoped for, but they did apparently allow him to stabilise the situation.[79]

Maybe what Theodore meant to emphasise to his intended Byzantine audience was that the Byzantine military constitution did not allow for a "Plan B" – once the troops were used up, there was no fall-back. In a society organised for war, as a feudal polity was, it was always possible, albeit progressively difficult, to go back to the well for more.

Theodore does not seem to have instituted assemblies where citizens would have been obliged to show the required arms, but he recommended keeping records of the various arms they owned.[80]

But Theodore went beyond these organisational and tactical concerns; he enjoined his fellow princes to ensure a functioning arms manufacturing base by attracting the relevant craftsmen, which the prince could do by issuing commissions.[81]

Though firearms begin to make their appearance on Italian battlefields around the time Theodore wrote, he makes no mention of them.[82]

Preparing for Campaign and Battle

Faced with an enemy determined to attack, Theodore gives the following advice:

> Make your preparations; assemble your council, formulate a plan, and put it into action forthwith. Call up your men and the nobles beholden to you. Especially the cavalry need to have generous advance notice of their assembly points and the period for which they will be required. Make a point of acknowledging your nobles' appearing at your side, especially those who are under no obligation to support you. Reassure them of their position and the gains they are set to make in your service. All units called up – cavalry and infantry – must assemble with their wagons and supplies at the place of assembly and on the appointed date. Siege engines similarly need to be taken to their assembly points.

79 Pene Vidari.

80 Knowles, p. 57; Merlo, p. 524-25.

81 Knowles, p. 56; Merlo, pp. 525.

82 Giorgio Dondi, « Le armi da fuoco all'epoca di Teodoro I di Monferrato », *Bollettino storico bibliografico subalpino* 110.2 (2012), pp. 569-588; Settia, *De re militari*, pp. 170-72.

You yourself and those assisting you in command (one might say "your staff") should be there days ahead of the date and monitor the arrivals.[83]

Spare no expenses in obtaining information on your enemy's preparations, strength and movements; begrudging expenditure in these respects is a false economy.[84]

Have clear orders for your troops. Continuously countermanding orders and leaving troops in uncertainty about their jobs wastes time and is damaging to your efforts. But do not be so specific that your game plan is revealed to all.[85]

If you are invading your enemy's territory, send out emissaries to declare to the enemy's civilian populace and town councils that you come in friendship and have no desire to harm them. If that is successful and they surrender to you, do not take advantage of them. Confirm them in their possessions and take only what is essential to garrison your newly acquired territory. Make sure that your own troops do not engage in looting or show disrespect to them; punish violators promptly. Otherwise, the population may regret having submitted to you, and rebel or revert to their previous ruler. Also ensure that castles in your newly acquired possessions are under loyal commanders and well stocked.[86]

If none of the enemy's castles or towns surrender to you, do not be discouraged and proceed with your plans. Go for a quick, easy win by attacking a weakly defended point. An early enemy set-back will encourage your troops and discourage the enemy; his feudatories will question whether he can protect them. If on the other hand you attack his strong points, you will get bogged down, which is not conducive to your troops' morale.[87]

As you advance into enemy territory, have your troops march in their units, under their banners. Keep moving. Your order of march should be your household in the van, followed by a portion of your men. You should follow next with your personal cavalry squadron, followed by another cavalry squadron and then the remainder of the infantry. Have two or three good and trusted men who know the country well recon-

83 Knowles, pp. 88-89, 98-99; Bargigia, pp. 200-01; Grillo, « Governo », pp. 106-07.

84 Knowles, pp. 88-89, 99.

85 Knowles, p. 99.

86 Knowles, pp. 99-100.

87 Knowles, p. 100.

noitre ahead and determine the next night's camp location, preferably well supplied with water.[88]

Make quickly for your objective, do not give the enemy time to prepare. As you besiege a city, place your siege engines so that the sun shines in the enemy's eyes, they will not be able to tell where the projectiles come from. Be prepared for sallies, so that you may ambush them and defeat them. During the night, especially the small hours, maintain attentive sentries so that your troops may have good rest. Organise your own troops in two relays, so that always one is active and one is resting, but continuously press your enemy so that he has no rest. Maintain mounted patrols, without banners or insignia, to locate and provide you warning of an approaching relief column.[89]

When besieging a town, encircle it completely, so that the town cannot obtain supplies. Train your siege engines not on the walls, they are liable to be strong enough to resist your projectiles. Instead, target the sentries and the weak points.[90] Also target the buildings inside the town to demoralise the population, and do that during day and night so that they are unable to rest. And if God should grant you victory and you are able to capture the town, spare the population and show it no cruelty. Already the fact of your victory will enhance your prestige.[91]

If your invasion falters, your troops are weakened and at risk of being defeated, do not delay a decision to break off the venture and retreat in good order, preserving all your equipment. Live to fight another day.[92]

88 Knowles, pp. 102-103; so also the *Pulcher Tractatus*, p. 49; Gassmann, « Pulcher tractatus », p. 123.

89 Knowles, pp. 103-104. Bargigia, p. 197: the injunction to have one half rest while the other fights may be a lesson from his experience with the Genoese fighting the Catalans on the trip from Constantinople to Monferrat. Sentries and patrols during the night also in the *Pulcher tractatus*, pp. 49-50; Gassmann, « Pulcher tractatus », pp. 123-24.

90 "Weak points" is my interpretation. The text here does not make sense. Knowles suspects that Jean de Vignay did not understand the terminology and substituted words he was familiar with even though those were tactically wrong: Knowles, p. 105 and fn. 252 / p. 127; also Settia, *Rapine*, p. 132, where he surmises the timber superstructures to the walls are meant.

91 Knowles, pp. 104-106.

92 Knowles, p. 107.

The Enemy Attacks

Theodore discusses various scenarios in which an enemy attacks. The gist of his advice is to be economical with the demands made on your own men:

> Demobilise some of them if they are not immediately needed. On the march, go in easy stages so as not to tire them out. Especially if your enemy is more powerful, focus on harassing him in his camp and generally seek to impede his progress, keep him away from his objective. And while he is in your territory, raid his lands and lay waste to them, so that his troops resent being on a risky campaign in foreign lands instead of defending their homes.[93]
>
> If your enemy manages to besiege one of your towns, you must seek to relieve it; better to die trying than to live with the shame of not having tried. It is best to attack his camp. If your forces allow it, use only your cavalry, since the infantry slows you down and they get in the way of the horses. Ideally advance under the cover of night and attack at dawn, while the enemy are still sleeping. If they are too far away to approach in one night, take a day to move to a position closer to them, then attack the following night.[94]

In a different chapter, Theodore decidedly counsels against actually fighting at night:[95]

> If you do have to move at night, keep your units close together and united with their equipment. Agree a password. Secure the services of guides who know the area well and place them both in the van and in the rear. Fighting at night is disorientating, even in familiar country.[96] If you encounter the enemy and put him to flight, do not pursue him. If you do, you will not be sure whether whom you are pursuing actually is

93 Knowles, pp. 90-91, 98-100; devastation of the countryside was a common feature of warfare at the time. Such actions are not attested for Theodore's re-conquests, which after all related to areas he considered his own, but are in evidence for HRE campaigns he participated in: Bargigia, p. 203.

94 Knowles, pp. 91-92; also discussed, somewhat differently, *ibid.* p. 97.

95 The text – in a passage probably interpolated by Jean de Vignay – here dragoons both Aristotle and divine preferences (God as the Father of Light would object to fighting in the dark) to justify this aversion, see the reference to *ordo*, fn. 44. However, Theodore's warnings are probably based on the simple fact that manoeuvring at night is highly complex and very difficult to pull off.

96 Then as now; Settia, *Rapine*, pp. 245-53; Id., *De re militari*, pp. 100-02, pointing to an unfortunate experience Theodore made.

> the enemy. Your forces will be dispersed and they will not know where they are. Come dawn, they will be spread out in such small units that they cannot properly defend themselves, and they will be at risk of being annihilated by inimical locals.[97]
>
> The only practical situation for a fight at night is when attacking the enemy camp. In this case, form two detachments with your forces. One detachment, on foot, attacks the camp guards, preferably in the middle of night. Its objective is to cause the camp guards to flee back to the camp and cause confusion there; your attacking infantry detachment does not pursue them. At that point, your second detachment will descend into the camp and exploit the confusion. This second detachment should be mainly cavalry, but with a small contingent of archers or crossbowmen, who should focus on killing the horses.[98]
>
> If it comes to a field battle, ensure that your men – including the infantry – are at peace in their souls, by confession, contrition, and the making of amends. In assembling your host do not focus simply on maximum number but on experience and quality.[99]

Unusually by comparison with contemporary authors, Theodore is specific about the arrangement of the cavalry: He recommends that the cavalry be assembled in three squadrons, where the first squadron comprises the best and best equipped riders, armed with lances. The overall commander of the host follows with the second squadron, separated in distance by a crossbow range. Its weapons are swords and maces, and its role is to follow up the initial attack by the first squadron. Offset to the left follows the third squadron, whose job it is to attack the enemy's right flank. Assuming a total complement of 1,000 horse, the first squadron should comprise 300, the second 500, and the third the remaining 200.[100]

Theodore is specific that the cavalry must coordinate with the infantry, which is ideally placed behind the cavalry and on the left flank, to threaten the enemy's right flank with ranged fire from bows and crossbows.[101]

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97 Knowles, pp. 96-97; injunction on passwords also *ibid.*, p. 72.

98 Knowles, pp. 97-98.

99 Knowles, p. 92; Settia, *De re militari*, p. 99.

100 Knowles, pp. 92-93.

101 Knowles, pp. 58-59; Settia, *Rapine*, p. 193; Kanellopoulos, « Byzantine Influence », pp. 290-91. The infantry is usually given short shrift in military histories for the time. For a more balanced assessment see William Caferro, «Toward an Understanding of Florentine Infantry in the Age of the Companies of Adventure», *Nuova Antologia Militare* 4.13 (Feb-



Fig. 4 – Skirmish between Byzantines and Saracens, late eleventh century
Ioannis Skyllitzes, Codex Graecus Matritensis, VITR/26/2, p. 442
Image courtesy of the Biblioteca Nacional de España, CC-BY 4.0

He is not a great fan of lances for the cavalry, they are unwieldy in the press of battle. Still, the front ranks of the advance formation should bear lances, since they present impressively. The rear ranks and following squadrons should not have lances, but shorter weapons like maces.[102]

In a different passage, Theodore offers various considerations about the composition of individual formations – e.g. when it is better to form one battle instead of several. He advises to not mix the squires on their rounceys in with the knights and their destriers since they will merely get in the knights' way, but to have them as a separate formation following the knights, to pick up the fallen and gather any horses and arms. And he says to place the experienced horsemen in the front, the sides, and the rear, and the less experienced ones inside the formation, so that they might be steadied by their more experienced comrades.[103]

The standard must be entrusted to a reliable fighter and well guarded. He advises that every unit commander should carry two standards, one flying, one furled.[104]

Theodore's stratagems and pointers for exploiting the physical environment too are spread throughout the text. For example, he says, if your force is smaller than the enemy's, choose a defile for your defence. However, do not occupy the defile itself, since the enemy can utilise the space before the defile to deploy, and look for ways to circumvent you. Instead, occupy the exit of the defile; then the enemy will not be able to unfold his full strength, and can only advance on a front you can defend.[105]

Battle and the Aftermath

Unlike most instructional military texts, Theodore also deals with the aftermath of combat:

> If by divine grace you triumph in battle, do not act with cruelty or vengeance, which are sinful in the eyes of God. Show humility and act

ruary 2023), pp. 119-138; though mainly based on Florence, the article is useful for a general overview.

102 Knowles, p. 93.

103 Knowles, p. 72.

104 Knowles, pp. 72-73; so also the Templar Rule: *Règle du Temple*, Cap. 165 / pp. 125-26; Settia, *De re militari*, p. 98; also in Maurice's *Strategicon*: Settia, « Esperienza », pp. 490, 497-8.

105 Knowles, pp. 72-73.

> with grace toward your enemies, you might be in their position next time. It is much better to take prisoners and have their money than to fall into sin by killing them, and so incur the hatred and enmity of their families.[106]
>
> See immediately to your mounted fighters. If they have lost horses and equipment, compensate the losses forthwith. And if there is among these a particularly valiant fighter, especially if he was under no obligation to join your cause, then ride up to him, descend from your horse, give him yours, and continue on foot. Generously reward those who have shown courage and proved themselves. By the same token, just as swiftly and publicly punish those who have proven themselves cowards or worse, or have absconded with spoils, especially if they did so before the battle was won; particularly harshly punish any officer to whom this applies.[107]
>
> Establish order on the battlefield, and ensure that all dead, including those of the enemy, are buried with due Christian respect, and not left to be scavenged by wild beasts. Not only is such conduct Christian duty and pleasing to God, but it will also give less grounds for enduring hatred by the vanquished.[108]
>
> If perchance the enemy prince or general is delivered into your hands, place him under close guard, but treat him honourably in accordance with his rank. Immediately assemble your council and seek to establish an advantageous and lasting peace with him. He can then return to his lands quickly and ensure the terms of the peace are kept. Such a result will be pleasing to God and enhance your standing as a wise ruler. If you delay, his own subjects will be distracted and look for guidance. They will be tempted to submit to a different lord, who will not feel bound by any commitments the prince in your captivity might have made; then you will have wasted an opportunity.[109]

Spoils are a matter of great importance, both tactical and as it relates to leadership. Troops should focus on winning the action, and not be side-tracked by the quest for booty, and so become vulnerable to a rallying enemy or their reserves.[110]

106 Knowles, pp. 93-94.

107 Knowles, pp. 94-95.

108 Knowles, p. 95; Settia, *Rapine*, p. 288.

109 Knowles, pp. 95-96.

110 An experience Theodore personally made as part of the HRE forces in the 1313 battle of

Also, disputes about the fairness of the distribution of booty can severely undermine the leader's authority, as the troops in the heat of combat have little opportunity to gather loot, while the reserves, not having been needed in action, can comb the battlefield at leisure. There are more than a few references to spoils-related procedures or disputes in contemporary sources, so this is not a subject unique to the *Enseignements*.[111]

Theodore strongly recommends that the distribution scheme for spoils should be laid down in writing before the battle, to avoid disputes with commanders and to prevent soldiers from breaking discipline in order to pillage and thus imperilling a victory. Any booty collected in a raid, though, should belong exclusively to the raiders, except for high value prisoners captured, which are reserved for the marquis. Particularly trusted men should value the horses before battle to determine the *restor* due if they are killed or injured. All the booty should be collected in one place, and then auctioned off to ensure transparency and fairness. From the proceeds, the losses need to be compensated first, and promptly. If the booty needs to be moved, e.g. out of enemy territory or transferred beyond a choke point, then a detachment of knights on the best horses should form a protective rearguard.[112]

The related passages most strongly evoke the provisions laid down in the *Siete Partidas*, though the language there is far more detailed and extensive.[113] My personal view is he was not familiar with the source itself, he is more likely to have learnt of the provisions by word of mouth, maybe through a Castilian diplomat or mercenary.[114] Some of Theodore's specific instructions parallel the *Siete Partidas*, but he omits other detailed mechanics that feature prominently there, especially the system of *cauallerias* that is used to calculate a fighter's entitlement.

Theodore also strongly enjoins the quick ransoming of any captives held by

Quattordio against Robert of Anjou, Charles II's successor – Bargigia, p. 206; Settia, *De re militari*, pp. 102-04; Id., *Rapine*, p. 59.

111 Settia, *Rapine*, pp. 56-75, reference to the *Enseignements* on p. 67.

112 Knowles, pp. 74-77; Settia, *De re militari*, pp. 99-100. Detailed regulations for *restor* for a detachment of mercenary cavalry hired by the city of Gubbio in 1326 Luongo, pp. 144-45.

113 Byzantine laws also regulated the distribution of spoils, but in a different manner than set out by Theodore: Settia, « Esperienza », pp. 482-3, 489-90, 497-98; *Siete Partidas*, 2:25-2:30 / pp. 93^{r}-113^{r}, trans. Scott, pp. 470-526; Gassmann, « Siete Partidas », pp. 12-21.

114 There were extensive Castilian relations on Theodore's mother's side – Rao, p. 23.

the enemy. The *Siete Partidas* deal with this as well, and also argue that doing so is called for by principles of charity etc. But Theodore's language here is more personal and impassioned than the administrative tone of the *Siete Partidas*. His anguish at the affected individuals' predicament is palpable, and that at its root lies the fact that these trusted officers from his personal entourage risked their lives for Theodore's benefit. To them, it matters not whether the war was won or lost, and the prince owes it to them to do his utmost – pledge castles to raise the cash if necessary – to obtain their release.[115]

Quite apart from the interpersonal aspect, such a policy solidifies the prince's leadership; failing in this respect would diminish the individuals' risk appetite in the next war. For the same reasons, he reminds his governors and lords to offer sincere condolences to the relatives of men killed.[116]

Summary, Conclusions, and Outlook

The subtitle to this article, paraphrasing Marco Merlo, described the *Enseignements* as a *speculum* in the style of a Byzantine military treatise. The *speculum* elements are readily apparent from the summary here presented. The *Enseignements* have in common with the Byzantine military literature that they are not dedicated to a specific individual, as Giles' *speculum* was, but intended as a didactic text for general usage – though Byzantine military treatises are generally better structured than Theodore's stream-of-consciousness. He would have had access to the palace library during his enforced inactivity in Constantinople, but concrete templates or sources for the *Enseignements* are hard to pin down.[117] Another stylistic commonality might be the broad sweep of Theodore's attention, from the strategic environment to detailed tactical advice.[118]

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115 In this specific respect, the *Siete Partidas* oblige the relevant lord only to spend what he can afford (*Siete Partidas* 2:29:3, trans. Scott pp. 517-18), as opposed to Theodore's advice to go a step further. Bear in mind, though, that the *Siete Partidas* are a legal code, and *lex coget, non suadet*. Grillo, « Governo », p. 109, refers to debts incurred by Theodore, including castles pledged, but makes no connection to paying ransoms. Mercenary contracts might specify that the client was obliged to pay up to a certain amount in ransom if a member of the force was captured – contract with Gubbio for mercenary cavalry in 1326 see Luongo, p. 145.

116 Knowles, p. 77.

117 Settia, « Esperienza »; Merlo, pp. 515-16.

118 Less evident in the ninth century *Τακτικά* attributed to Leo VI the Wise or Maurice's sixth

The *Enseignements* are clearly a military text, and they do also include advice on tactics and stratagems. But Theodore's main focus is on shaping the strategic environment, i.e. on readiness and preparation in the widest sense.[119] The marquis should procure intelligence on his neighbours and engage in active diplomacy; he should ensure that ample supplies of arms, armour, horses, and victuals are stocked, and that the marquisate retains an autochthone arms industry; and, crucially, the marquis must conduct himself and his relations with his people and especially his immediate reports, the nobility and governors, in such a way to earn their trust and loyalty. Realistically, Theodore complements this worthy injunction with the warning to ruthlessly punish disloyalty.

On the basic, practical level, Theodore emphasises the simple things that make war so difficult: Keep it simple, make your presence felt, avoid confusion, ensure everyone knows what is going on, that friend can recognise friend.[120] Getting these matters right does not ensure victory, but getting them wrong is a certain route to defeat. They are far more important for the craft of soldiering than gimmicky stratagems or erudite quotations. The contrast to a work like Giles of Rome's could not be greater.

As an individual, Theodore vividly comes across as compassionately sensitive to the sacrifices the prince demands of his subjects – of all levels, not just his nobility or entourage. It is true that his guidance in this respect has a practical side; the prince *can* order all effectives to turn out, but keeping them in the field for even more than a day will tire them out physically, sap their morale, and undermine the economic substrate.[121] The ultimate result will not be strength but

century *Στρατηγικόν*, but a feature of e.g. Kekaumenos' *Στρατηγικόν τοῦ Κεκαυμένου* from around 1075 or the anonymous c.970 Περὶ παραδρομῆς ("On Skirmishing," usually known by its Latin title *De velitatione bellica*). Kekaumenos' work also includes a chapter representing an "integrated" *speculum*: Prinzing, « Byzantine Mirrors », pp. 115-16; Id., « Beobachtungen », pp. 19-22.

119 Comparable in this sense to the works of Gerald of Wales, see John D. Hosler, « Reframing the Conversation on Medieval Military Strategy », *Journal of Medieval Military History* 16 (2018), pp. 189-206, at pp. 195-97. Gerald wrote in the twelfth century so it is possible though unlikely that Theodore could have known about him.

120 Knowles, p. 6.

121 As outlined in the opening paragraphs, the guidance also has an ethical and a legal side: On an ethical level, the prince is limiting the sacrifice he is demanding of his subject's blood and treasure only to the extent absolutely necessary, and since it is for the purposes of defence, the demand is justified. On a legal level, general levy service obligations were ge-

weakness. To use a buzz-phrase, less is more, or to put it differently, skill, quality, and thought trump raw numbers. His advice integrates practical, ethical, and legal considerations into the prince's decision-making. In doing so, he is showing an understanding that to be a successful ruler and commander, he must first of all be a good leader.

As a source the text is intriguing. Unlike so many medieval relations, it is openly a personal text, written by a prince dealing with contemporary problems facing a feudal prince at the time of his writing. Beyond general ethics, it does not purport to transmit eternal tactical verities, couched in confident authoritative statements buttressed by quotations from Scripture and the Ancients – that is, always assuming that Vignay has stayed reasonably close to his source. So the *Enseignements* provide us with a snapshot. But is it a snapshot of what was, or of what ought to have been? And is it a snapshot of stability, or is it a snapshot of a situation in full motion?

Regarding the first question, it seems that Theodore focused on what was, though a politically motivated colouration in the direction of what ought to have been cannot be discounted. Regarding the second question, I personally believe that we are seeing a polity in the midst of transition. Theodore was able to assert his inheritance to the marquisate because his uncle and predecessor John I as well as John's father William VII had cultivated strong bonds of loyalty with their feudatories. They also created a Monferrine identity that provided an ideological bulwark against foreign-allied pretenders. Theodore built on this identity. In doing so, he worked toward the further centralisation and bureaucratisation of his marquisate, a development mirrored in other princely polities, but also one that inevitably encroached on feudal structures.

Which leads us to another aspect of the *Enseignements* that sets them apart: they relate to a mainly rural polity organised under feudal lines more typical of lands north of the Alps. Historiography, both in Italy and anglophone, typically focuses on the organisation of the various city-states, whether under republican or monarchical government.[122] A common theme here is the social and societal

nerally limited to defensive war and by time or distance – Theodore, like other rulers of the time, probably fought these limitations and would not have wanted to acknowledge them, but they no doubt existed in Monferrat.

122 Grillo, « Governo », p. 103.

distinctions and conflicts between on the one side a ruling *popolo grasso* focused on finance, trade, and peace and order, and on the other side a broadly defined nobility with their violence-prone chivalric ethos and an identity rooted in mounted warfare. The source and anchor for this nobility's ethos is generally seen as lying outside (and being inimical to) the republican polities in which this nobility lived and transacted. In this context, surely it would be rewarding to compare the situation of the nobility in the republican city-states with their situation in a monarchical rural polity such as Monferrat.[123]

As variously stated, the *Enseignements* are in structure and content wholly original; even if Theodore drew on Roman, Byzantine, or Western authors, his own text is not obviously a reworking of any single precedent. One must also assume that his personal history informed his choice of emphasis, regardless of his motivations for writing his treatise. It stands to reason that he had an eye for issues which someone growing up in the Western military tradition would have regarded as so matter of course that it was not worth mentioning.

The preceding argument works both ways. It would have been extremely interesting to understand better the relationship between Monferrat's feudal military organisation, its nobility, and its cavalry organisation. Theodore drops tantalising clues but leaves the matter even more opaque than the infantry organisation.[124] Were the issues that interest us today simply irrelevant in Theodore's time and place, or so self-evident that it was not worth spilling ink over? Or was it an issue that Theodore understood but did not want to mention, either because it would have confused his intended Byzantine audience, or because it would have shown weaknesses of the feudal organisation which would have undermined the argument he was trying to make in its favour? Or was it Jean de Vignay who edited the information out?

As set out in the opening sections of this article, the *Enseignements* address the military challenge faced by the prince at three levels: Firstly, measures to shape

123 For a recent anglophone monograph on this subject e.g. Peter Sposato, *Forged in the Shadow of Mars: Chivalry and Violence in Late Medieval Florence*, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 2022. A major theme around nobility and knights in republican polities is their feuding and violence; Byzantium, with a very different social structure, was not an environment in which feuds were common, so if this had been a phenomenon in Monferrat, Theodore would surely have addressed it. This is a question that cannot be explored here.

124 Settia, *De re militari*, p. 115.

the strategic environment; secondly, preparedness; and finally, tactics. Theodore does not conceptually or organisationally separate these three spheres, which would have helped the understanding of his text from a didactical perspective. On the other hand, it is very clear that Theodore understood these three elements as an integrated, organic whole. To be successful, a prince has to be on top of all three, neglecting any one would weaken his position.

It becomes apparent from Theodore's text that the marquis not was not an absolute sovereign – unlike the Byzantine Emperor. The marquis needed the co-operation and support of the feudal estates comprising his domains. Doing so required long-term thinking, a mix of assertive leadership, diplomatic tact (not least *vis-à-vis* his own nobility), guarded trust, and if necessary forceful intervention. Institutions such as parliaments could be exploited to socialise buy-in to the prince's ambitions. Getting the balance right leveraged the combined might of the marquisate's estates; getting it wrong could lead to its dissolution.

Theodore was not crowned with many spectacular victories; if the record is to be believed, most of the battles he participated in were draws or losses. Still, he managed to preserve to a large extent the integrity of his marquisate. Arguably, then, Theodore was successful in achieving his strategic goal. His efforts to consolidate and rationalise the military constitution of the marquisate and to build on his uncle's and grandfather's policies aimed at creating a common identity allowed him to weather the near-incessant warfare he was engaged in. At the same time, though, the costs of this warfare forced him to resort to governance tools of the feudal order which undermined his efforts at the modernisation of his polity. It was left to his son and successor John II to unify both efforts and reap the benefits of internal consolidation – and achieve impressive military success.[125]

125 Settia, *De re militari*, p. 92; Grillo, « Governo », p. 117; Merlo, pp. 517-19; apparently, Theodore's successors saw no need to call parliaments, with the next one not attested until 1379, though subsequently they seem to have become better institutionalised: Pene Vidari, p. 128.

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Fig. 5. Ο Αλέξανδρος τη νύχτα στήνει ενέδρα στους Σκύθες. Ο Αλέξανδρος σκοτώνει και αιχμαλωτίζει Σκύθες (Alexander ambushes the Scythians at night. Alexander kills and captures Scythians.). From *The Alexander Romance*, Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini di Venezia, Museo delle Icone, MS 05, Fol. 28r.

Cristo appare a San Mercurio e a Santa Caterina di Alessandria nell'atto di calpestare Giuliano l'Apostata la cui morte, supplicata da San Basilio difronte ad un'icona di San Mercurio, fu attribuita all'intercessione del santo. Icona del laboratorio di Georgios Klontzas, Creta, ca 1560/70. Yale University Art Gallery, ID 255. Connecticut, U. S. Wikimedia Commons

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