

Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, semantic paradoxes and medieval commentators: the case of John Dinsdale (1280 ca.)¹

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Abstract: In *Metaphysics* Γ 8, 1012b14-18, Aristotle argues against those authors who claim that everything is true and those claiming that everything is false insofar as such claims are self-refuting; this passage can be easily linked with semantic paradoxes, particularly those of the Liar family. The first part of my paper will: (§1) present the logic of self-refuting propositions in Aristotle's text; (§2) provide a list of 13th century commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* dealing with self-refuting and paradoxical propositions; (§3) sketch the different solutions to these problematic propositions proposed by Siger of Brabant, the Anonymous Zimmermanni and John Dinsdale, with special emphasis on their view about the meaning and truth of propositions; (§4) analyse Dinsdale's solution to performative contradictions and the Liar paradox. The second part of my paper, §5, will provide an edition of Dinsdale's questions 29-30 (Durham, Cathedral Library, C. IV.20 A, ff. 56va-60ra).